What happened at the Berezina in 1812?
Retreating from Moscow, Napoleon found the Borisov bridge over the Berezina destroyed and Russian armies closing on both banks. From 26 November General Eblé’s pontoneers built two trestle bridges at Studzianka, north of Borisov, while a feint drew Admiral Chichagov south. The army crossed over three days and fought on both banks on 28 November. Eblé burned the bridges on the morning of 29 November, leaving thousands of stragglers behind.5
By the time the Grande Armée reached the Berezina it had lost most of its horses, its guns and its bridging train. What it did there in four days turned a river crossing into a French word for disaster, and gave it the escape it needed. For the rest of the day see 26 November in military history, and for the wider campaign our guide to Napoleon’s invasion of Russia.6
The retreat reaches the river
Napoleon’s own 29th Bulletin dates the hard cold to 7 November and says that between 14 and 16 November, with 16 to 18 degrees of frost, more than 30,000 horses died in a few days. The army, it admitted, had been splendid on the 6th and was by the 14th almost without cavalry, artillery or transport. Officers who still had horses were formed into a “sacred squadron” under Grouchy, with generals serving as captains, a body that Labaume and Ségur also describe.7

At Orsha the pontoon train was burned for want of horses to draw it. Wilson writes that two complete sets of pontoons, sixty in all, went up in flames. Chuquet, working from the papers of General Jean-Baptiste Eblé, its commander, says Eblé begged in vain to keep fifteen boats. He did save two field forges, two wagons of charcoal and six of tools, and had each of his men carry a tool, clamps and nails.8
Foord, a British historian writing in 1914, estimates that near Orsha Napoleon had only some 25,000 demoralised men, with a helpless mass of 40,000 non-combatants around them. Ségur, an aide on Napoleon’s staff, counts 40,000 to 50,000 men, women and children moving through the forest towards Borisov. When the fresh corps of Victor and Oudinot met this column, Ségur says they saw a train of spectres covered with rags, and Sergeant Bourgogne of the Imperial Guard heard the men of the 9th Corps say they could hardly believe this was the army of Moscow.9
Minsk and Borisov lost
The Russians were closing the road west. Admiral Pavel Chichagov’s Army of the Danube took Minsk, Napoleon’s great supply base, on 16 November, and with it 4,700 sick and wounded and two million rations, figures given by both Ségur and Foord. Labaume and Fezensac give the same date.10

The next prize was Borisov, with the only bridge over the Berezina for miles. General Jan Henryk Dąbrowski’s Polish division held the bridgehead on 21 November against Lambert’s vanguard. Foord gives Lambert about 8,000 men and 36 guns against fewer than 5,000 for Dąbrowski, and says the 1st and 6th Polish regiments resisted with magnificent courage before the bridgehead fell. The 29th Bulletin dates the loss to the 23rd, against the 21st in Ségur, Labaume, Fezensac and Foord.11
Oudinot’s 2nd Corps then routed the Russian vanguard and drove it back through Borisov, but the retreating Russians broke the bridge behind them. Ségur says it was over 300 fathoms long and destroyed at three points. The Bulletin dates this fight to the 24th and claims 2,000 prisoners, while Ségur gives 900 and Labaume 700. Foord adds that Chichagov and his staff were at dinner when the panic reached them, and that the admiral lost his camp service and his portfolio.12
Napoleon was told that the river at Borisov was a lake of moving ice. Behind him Wittgenstein was marching down from the north and Kutuzov’s main army was following from the east. Ségur, who was there, has him looking at the map and comparing himself to Charles XII at Poltava.13
The ford at Studzianka
The way out was found by cavalry. General Corbineau’s brigade, cut off on the west bank, came back across a ford opposite the village of Studzianka, about four leagues above Borisov in the reckoning of Marbot and Chuquet and about twelve miles in Wilson’s. Ségur tells the story of a Lithuanian peasant whose horse was wet, which showed where the river could be crossed.14
Marbot, who commanded the 23rd Chasseurs in Oudinot’s corps, credits the 8th Polish Lancers of Corbineau’s brigade, whose officers got the information from the local people. Józef Załuski of the Polish Guard lancers wrote that an officer of the 8th tested the ford with a few lancers, and thought that Prince Dominik Radziwiłł, owner of Studzianka, may have guided Napoleon’s choice, though he says he cannot be certain. Foord gives the decision itself to Oudinot, about midday on the 24th.15
