What was Operation Solstice?
Operation Solstice (Unternehmen Sonnenwende) was a German counterattack launched from the area of Stargard in Pomerania in mid-February 1945, during World War II, against the northern flank of Marshal Georgy Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front, which stood on the Oder within reach of Berlin. A one-division thrust reached the besieged town of Arnswalde, today Choszczno, on 15 February and the general attack opened the next day, but it stalled in mud and Soviet defences and was halted on 18 February after gains of a few kilometres. The Soviet Union won, and the attack's lasting effect was on the Soviet side, which turned against Pomerania before it attacked Berlin.4
This article follows Operation Solstice from the arguments in Berlin to the mud south of Stargard, sets the conflicting figures of the German, Soviet, American and Polish accounts side by side and lays out the debate over whether it delayed the fall of Berlin, which is told in our article on the Battle of Berlin. The other events of the date are in 15 February in military history.
The Red Army on the Oder
The Soviet winter offensive that opened on the Vistula in mid-January 1945 carried Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front across Poland in about three weeks. Zhukov writes that his main forces reached the Oder between 1 and 4 February and seized a very important bridgehead on its western bank near Küstrin, today Kostrzyn, and Vasily Chuikov, whose 8th Guards Army reached the river on 1 February, describes the first crossings the next day.5
The front command now set its sights on Berlin itself. A directive of 4 February, quoted in full by both Zhukov and Chuikov, told the armies to consolidate their gains for six days, bring up a double load of fuel and two sets of ammunition, and capture Berlin in a sweeping assault on 15 or 16 February. The same directive gave the armies of the right wing, among them the 47th and 61st Armies and the 2nd Tank Army, a separate task: to throw the enemy back beyond a line through Falkenburg and Stargard and to cover the flank until the 2nd Belorussian Front came up.6
That flank was the weak point of the whole plan. On 31 January Zhukov warned Stalin that, because the left wing of Konstantin Rokossovsky's 2nd Belorussian Front lagged behind, his own attack frontage had grown to 500 kilometres. Sergei Shtemenko, in his memoir of the Soviet General Staff, writes that the flank stretched over hundreds of kilometres and was held by the 3rd Shock, 1st Polish, 47th and 61st Armies, with part of their strength tied down by surrounded German garrisons. On the Berlin axis itself Zhukov counts only four short-strength armies, and Shtemenko adds that companies of the 8th Guards Army were down to 22 to 45 men and that shells were still being brought up from depots east of the Vistula.7
The pocket at Arnswalde
Behind the Soviet front, German garrisons still held out in towns the Red Army had bypassed. Ziemke records that Zhukov used the infantry armies of his right flank to clean out the pockets at Arnswalde, Schneidemühl and Deutsch Krone, and Rokossovsky, whose front fought on Zhukov's right, notes that fierce fighting was still going on around those three towns as late as 19 February.8
Arnswalde, today Choszczno, was a district town of Pomerania. The Polish historian Grzegorz Baziur, whose study of the town draws on local and German accounts, writes that the Soviet 61st Army began its siege on 2 February, that about 2,000 German soldiers were inside the ring and that the fighting for the town lasted from 4 to 23 February. A first Soviet assault on 12 February was beaten off, an ultimatum to surrender by ten o'clock the next morning went unanswered, and seven hours of shelling then left almost the whole town in flames.9
Guderian's plan and Hitler's cut
The idea of striking back came from Heinz Guderian, chief of the Army General Staff. In his memoirs he writes that he asked Hitler to give up the planned offensive in Hungary and instead attack both flanks of the Soviet wedge that had reached the Oder between Frankfurt and Küstrin, from the line of Glogau and Guben in the south and from Pyritz and Arnswalde in the north. Shtemenko writes that the Soviet General Staff learned of a German plan for converging blows from the Arnswalde area and from Glogau and Guben, a plan championed by Guderian.10
Guderian hoped, as he admits and as Chuikov quotes him, that the attack would protect the capital and win time for armistice negotiations with the Western powers. The troops were to come from evacuating the Balkans, Italy and Norway, and above all the Courland pocket. Hitler refused after a scene that Guderian describes at length, and what remained of the plan was a limited thrust from the area around Arnswalde to beat the Russians north of the Warthe and to hold Pomerania and its link with West Prussia.11
