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Greek hoplites holding the pass at Thermopylae

Sparta vs Athens

Ancient history · Head to head · Evidence for both, the verdict is yours · ~15 min read · Updated November 2026

Jacques-Louis David, 1814, via Wikimedia Commons, public domain.

In short

Sparta or Athens: what does the evidence say?

Sparta was the first land power of classical Greece, Athens the first sea power. They fought side by side against Persia in 480 and 479 BC and against each other in the Peloponnesian War of 431 to 404 BC, which ended with Athens' surrender to Sparta. Historians have not settled it. Sparta had the best army and won the war, with Persian money. Athens had the best navy and the richer empire, and held out for years after its disaster in Sicily. Thucydides blamed Athens' defeat on its own politics, a reading Kagan challenged point by point. This page sets out the evidence for each and leaves the final verdict to you.

Thucydides, the Athenian general who wrote the history of their war, put the contrast in a single sentence: once Persia had been driven off, Greece split into two camps, one led by Athens, the first naval power, the other by Sparta, the first military power. The Enciclopedia Italiana calls the war that followed the bloodiest ever fought among Greeks.1

This is not a ranking. Below you will find the two cities side by side, the campaigns in which they met, and six questions on which a state at war can be judged, from its army to what it left behind. Under each we give the strongest evidence for Sparta and the strongest for Athens, with the ancient writers and modern historians who argue each case, and the weak points of each inside its own case. At the end the decision is yours.

Side by side

Degas painting of young Spartans exercisingSpartaLacedaemon, head of the Peloponnesian League
Marble bust of Pericles in a helmetAthensHead of the Delian League
Kind of power
Land, with an army of citizen hoplites and many allies
Sea and money, with a league of islands and coastal cities
Government
Ruled by law: "law is their master", in the words Herodotus gives an exiled Spartan king
Democracy, in which, says one critic, the poor who rowed the fleet held power
The city
Villages without a city wall
The Acropolis and its monuments, the Long Walls to Piraeus
At Plataea, 479 BC
10,000 Lacedaemonians, 5,000 of them Spartiates
8,000 Athenians, holding the left wing
At sea, 480 BC
10 ships at Artemisium
127 ships at Artemisium, the largest Greek contingent
Money
No tribute empire, later Persian subsidies
Tribute from the allies, a sixtieth of it dedicated to Athena and listed in stone from 454/3 BC
Citizens
Fewer than 1,000 Spartiates in Aristotle's day
A much larger citizen body
Battles named here
Thermopylae, Plataea, Sphacteria, Mantinea, Aegospotami, Leuctra
Marathon, Salamis, Plataea, Sphacteria, Syracuse, Aegospotami

Figures from Herodotus for 480 and 479 BC, with Aristotle, the Attic tribute lists and modern scholarship on Sparta. We give no win and loss totals: most battles of the war were fought by allies on both sides, and no source counts them the same way.2

Where they met: allies, then enemies

Allies against Persia, 480 to 479 BC

Before they were enemies they were allies. At Artemisium in 480 BC, Herodotus counts 127 Athenian ships in the Greek fleet against 10 from Sparta. At Plataea the next year the Spartans held the right wing with 10,000 Lacedaemonians, 5,000 of them Spartiates, each attended by seven helots, and the 8,000 Athenians held the left. Our pages on Thermopylae, Salamis and Plataea tell those battles.3

Atlas page with a colour map of Greece and the Aegean at the start of the Peloponnesian War
Greece at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War in 431 BC (upper map), from William R. Shepherd's Historical Atlas of 1911. Public domain

Pylos and Sphacteria, 425 BC

The war's first great shock fell on Sparta. An Athenian force fortified Pylos on the coast of Messenia, and Spartan hoplites were cut off on the island of Sphacteria. Thucydides counts 292 men taken alive to Athens, about 120 of them Spartiates, after a blockade of 72 days, and writes that nothing in the war surprised the Greeks so much. Diodorus gives the same 120 Spartiates and 180 allies, brought to Athens in chains by Cleon.4