How wide and deep the river was there depends on the witness. Ségur gives fifty-four fathoms and six feet. Wilson says the ford was three and a half feet deep when Corbineau crossed and five feet when it was checked again, and the river over eighty yards wide. The Bulletin gives forty toises. Marbot thought it no wider than the rue Royale in Paris. The banks were marshy, and the water carried ice.16
The feint
To keep Chichagov away from Studzianka, the French put on a show downstream. On the 24th, Ségur writes, 300 men and several hundred stragglers were sent to Ukholoda to gather bridging material as noisily as they could, and the cuirassiers were paraded in view of the enemy. Marbot describes the same feint. Ségur adds that Jews questioned about the fords there were sent across the lines so that they would repeat what they had heard.17
It worked, helped by Kutuzov. A despatch of 25 November told Chichagov that Napoleon meant to cross at or below Berezino, to the south. Wilson, the British commissioner with the Russian army, says Chichagov marched south that day and left General Chaplitz at Studzianka with only a regiment of infantry, one of hussars, some Cossacks and twelve guns, even though Chaplitz reported that bridges were being built there. Chichagov’s whole force, Wilson adds, was under 32,000 men, 12,000 of them cavalry, spread over at least sixty miles.18
Napoleon spent the night of 25 to 26 November at Staroi-Borisov, in a chateau of Prince Radziwiłł. Ségur says Murat urged him to escape with some Polish volunteers who offered to guide him to Vilna, and that he refused. At dawn the Russian fires opposite were deserted and a column of guns was seen moving off. Ségur and Ganière both report his words: he had fooled the admiral.19
Eblé’s pontoneers
Eblé reached Studzianka at five in the evening of the 25th, Ségur writes, and found that the trestles already made were too weak. He had seven companies of pontoneers, about 400 men, of whom Foord says 100 were Dutch. Chuquet calls them four hundred brave and disciplined men. In the night, on Eblé’s orders, the houses of Studzianka were pulled down for timber.20

The men worked in the river among the ice. The witnesses do not agree on how deep: up to their mouths in Ségur, their shoulders in Bourgogne and Foord, their breasts in Chuquet, their waists in Ganière. Bourgogne heard that Napoleon himself handed out wine to them, and Foord has him helping to serve brandy. The men were relieved every fifteen minutes, Foord writes, but five sixths of them perished, and of the 400 not 40 ever saw their homes again.21
The first trestle was fixed at eight in the morning of the 26th. Each bridge had twenty-three trestles. The right-hand bridge, for infantry and horsemen, was finished at one in the afternoon, and the left-hand bridge, for guns and wagons, at four. Chuquet says the deck of the upper bridge was made of old roof boards from Studzianka.22
The artillery bridge broke three times. Chuquet lists the breaks at eight in the evening of the 26th and at two in the morning and four in the afternoon of the 27th, and each repair took three or four hours. Foord gives the same three breaks. Wilson says Napoleon had sixty guns placed on the heights of Studzianka to cover the work, while Fezensac gives thirty.23
26 and 27 November: the crossing
Before the bridges were ready, Ségur writes, Colonel Jacqueminot and a Lithuanian count swam the river, followed by fifty chasseurs, with voltigeurs carried over on two rafts. Then Oudinot’s corps and Dąbrowski’s division crossed, cheering Napoleon as they filed past. Their number is given as 7,000 by Ségur and Chuquet, 9,000 by Ganière and nearly 11,000 by Foord.24
Napoleon crossed with the Guard on the 27th, at one in the afternoon according to Wilson and Foord and about two according to Ségur. That day he wrote from Studzianka to his foreign minister Maret that he had just crossed the Berezina, but that the ice the river carried made his bridges very unstable. His order of the same day sent Ney across with all the Poles and the remains of the 3rd Corps.25
The night of 27 to 28 November was the great lost chance. The bridges stood almost empty while tens of thousands of stragglers sat by their fires and would not move. Bourgogne called it a most astonishing thing. Marbot says he saw more than 50,000 men by moonlight and drove 2,000 or 3,000 of them across. Ségur says Eblé warned that six days would not be enough to pass all the carriages, and that Ney wanted them burned at once.26
