Battle of the Java Sea, 1942: Doorman's last fight

EBSCO's account calls the Battle of the Java Sea a naval disaster for the Allies and the first full-scale fleet action since Jutland, a battle of more than seven hours fought almost entirely by surface ships. It ended organized naval resistance in the Dutch East Indies.²

The last barrier

By late February 1942 the Allies had lost Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore and Borneo, and the Philippines were falling. What was left of their warships in the region had gathered around Java, the richest island of the Dutch East Indies and the main prize of Japan's southern offensive. Two Japanese invasion forces were closing on the island, one from the east and one from the west.³ › Battle of Makassar Strait, 1942

The Allies had formed an ABDA (American, British, Dutch and Australian) Combined Striking Force. Its eastern group, under the Dutch Rear Admiral Karel Doorman, had the Dutch light cruisers De Ruyter and Java, the American heavy cruiser Houston, the British heavy cruiser Exeter and the Australian light cruiser Perth, with Dutch, American and British destroyers. It was a fleet only in name. EBSCO notes that its captains had held a single hour-long conference before the battle, that only Exeter had radar and that orders had to be translated from Dutch into English.⁴

Contact off Surabaya

On 27 February Doorman searched the coast for the Japanese without success and turned back to Surabaya. At 3:57 p.m., as his ships were entering harbor, a scout plane reported the invasion fleet to the northeast, and Doorman turned back out to sea with a signal that he was going for the enemy and that all ships should follow. According to the Australian War Memorial, the Japanese Eastern Invasion Force had four cruisers and 14 destroyers escorting 41 transports; EBSCO lists the heavy cruisers Nachi and Haguro, the light cruisers Jintsu and Naka and sixteen destroyers, two of which stayed with the transports.⁵

Fire opened at 4:16 p.m. at long range. The Japanese had the advantage of the oxygen-powered Long Lance torpedo, which outranged anything the Allies carried and left almost no wake, while many American torpedoes failed to explode even when they hit.⁶

Exeter is hit

The turning point came at 5:08, when a shell from Nachi struck Exeter's engine room. The U.S. Navy's history of the destroyer Pope, which met the cruiser that night, records that the hit cut her speed to five knots. Exeter swung out of line, and the cruisers behind her, thinking she was obeying an order, turned too, leaving De Ruyter steaming alone toward the enemy. In the confusion the Dutch destroyer Kortenaer was torpedoed by Haguro and sank almost at once, and the British destroyer Electra was sunk at 6:16.⁷

Doorman sent the crippled Exeter back to Surabaya under escort and, in the dark, tried to work around the Japanese warships to reach the transports. The four American destroyers, out of torpedoes and short of fuel, went home. At 9:25 the British destroyer Jupiter hit a mine laid by the Allies themselves and sank four hours later.⁸

The night torpedoes

Late that night the Japanese heavy cruisers found the Allied cruisers again and fired torpedoes. One struck De Ruyter at 11:32 and set off her ammunition; another hit Java, which sank about ninety minutes later. Doorman's last order sent Houston and Perth to Batavia. The Australian War Memorial records that De Ruyter was lost with Doorman and 344 of her crew, and that almost all the crews of both Dutch cruisers died.⁹

Days of destruction

The battle delayed the Japanese landing on Java by a day; it did not stop it. In the next two days the survivors were hunted down. Houston and Perth ran into the Western Invasion Force in the Sunda Strait and were sunk, and the damaged Exeter, trying to escape with the destroyers Encounter and Pope, was caught in the Java Sea and sunk with both escorts. Only the four American destroyers reached Australia, and the Dutch on Java surrendered a few days later.¹⁰ › Second Battle of the Java Sea, 1942

Doorman was blamed at the time for poor decisions. EBSCO notes that later historians have judged him more kindly, as a commander who did his best with a fleet that had no common doctrine, signals or radar, and who took the fight to a stronger enemy; in the Netherlands he is a national hero.¹¹