The surrender left traces in Athens that can still be seen. Pausanias, travelling in the 2nd century AD, saw bronze shields in the Painted Stoa said to be those of the Spartans taken on Sphacteria, smeared with pitch to keep off rust. In 1936 excavators of the American School found one such bronze shield in a cistern on Kolonos Agoraios, the Agora excavation record notes, inscribed in punched letters as Athenian loot from the battle of Pylos of 425 BC.5

Mantinea, 418 BC

Sparta answered on land. At Mantinea it beat an army of Argives, Mantineans and Athenians in what Thucydides calls the greatest battle for a very long while among the Greeks. He gives the losses of the other side as 700 Argives and allies, 200 Mantineans and 200 Athenians and Aeginetans with both their generals, against about 300 Spartans by report, and says the charge of cowardice over Sphacteria was wiped out by this single action.6

Sicily, 415 to 413 BC

Athens' greatest blow fell far from Sparta. Diodorus records that the expedition sailed with 140 triremes and more than 7,000 allied troops besides the crews. A Spartan, Gylippus, led the defence of Syracuse. The Enciclopedia Italiana says Athens lost almost its whole fleet in the harbour of Syracuse and thousands of men in the retreat.7

Aegospotami and the surrender, 405 to 404 BC

The war ended at sea. Xenophon, Plutarch and Diodorus all give the Athenian fleet at the Hellespont as 180 ships. Lysander caught it on the beach at Aegospotami while the crews were scattered ashore. Xenophon says only Conon's ship, seven others and the state galley Paralus got away, and that the other 171 were taken, and Plutarch says Lysander took 3,000 prisoners with their generals.8

In spring 404 BC Athens surrendered. Xenophon describes the Long Walls coming down to the music of flute girls, the allies thinking that day the beginning of freedom for Greece, and Plutarch tells the same scene, adding that Lysander set up thirty rulers in the city and a Spartan garrison on the Acropolis.9

Nineteenth-century map of Athens with the Long Walls running down to the harbours of Piraeus and Phaleron
Map of ancient Athens and the Long Walls linking the city to its harbours at Piraeus and Phaleron, published by George William Cox in 1876. Athens had to pull the Long Walls down when it surrendered in 404 BC. Public domain

War on land

The case for Sparta

In a pitched battle no Greek state could match Sparta. Herodotus has the exiled king Demaratus warn Xerxes that the Spartans, fighting together, are the best warriors on earth, because law is their master and it bids them never to flee from any multitude of men but to stand and conquer or die. At Plataea, he writes, the Spartans took the post of honour on the right wing.10

The case for Athens

Athens did not need to win on land to survive, and Sphacteria showed that Spartans could be beaten. An Athenian critic of the democracy known as the Old Oligarch, in a short treatise long attributed to Xenophon, observed that the Athenians stored their goods on the islands, trusting to their command of the sea, and let Attica be ravaged without a sigh. The historian Donald Kagan, as Tim Rood sums him up, thought this defensive strategy of Pericles weaker than Thucydides allowed.11

War at sea

The case for Sparta

Sparta learned to fight at sea and won the war there. Diodorus records that at Notium in 406 BC, while Alcibiades was away, Lysander beat the Athenian fleet and took 22 ships. At Aegospotami he caught the last great Athenian fleet on the beach, and Plutarch writes that he ended in a single hour a war of unmatched length and variety.12

The case for Athens

Athens was the sea power of Greece from the Persian Wars on: at Artemisium it supplied 127 ships, by far the largest contingent in Herodotus' list. The Old Oligarch explains the politics behind it: it was the common people who manned the fleet, the steersmen, boatswains and rowers, who gave the city its power, far more than its heavy infantry. Even late in the war Athens could win at sea, as at Arginusae in 406 BC, which Diodorus describes.13

Reconstructed Greek trireme Olympias in a museum shelter
Olympias, a full-size reconstruction of an Athenian trireme completed in 1987, displayed at Palaio Faliro near Athens. Public domain

Money

The case for Sparta

Sparta found the money it lacked. Xenophon has the Persian prince Cyrus tell the Spartan envoys that he had brought 500 talents, and that if this ran out he would coin the gold and silver throne he sat on. Plutarch describes Lysander winning Cyrus over against the satrap Tissaphernes, whose meagre subsidies had held the fleet back.14