Partouneaux takes the wrong road
Victor’s rearguard division under General Partouneaux was left in Borisov with orders to stay through the night of the 27th. Marching to rejoin, it reached a fork and took the right-hand road instead of the one along the river, straight into Wittgenstein’s army. The Bulletin says so in nearly those words, and Marbot and Foord tell the same story.27
Partouneaux refused a summons and tried to break through. Ségur says he had 3,500 men and three guns, lost half, and with 400 men tried to slip through the woods before surrendering. The rest gave up the next morning, at seven according to Wilson and Buturlin, the Russian official historian. One battalion escaped along the river to Victor. Ségur calls it the first and only division to lay down its arms during the retreat.28
How many were lost there is disputed. The Bulletin admits 2,000 infantry, 300 horses and three guns, and Napoleon wrote of a brigade of 3,000 men. Wilson counts 6,000 to 7,000 taken, including 3,000 non-combatants. Buturlin gives about 7,000 with three guns. Porter, a British painter who wrote up the Russian reports in 1813, gives 7,800 soldiers and 239 officers.29
28 November: the west bank
On the morning of the 28th the Russians attacked on both banks at once. On the west bank Chichagov came on at eight. Wilson gives him 18,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry against 9,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry under Oudinot and Ney, on a front of about a mile and a quarter in the forest. Oudinot was wounded early, and Ney took command, as the Bulletin, Wilson, Labaume and Fezensac all record.30
A strong Russian column broke the Vistula Legion, the Polish infantry under General Claparède, and the line began to give. Fezensac saw stragglers and even the Young Guard waver. Then General Doumerc’s cuirassiers, the 4th, 5th and 7th, charged through the trees and broke the Russian squares. Ségur and Marbot give 2,000 prisoners, Fezensac 4,000 and the Bulletin 6,000, while Wilson has 1,200 killed or taken.31
The Polish generals paid heavily. Załuski names Zajączek, Dąbrowski, Kniaziewicz and Claparède among the wounded divisional commanders, and Foord adds that Zajączek’s leg was shattered. Ségur and Marbot record that Berthier’s aide Alfred de Noailles was killed. Wilson says the fighting went on until eleven at night and cost both sides no less than 5,000 men.32
28 November: the east bank
On the east bank Marshal Victor held the heights of Studzianka to cover the bridges. His numbers are given as 6,000 by Ségur, 5,000 infantry and 400 cavalry by Wilson, up to 8,000 infantry and 500 cavalry by Foord, with 7,400 in Victor’s own account, and 10,000 by Marbot. He had the Baden and Berg brigades, Saxons and General Girard’s Polish regiments, recently back from Spain, which Labaume says held the Russians to the end.33
Wittgenstein attacked at ten in the morning. Ségur gives him and Platov 40,000 men on that bank, but Buturlin and Wilson say the Russians actually engaged at Studzianka were not more than 14,000. Napoleon placed a battery on the west bank to fire across into the Russian flank, and Fournier’s cavalry charges held the left.34

Panic at the bridges
Behind Victor the crowd was packed in front of the bridges. Chuquet says it was more than 1,000 yards across and 300 deep, and that Prussian hussar officers took five hours to move 180 steps. When Russian guns, among them a battery of twelve under Diebitsch, began firing into it about midday, Ségur writes, the first shots became the signal of universal despair.35
The artillery bridge gave way again in the crush, at about eight in Labaume, about ten in Bourgogne and simply “in the morning” in Fezensac. Ségur describes wagons driven over the fallen and women in the ice holding up their children as they sank. Bourgogne saw Marshal Lefebvre trying to keep order at the bridge until the crowd carried him across.36
Victor began to pull back across the river at about nine in the evening. Eblé’s sappers had to cut a path through overturned wagons and bodies to let his corps through, and Chuquet says the 9th Corps was across by one in the morning. Labaume wrote that several hundred men were crushed beyond recognition under the wheels of the guns.37
The bridges burn
