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The Suez Crisis, 1956: invasion, ultimatum and retreat

Cold War · 1956 · Israel, Britain and France vs Egypt · ~7 min read · Updated October 2026

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Black and white photograph of a wrecked street in Port Said, with broken beams and rubble in the foreground, burned-out buildings on both sides, a jet of water on a smoking ruin and people walking in the distance

A street in Port Said after the Anglo-French bombing, photograph dated 4 December 1956 in the Anefo collection (cropped). Photo: Wim van Rossem / Anefo, Nationaal Archief, Wikimedia Commons, CC0

At a glance

Israel, United Kingdom and FranceDavid Ben-Gurion and Moshe Dayan; Anthony Eden; Guy Mollet
vs
EgyptPresident Gamal Abdel Nasser
Date
29 October 1956 (Israeli attack) to 22 or 23 December 1956 (Anglo-French withdrawal); Israel left Sinai and Gaza in March 1957
Location
Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip and the Suez Canal zone, Egypt
Conflict
Arab-Israeli conflict, during the Cold War
Trigger
Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956
Ceasefire
6 November 1956; in force from midnight GMT on 7 to 8 November, according to the UN
Outcome
Military success for the invaders, political defeat for Britain and France; Egypt kept the canal
Quick answer

What was the Suez Crisis?

It was the 1956 attack on Egypt by Israel, Britain and France after President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company. Under a plan secretly agreed at Sèvres, Israel invaded Sinai on 29 October, and Britain and France bombed Egypt and landed at Port Said. Pressure from the United States and the United Nations forced a ceasefire and the withdrawal of all three.1

The Suez Canal links the Mediterranean to the Red Sea. In 1956 a dispute over who should run it turned into a short war, fought by three states against Egypt and ended by pressure from the United States and the United Nations.2

Background: the canal and the dam

The Suez Canal Company, a British and French enterprise, had run the canal since it was built in 1869. By 1956 France held the majority stake and British banks and companies about 40 percent. In mid-July 1956 the United States and Britain withdrew their promised funding for the Aswan High Dam, Egypt's great development project. On 26 July President Gamal Abdel Nasser answered by nationalizing the canal company, offering compensation to its shareholders.3

Britain and France were outraged. France also resented Egypt's support for the rebels in Algeria. Israel had its own grievances: Egypt blockaded the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, fedayeen raiders struck Israel from the Gaza Strip, and in 1955 Nasser had signed an arms deal with Czechoslovakia backed by the Soviet Union. An American plan for an international users' association to run the canal won no real support.4

Sèvres: the secret plan

From 22 to 24 October 1956 Israeli, French and British representatives met in secret at Sèvres, near Paris. David Ben-Gurion came with Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres; the French side included Prime Minister Guy Mollet and Foreign Minister Christian Pineau; Britain was represented first by Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd and then by the senior diplomat Patrick Dean. On 24 October Ben-Gurion, Pineau and Dean signed a document setting out the plan.5

Israel would invade Sinai on 29 October. Britain and France would then call on both sides to withdraw ten miles from the canal and accept a temporary Anglo-French occupation, and if Egypt refused they would attack early on 31 October. Pineau later called the paper a protocol; Lloyd insisted it was only a record of discussion and denied any collusion.6

29 October: Israel strikes in Sinai

Israel called its campaign Operation Kadesh. Its aims were to threaten the canal, to open the Straits of Tiran and to destroy the Egyptian forces in northern Sinai. On the evening of 29 October a paratroop battalion under Raphael Eitan dropped near the Mitla Pass, deep in Sinai. Israeli columns advanced along three axes across the peninsula, and another force drove south toward Sharm el-Sheikh. Within days they were within ten miles of the canal.7

As planned, Britain and France called on Israel and Egypt to pull back ten miles from the canal. Nasser rejected the demand.8

31 October to 6 November: bombing and landings

On 31 October British and French aircraft began attacking Egyptian airfields. According to the bpb, Germany's Federal Agency for Civic Education, Egypt's air force was almost entirely destroyed within two days. On 5 November Anglo-French paratroopers landed at Port Said, Port Fuad and Gamil airfield, and on 6 November seaborne troops came ashore at the northern end of the canal and took Port Said.9

By then the political ground had gone from under the invaders. The United Nations General Assembly met in its first emergency special session from 1 November, and early on 2 November it called for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of forces. On 5 November the Soviet government threatened to use force against the aggressors. The United States, which had condemned the Soviet invasion of Hungary that same week, refused to be tied to European colonialism and pressed Britain and France hard. A ceasefire was agreed on 6 November; the UN dates its coming into force to midnight GMT on 7 to 8 November.10