The case for Athens

Athens began the war rich. Thucydides gives an average revenue of 600 talents a year from the allies' tribute, 6,000 talents of coined silver on the Acropolis, and an army of 13,000 hoplites with 16,000 more on guard and 300 triremes. The tribute was recorded in stone: Attic Inscriptions Online explains that from 454/3 BC a sixtieth of each city's payment was dedicated to Athena and listed on stelai on the Acropolis, the first of them some 3.8 metres high.15

Decisions

The case for Sparta

Sparta's system was stable and its citizens drilled for war. Paul Cartledge, as his reviewer in the Bryn Mawr Classical Review describes his work, saw it as an armed camp whose citizens dined in their messes every night. When its ships finally won, Sparta used the moment: within months of Aegospotami, Plutarch tells, Athens had surrendered.16

Its slowness was notorious, and an Athenian historian enjoyed saying so. In 411 BC, when Athens had lost Euboea and had no fleet to defend Piraeus, the Spartans did not attack, and Thucydides calls them the most convenient people in the world for the Athenians to be at war with.17

The case for Athens

Athens could take risks no other Greek state would, and paid for some of them. In a speech Thucydides writes for the Corinthians, the Athenians are born to take no rest themselves and give none to others, while the Spartans have a genius for keeping what they have and a total want of invention. Yet Thucydides also blames Pericles' successors for a host of blunders, the Sicilian expedition among them, and says Athens fell in the end to its own internal disorders.18

Not everyone accepts that verdict on the assembly. Ugo Fantasia, as Bruno Bleckmann reports, argues that by leaving out Athens' treaty with Segesta, Thucydides made the people's vote for Sicily look far more irrational than it was. Kagan went further and held that Thucydides was writing partly to defend the generals blamed for Sicily and for Amphipolis, himself among them.19

The most convenient people in the world for the Athenians to be at war with. Thucydides, on the Spartans

Citizens and manpower

The case for Sparta

Every Spartiate was a soldier, but the numbers were small and shrinking. The Enciclopedia Italiana puts the Spartiates at 8,000 in 480 BC, reduced to a quarter of that by the 4th century, and Aristotle writes that their land could support 1,500 cavalry and 30,000 infantry, yet the citizens numbered not even a thousand, so that the city could not survive a single blow and was ruined for want of men.20

The whole system rested on the helots, the unfree population of Laconia and Messenia who worked the land: at Plataea, Herodotus says, each Spartiate was attended by seven of them. Ellen Millender, reviewing a volume on the helots, reports Paul Cartledge's view that their brutal treatment and the shortage of Spartan citizens help explain their unusual revolts, and Susan Alcock's warning that the evidence is so thin that the helots have become a kind of Rorschach test for historians.21

Leuctra in 371 BC showed what that meant. Xenophon says nearly a thousand Lacedaemonians fell there, among them some 400 of the 700 Spartiates present. Diodorus gives more than 4,000 Lacedaemonian dead against about 300 Boeotians. The figures differ widely, and both are given here.22

The case for Athens

Athens drew on a far larger population, and its fleet was manned by the poorer citizens, as the Old Oligarch complained. Its losses were still terrible: the Enciclopedia Italiana counts thousands dead in the retreat from Syracuse. Stewart Flory, reviewing Victor Davis Hanson's study of the war, notes that Hanson builds his case on its death toll, and warns that the ancient figures he relies on are often exaggerated.23

What came after

The case for Sparta

Sparta won the war and led Greece for a generation. The Enciclopedia Italiana describes its hegemony after 404 BC, backed by Persian support that was confirmed in the King's Peace of 386 BC. It also records how it ended: Sparta's harsh rule over its allies broke up its league, and after Leuctra in 371 BC the lead passed to Thebes and Messenia was lost. Xenophon's account of Leuctra shows how heavy the blow was.24

The case for Athens

Athens lost the war but kept what it had built, and its monuments still shape how both cities are seen. Thucydides remarked that no visitor could guess Sparta's power from its plain villages, a passage Cartledge, his reviewer notes, explains by Sparta's lack of a city wall and of urban splendour.25

No visitor, Thucydides remarked, could guess Sparta's power from its plain villages.