Speed was the whole point of it. Guderian calculated from General Gehlen's intelligence estimates that about four divisions a day could reinforce the Russians on the Oder, so the attack had to come with lightning speed, before more Soviet troops arrived and before the Russians saw what was intended. Zhukov quotes the same words from Guderian's memoirs as proof that the danger from Pomerania was real, and Shtemenko writes that the Soviet General Staff knew the plan was to be carried out with lightning speed, before large Soviet forces could be brought up.12
Himmler, Wenck and Steiner
The attack fell to Army Group Vistula, which Hitler had created in late January to fill the gap between the Vistula and the Oder and had given to Heinrich Himmler, the head of the SS. Ziemke writes that Guderian had wanted Weichs and his headquarters brought up from Yugoslavia for the post, and that Himmler, as an army group commander, at first had no communications with his front line units, no staff and virtually no troops. Shtemenko remarks that the appointment did not strengthen the German command but rather weakened it.13
On 13 February Guderian forced the issue at a conference in the Reich Chancellery attended by Hitler, Himmler, Sepp Dietrich of the Sixth Panzer Army and Guderian's deputy, General Walther Wenck. Himmler argued that the attack should wait because part of the ammunition and fuel had not yet been unloaded, while Guderian demanded that it begin on 15 February and that Wenck join Himmler's staff to direct it. By Guderian's account the argument lasted two hours, with Hitler raging, until he suddenly told Himmler that Wenck would join his staff that night and lead the attack, and then remarked that the General Staff had won a battle that day. Ziemke confirms that Guderian demanded, in Hitler's presence, a special mandate for Wenck, but notes that Hitler never said what Wenck's authority was, which took the final decision away from Himmler without clearly giving it to Wenck.14
The troops were to be led by the Eleventh SS Panzer Army, which Ziemke describes as an upgraded corps staff under SS-Obergruppenführer Felix Steiner, far from the ideal instrument for a major offensive. The headquarters of the Third Panzer Army had been ordered from Samland to take command but arrived late, so command stayed with Steiner. Baziur notes that units of Steiner's III SS Panzer Corps had reached Arnswalde as early as 1 February. Guderian's memoirs, written after the war, name the Third Panzer Army under Colonel General Raus as the army that attacked, while Ziemke's account, based on the army group's records, gives the Eleventh SS Panzer Army.15
The forces
Ziemke writes that the high command scraped together two corps headquarters and ten divisions for the offensive, seven of them panzer divisions, a remarkable feat at that stage of the war. Getting them to Pomerania was harder, because the railways, whose engines were burning lignite, ran at about 40 percent of normal efficiency when they ran at all, and by 10 February, the eighth day of the assembly, fewer than half of the trains had arrived. Guderian describes the same crawling pace in the transfers from the West and blames Allied air superiority, which in his words paralysed both the transports and the will of the command.16
The Soviet estimates were far larger, because they counted every German formation between the Oder and the Vistula, not only the attack force. Zhukov puts the German 2nd and 11th Armies there in early February at 22 divisions, four of them tank and two motorized, with five brigades and eight combat groups. Rokossovsky quotes the 1st Belorussian Front's estimate that the 11th Army alone, facing Zhukov's right wing, had some 200,000 men, 700 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2,500 guns and mortars and up to 300 aircraft, and Shtemenko gives Army Group Vistula 38 divisions, 6 of them panzer, and 6 brigades once the 11th Army had been formed on 10 February. By the time the Soviet command turned on Pomerania, Zhukov writes, the grouping had grown to 40 divisions.17
In the path of the attack stood the Soviet 61st Army, which was besieging Arnswalde, and its neighbour, the 2nd Guards Tank Army. Zhukov's directive of 4 February had given both armies the task of driving the Germans back beyond Stargard.18
15 February: the thrust to Arnswalde
Wenck crossed the Oder to inspect the preparations in person, something Himmler had not done, and found that the units for the offensive were not fully assembled or equipped. Ziemke writes that he then chose the unpromising course of starting piecemeal. On the night of 14 February the Eleventh SS Panzer Army reported that, in view of the whole situation on the Eastern Front as Wenck had described it, even a small attack was urgently needed, and that it would thrust toward Arnswalde the next morning, the date on which Guderian had insisted because, he wrote, the attack would otherwise become impossible.19