The UN steps in

The UN credits its first peacekeeping force mainly to the vision of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and the Canadian foreign minister, Lester Pearson. On 5 November the General Assembly set up a UN Command under the Canadian general E. L. M. Burns. Egypt agreed on 14 November, and the first contingents of the United Nations Emergency Force arrived on 15 and 16 November. It was the first UN peacekeeping force of its kind.11

The UN dates the end of the Anglo-French withdrawal to 22 December 1956, when UNEF took over the Port Said area; other accounts give 23 December. Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip on 6 and 7 March 1957 and from Sharm el-Sheikh by 8 to 12 March.12

Casualties

The sources used for this page do not give casualty totals, and the published estimates for the war vary widely, especially for Egyptian soldiers and civilians. This page therefore does not quote a figure.

Why Suez mattered

Militarily the invasion had gone well; politically it was a disaster for Britain and France. American censure strained relations with London and Paris and helped bring about the resignation of the British prime minister, Anthony Eden, in January 1957. In the same year the Eisenhower Doctrine gave Washington more power to aid Middle Eastern states. Egypt kept the canal and ran it successfully, against the forecasts of its former owners. Israel had to give back Sinai and Gaza, and relations between Britain and France on one side and the United States and the UN on the other stayed strained for some time.13

Frequently asked questions

When did the Suez Crisis start?

The canal dispute began when Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956. The fighting began with Israel's invasion of Sinai on 29 October 1956.

Who won the Suez Crisis?

Militarily the invaders did well, but politically Egypt came out ahead: Britain, France and Israel had to withdraw under American and UN pressure, and Egypt kept the canal.

What was the Protocol of Sèvres?

A secret agreement signed on 24 October 1956 by Israel, France and Britain: Israel would attack Sinai, and Britain and France would use the fighting as a reason to occupy the canal zone.

Why did the United States oppose Britain and France at Suez?

The Eisenhower administration did not want to be tied to European colonialism, especially while it was condemning the Soviet invasion of Hungary, and feared Soviet involvement.

When did British and French troops leave Egypt?

By 22 December 1956 according to the UN (other accounts say 23 December). Israel withdrew from Sinai and Gaza in March 1957.

Notes

A number in the text points to a note; each note names the works that paragraph draws on, listed in full under Sources.

  1. US Department of State, “The Suez Crisis, 1956”; Federal Agency for Civic Education, “31.10.1956”; US Department of State, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955 to 1957, Volume XVI, document 373, Editorial Note”; United Nations Peacekeeping, “First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), Background”. ↩
  2. US Department of State, “The Suez Crisis, 1956”; United Nations Peacekeeping, “First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), Background”. ↩
  3. US Department of State, “The Suez Crisis, 1956”; Federal Agency for Civic Education, “31.10.1956”; MIT CASCON project, “Cascon Case SUE”. ↩
  4. US Department of State, “The Suez Crisis, 1956”; Federal Agency for Civic Education, “31.10.1956”; MIT CASCON project, “Cascon Case SUE”; IDF and Defense Establishment Archive, “Operation Kadesh, the Suez Crisis 1956”. ↩
  5. US Department of State, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955 to 1957, Volume XVI, document 373, Editorial Note”; IDF and Defense Establishment Archive, “Operation Kadesh, the Suez Crisis 1956”. ↩
  6. US Department of State, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955 to 1957, Volume XVI, document 373, Editorial Note”. ↩
  7. IDF and Defense Establishment Archive, “Operation Kadesh, the Suez Crisis 1956”; US Department of State, “The Suez Crisis, 1956”. ↩
  8. Federal Agency for Civic Education, “31.10.1956”; MIT CASCON project, “Cascon Case SUE”. ↩
  9. Federal Agency for Civic Education, “31.10.1956”; MIT CASCON project, “Cascon Case SUE”. ↩
  10. United Nations Peacekeeping, “First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), Background”; Federal Agency for Civic Education, “31.10.1956”; US Department of State, “The Suez Crisis, 1956”; MIT CASCON project, “Cascon Case SUE”. ↩
  11. United Nations Peacekeeping, “First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), Background”; MIT CASCON project, “Cascon Case SUE”. ↩
  12. United Nations Peacekeeping, “First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), Background”; Federal Agency for Civic Education, “31.10.1956”; MIT CASCON project, “Cascon Case SUE”. ↩
  13. US Department of State, “The Suez Crisis, 1956”; MIT CASCON project, “Cascon Case SUE”; United Nations Peacekeeping, “First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), Background”. ↩

Sources

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