Eblé spent the night trying to move the stragglers across. At five in the morning, Chuquet writes, he had carriages set on fire to drive them to the bridges, and Bourgogne saw wagons burned on purpose for the same reason. The order was to fire the bridges at eight. Eblé waited until half past eight, when the Russians were close, and then set them alight. Ganière gives nine o’clock.38
Wilson wrote that when the flames burst out, a wailing shriek of anguish and despair rose with them. Bourgogne saw men wading into water up to their shoulders, who all perished. The Cossacks came down at about nine, and Wittgenstein’s regulars reached the river half an hour later.39
Ségur says a multitude of carriages, three guns and several thousand men, women and children were left on the east bank. The Fondation Napoléon and the Musée de l’Armée put the figure at nearly 10,000, and Ganière at 8,000 to 10,000. Wilson writes that many died in the melee but that there was no general massacre. Foord says almost all the non-combatants taken died of hunger and cold, and that of 500 women held in a barn at Borisov only some 20 survived. Grabowski, an officer on Napoleon’s staff, recalled several hundred vehicles left behind.40
How many crossed, how many were lost
No count is secure. Ségur gave Napoleon 80,000 people in all and said he saved 60,000. Wilson estimated 70,000 to 80,000 souls, of whom not more than 40,000 were combatants. Fezensac gives 50,000 combatants, and Foord about 47,000, rejecting a lower French estimate of 31,000 as too small. Against them Foord counts about 75,000 Russians on the river.41
The losses are wider still. Foord reckons 12,000 to 15,000 killed and wounded, and 20,000 to 25,000 with the prisoners and those who died of cold. Fezensac says more than 15,000 died or were taken on the 28th alone. Buturlin counts nearly 11,000 prisoners and 5,000 killed on the east bank. The Fondation Napoléon gives 25,000 soldiers and 30,000 non-combatants killed. Labaume claims 200 guns lost, Ségur three on the bank and the Russians, Foord says, 23.42
Russian losses were also heavy. Foord puts them at not less than 10,000 and quotes the Russian general Langeron for 7,000 in Chichagov’s army alone. Buturlin gives Wittgenstein about 4,000 for 27 and 28 November, and Porter not more than 2,000.43
After the river
The army went on west across the Zembin marshes, along a causeway with many wooden bridges that Chichagov had left intact. Marbot thought this the admiral’s worst blunder, and Ségur says a single Cossack’s pipe could have set them alight. The Zembin bridges were burned behind the army the following night, by Eblé according to Chuquet, and by Marbot’s own regiment and the 24th according to Marbot.44
On 29 November, from Zanivki near Zembin, Napoleon wrote to Maret that the army was numerous but frightfully broken up, called for food above all else, and said his presence in Paris might be needed. The 29th Bulletin, dated Molodechno on 3 December, told France of the disaster, said nothing of the stragglers left at the bridges, and ended by saying that His Majesty’s health had never been better.45
On 5 December at Smorgonie Napoleon handed command to Murat and left for Paris, which he reached on 19 December, two days after the Bulletin appeared, according to Ségur. Grabowski and Ganière give the same date of departure. Eblé, worn out, died at Königsberg on 30 December, about a month after the crossing.46
A word for disaster
In French “bérézina” now means a complete failure. Larousse defines it as a total defeat and gives the example of an electoral bérézina, and the Fondation Napoléon notes that the name entered the language as a synonym for disaster. The same page calls the battle a tactical victory for Napoleon, and Alexander Mikaberidze writes that Napoleon won militarily because he saved what was left of his army, while the human disaster was immense. He also traces Balzac’s story Adieu of 1830 to the crossing.47
A Polish eyewitness judged it differently. Załuski, who crossed with the Guard lancers, called the crossing in military terms unexpectedly fortunate and very skilfully achieved, blamed the disaster on the undisciplined stragglers, and said the first credit for Studzianka belonged to the Poles. January Suchodolski painted the scene around 1859, in the picture at the top of this page.48
At Studzianka, now Studzionka in Belarus, the Fondation Napoléon reported in 2009 that France had for three years had its own plot in the village cemetery, where remains of Grande Armée soldiers found in excavations are reburied. It describes a ceremony there every 29 November with the French embassy and the Belarusian authorities, and monuments honouring both Russian and French soldiers.49