The one-division attack caught the Russians unawares, and according to Ziemke its point reached Arnswalde early in the afternoon of 15 February. Baziur's account has the Nordland division retaking the village of Slagenthin, today Sławęcin, on 17 February and breaking the ring around the town, which opened a corridor a few kilometres wide along the road into Arnswalde. A Polish Press Agency report on a tank of the 10th SS Panzer Division, which fought in the offensive and now stands in the Museum of Polish Arms in Kołobrzeg, likewise sums up the operation's only success as the brief relief of encircled Choszczno.20

Tempted by that start, the army group ordered the whole operation, code-named Sonnenwende, or Solstice, to begin the next day. Ziemke remarks that it would have taken more self-control than Army Group Vistula and the high command shared between them to throw away so tempting a start. Guderian and Chuikov both date the general attack to 16 February.21
16 to 18 February: stuck in the mud
The accounts part company on how well it went. Guderian writes that the attack made good progress on 16 and 17 February and that hopes rose in Berlin that it might succeed after all. Ziemke, working from the army group's files, finds that the unready and inexperienced Eleventh SS Panzer Army spent the 16th feeling out the enemy and that by the time its command was ready to decide where to concentrate, the offensive was already stuck, even though Steiner insisted he could get rolling within another two days.22
The officer sent to direct the attack was then lost to it in an accident. Guderian writes that Wenck, returning on the evening of 17 February from a report to Hitler, took the wheel himself because his driver was exhausted, fell asleep and crashed into the railing of a bridge on the Berlin to Stettin autobahn. He was taken to hospital badly injured, was out of action for weeks and was replaced by General Hans Krebs. Guderian blamed the stall on his loss, but Ziemke, who also records that Wenck was severely injured in a car accident on the way back from a conference with Hitler, doubts that he could have saved the offensive.23
The weather fought against the German tanks as hard as the Soviet guns did. Ziemke writes that rain and mud confined them to the roads, and Rokossovsky, whose front was attacking further east in the same weeks, describes how the spring thaw and the mud kept every attacker to hard-surfaced roads that the enemy mined and blocked. Himmler ordered the attack to continue through the night of 17 February, but the next day minefields and strong antitank defences brought it to what Ziemke calls its inglorious conclusion.24
How far the Germans got depends on the source. Ziemke gives two to three miles at most by the night of 18 February, when Himmler stopped the offensive with a directive for regrouping. Zhukov writes that the enemy, attacking south of Stargard, even pressed his troops back by some 12 kilometres, and Shtemenko, who dates the strong German blow to 17 February, that it pushed the Soviet troops back southward. Chuikov states that on 17 February the Soviet forces repulsed all enemy attacks.25
At Arnswalde the corridor stayed open only briefly. Baziur writes that General Hans Voigt, who commanded the defence of the town, led most of his troops out along it, that about 3,000 soldiers left behind to cover the withdrawal were surrounded again once it closed on 18 February, and that the town fell to the 61st Army on 23 February. Guderian lists Arnswalde, together with Posen, among the losses of 24 February.26
The Soviet answer
The Soviet command had seen the danger coming. Zhukov writes that air and ground reconnaissance detected considerable German forces gathering in East Pomerania, and that as early as 2 February his Military Council ordered the 1st Guards Tank Army to leave the Oder and move by forced march to the Arnswalde area, followed by the 9th Tank Corps, the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps and many artillery and engineer units. Chuikov, whose army stayed on the Oder, recalls that all the supplies arriving from the interior had to be rerouted to the right flank of the front, to Pomerania.27
Moscow was also weighing a blow of its own. Shtemenko writes that on 15 February Stalin asked Zhukov and Rokossovsky for their proposals. Rokossovsky offered to bring up the 19th Army and a tank corps on his left wing by 24 February and strike for the Baltic coast toward Köslin, cutting the Pomeranian grouping in two, while Zhukov meant to throw the enemy back with his right wing, starting on 19 February. Rokossovsky recalls a call from the Chief of the General Staff, Aleksandr Vasilevsky, about Zhukov's plan for an offensive against the East Pomeranian grouping, and his own advice that the two fronts strike together.28