The record of its empire survives too. The tribute lists of the Delian League, inscribed from 454/3 BC, are the most massive of all Athenian inscriptions, Attic Inscriptions Online notes, and the portions dedicated to Athena probably helped pay for the Periclean buildings on the Acropolis.26

The Enciclopedia Italiana draws a darker conclusion for both. The war left Greece so impoverished and weakened, it suggests, that this may be one reason why the Greeks resisted Macedon so little sixty years later, when Philip II marched south.27

How historians have judged them

The ancient judgement comes mostly from Athenians. Thucydides admired Pericles' strategy and blamed Athens' defeat on its own politics, a reading Kagan challenged point by point: in his view, as Rood lists it, Thucydides was wrong that the war was inevitable, wrong about Pericles' strategy and unfair to Cleon at Pylos. Aristotle explained Sparta's decline by its shrinking citizen body.28

Others defend Thucydides. Rood himself disputes Kagan's reading of the passage on the war's causes, and Fantasia, Bleckmann notes, sees little reason to challenge Thucydides' authority, holding that even his speeches can help reconstruct events. Paul Cartledge argued that Sparta was as foreign to other Greeks as the Soviet Union and China were to the West of the 1960s, and that the Spartan mirage, the legend built around it, can be studied but never fully dispelled.29

The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable. Thucydides, 1.23

For Victor Davis Hanson the war was unlike any other because of the lives it cost, a reading that Flory finds rich in insight but weak in its use of ancient numbers. Between the Athenian witness, the Spartan mirage and the body count, the evidence leaves room for more than one verdict.30

Battles on the site

Echoes of Battle has no page yet for a battle between Sparta and Athens. These are the pages on the wars they fought together, the men who led them, and the guides that set them in context.

Sphacteria, Mantinea, Syracuse, Notium, Arginusae, Aegospotami and Leuctra do not have pages yet. See also Spartan vs Samurai.

Your verdict

We do not pick a winner. Here are the two cases at their strongest, and the questions that decide which one you find more convincing.

For Sparta

  • The strongest army in Greece, proved again at Mantinea
  • The post of honour at Plataea, with 5,000 Spartiates
  • A navy built almost from nothing that won at Notium and Aegospotami
  • Victory in the war, and Athens' surrender in 404 BC
  • A system that drilled every citizen for war

For Athens

  • The largest contingent of the Greek fleet against Xerxes
  • Sphacteria, the surrender no one thought possible
  • Money enough for a fleet of 300 triremes
  • A citizen body large enough to replace its losses
  • An empire documented in stone on the Acropolis

Questions to weigh before you decide:

  1. Does winning the war make Sparta the stronger state, when it needed Persian money to build the fleet that won it?
  2. Should Athens be judged by Pericles' strategy or by the assembly's choices after him, Sicily above all?
  3. Is a state that cannot replace its citizens strong or brittle?
  4. How far can we trust Thucydides, an exiled Athenian general, on Athenian mistakes and Spartan virtues?
  5. Which counts more: the battles each won, or what each still had after 404 and 371 BC?
  6. Was the real winner Persia, which paid for Sparta's fleet?

Frequently asked questions

Who won, Sparta or Athens?

Sparta won. The Peloponnesian War of 431 to 404 BC ended with Athens' surrender to Sparta in spring 404 BC, after Lysander captured the Athenian fleet at Aegospotami in 405 BC. Athens had to pull down its Long Walls, and Sparta won the war with Persian money.

Which was stronger, Sparta or Athens?

Historians have not settled it. Sparta had the best army and won the Peloponnesian War with Persian money, while Athens had the best navy and the richer empire and held out for years after its disaster in Sicily. Thucydides blamed Athens' defeat on its own politics, a reading Kagan challenged point by point. This page compares the evidence for both.

Who won the Peloponnesian War?