The German attack from Stargard changed that timetable. Ziemke writes that on 17 February the Stavka suddenly scrapped the original plan and ordered Zhukov to turn north and join Rokossovsky against Army Group Vistula. Shtemenko gives a slightly different sequence: after the German blow, Zhukov reported on 20 February that his whole front, the Oder included, needed to go over to firm defence for a time, until Rokossovsky's front attacked, and Stalin approved. Zhukov himself writes that the Supreme Command decided to move four field armies and two tank armies of his front against the East Pomeranian grouping.29
Why it failed
The sources agree on the main reasons even where they disagree on the details. The force was assembled in a hurry over a broken railway network and was short of fuel and ammunition, which Ziemke documents from the army group's records and Guderian confirms through Himmler's own objections on 13 February. The command was split between Himmler, a political leader with no experience of leading armies, the untried staff of the Eleventh SS Panzer Army and Wenck, whose authority Hitler never defined and who was lost on the third day.30
The ground and the enemy did the rest of the work. Thaw and mud kept the tanks on roads that the Soviet troops had mined and covered with antitank guns, as Ziemke and Rokossovsky both describe, and the Soviet command had moved tank and cavalry reserves toward Arnswalde in good time, as Zhukov and Shtemenko relate. Ziemke's verdict is that the Stargard offensive ranks as one of the war's closest approaches to a planned fiasco.31
Did it delay the attack on Berlin?
This is the question the operation is remembered for. On the ground Solstice failed completely, Ziemke writes, but it hit exactly the most fragile feature of the Soviet plan, the need for a certain daring in the second phase of the offensive. In his view the abortive Stargard operation brought the Germans a substantial, unexpected and unearned dividend of time: in the fit of caution that followed in mid-February, the Stavka dismantled its preparations for an advance on Berlin and turned its main forces to clearing operations on the flanks in Pomerania and Silesia, and for nearly a month and a half Berlin seems to have dropped out of its sight.32
Soviet commanders argued the opposite case. Chuikov, as Zhukov quotes him, claimed that Berlin could have been taken in February, which would have brought the end of the war nearer, and that the risk was worth taking when only 60 to 80 kilometres separated the Oder from Berlin. Zhukov rejected this. The threat from the north was real, he wrote, the 2nd Belorussian Front had covered only 50 to 70 kilometres in ten days, and a German blow from Pomerania could easily have broken through his cover to the Oder crossings behind the armies near Berlin. He recalled the Red Army's defeat before Warsaw in 1920 as the lesson of a headlong, unprotected advance.33
Shtemenko, writing for the General Staff, calls a non-stop advance on Berlin impossible at that moment, given the German reserves, the shortage of ammunition and fuel, the temporary German superiority in the air and Soviet divisions that averaged some 4,000 men, and he says that it would have been a crime. Chuikov's own account of 1985 records simply that after the failed German offensive the Supreme Command decided to smash the enemy group in Pomerania before the decisive assault on Berlin, and Rokossovsky presents the joint strike of the two fronts as the radical way to remove the threat from the north and hasten the Berlin operation.34
The record leaves room for both readings. Soviet orders to move a tank army toward Arnswalde were given on 2 February, two weeks before Solstice began, and the Soviet command was already discussing a Pomeranian operation on 15 February, so the threat from Pomerania weighed more than the attack itself. Yet the decision to stand on the Oder followed the German blow within days. The East Pomeranian operation lasted, in Shtemenko's dates, from 24 February to 4 April, and the final Soviet offensive on Berlin began only on 16 April 1945.35
What followed
Hitler formally called off Sonnenwende on 21 February and ordered Himmler to hand a corps headquarters and three of its divisions to Army Group Center, Ziemke writes, and the Third Panzer Army took over the divisions that were left. On 1 March Zhukov's right wing attacked with the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies at its spearhead, and on 4 March Soviet tanks reached the Baltic near Kolberg, cutting the German forces in East Pomerania in two. Zhukov, Shtemenko and Ziemke all give those dates.36
Himmler did not survive the failure as a commander. Ziemke writes that after the Stargard fiasco he lost Hitler's favour, evaded direct responsibility for the army group and finally withdrew under his physician's care, and Guderian describes how in March he persuaded Himmler to give up the command. On 20 March Colonel General Heinrici took over Army Group Vistula, which would face the Soviet assault across the Oder a month later.37