Sparta. After Lysander captured the Athenian fleet at Aegospotami in 405 BC, Athens surrendered in spring 404 BC, pulled down its Long Walls and accepted a government of thirty men backed by Sparta. Sparta itself lost its leadership of Greece to Thebes after the battle of Leuctra in 371 BC.

Did Sparta and Athens ever fight on the same side?

Yes. They were allies against Persia in 480 and 479 BC. Herodotus counts 127 Athenian and 10 Spartan ships at Artemisium, and at Plataea 10,000 Lacedaemonians, 5,000 of them Spartiates, on the right wing and 8,000 Athenians on the left.

Why did the Peloponnesian War start?

Thucydides wrote that the truest cause was the growth of Athenian power and the alarm it caused in Sparta. The Enciclopedia Italiana adds the immediate causes: Athens' intervention at Corcyra and Potidaea and its blockade of Megara's trade. Donald Kagan argued that Thucydides was wrong to call the war inevitable.

What happened at Sphacteria in 425 BC?

Athenian forces cut off Spartan hoplites on the island of Sphacteria near Pylos. After 72 days 292 men surrendered, about 120 of them Spartiates, which Thucydides says surprised the Greeks more than anything else in the war. A bronze Spartan shield taken there was found in the Athenian Agora in 1936.

How many Spartan citizens were there?

Few, and fewer over time. The Enciclopedia Italiana gives about 8,000 Spartiates in 480 BC, reduced to a quarter later. Aristotle wrote that in his day they numbered not even a thousand. At Leuctra in 371 BC, Xenophon says, about 400 of the 700 Spartiates present were killed.

How did Persia help Sparta win?

Persian money paid for the Spartan fleet. Xenophon has the prince Cyrus promise 500 talents and even his gold and silver throne, and Plutarch describes Lysander winning his support. With that fleet Lysander won at Notium in 406 BC and Aegospotami in 405 BC.

Notes

A number in the text points to a note. Each note names the works that paragraph draws on, listed in full under Sources.

  1. Thucydides, “History of the Peloponnesian War”. Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, “Peloponneso, guerra del”. ↩
  2. Herodotus, “The Histories”. Aristotle, “Politics”. Stephen Lambert and Robin Osborne, “IG I³ 259”. Bryn Mawr Classical Review, review of Paul Cartledge, “Spartan Reflections”. ↩
  3. Herodotus, “The Histories”. ↩
  4. Thucydides, “History of the Peloponnesian War”. Diodorus Siculus, “Library of History”. ↩
  5. Pausanias, “Description of Greece”. American School of Classical Studies at Athens, “Shield”. ↩
  6. Thucydides, “History of the Peloponnesian War”. ↩
  7. Diodorus Siculus, “Library of History”. Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, “Peloponneso, guerra del”. ↩
  8. Xenophon, “Hellenica”. Plutarch, “Life of Lysander”. Diodorus Siculus, “Library of History”. ↩
  9. Xenophon, “Hellenica”. Plutarch, “Life of Lysander”. ↩
  10. Herodotus, “The Histories”. ↩
  11. Pseudo-Xenophon, “The Polity of the Athenians”. Tim Rood, review of Donald Kagan, “Thucydides”. ↩
  12. Diodorus Siculus, “Library of History”. Plutarch, “Life of Lysander”. ↩
  13. Herodotus, “The Histories”. Pseudo-Xenophon, “The Polity of the Athenians”. Diodorus Siculus, “Library of History”. ↩
  14. Xenophon, “Hellenica”. Plutarch, “Life of Lysander”. ↩
  15. Thucydides, “History of the Peloponnesian War”. Stephen Lambert and Robin Osborne, “IG I³ 259”. ↩
  16. Bryn Mawr Classical Review, review of Paul Cartledge, “Spartan Reflections”. Plutarch, “Life of Lysander”. ↩
  17. Thucydides, “History of the Peloponnesian War”. ↩
  18. Thucydides, “History of the Peloponnesian War”. ↩
  19. Bruno Bleckmann, review of Ugo Fantasia, “La guerra del Peloponneso”. Tim Rood, review of Donald Kagan, “Thucydides”. ↩
  20. Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, “Sparta”. Aristotle, “Politics”. ↩
  21. Herodotus, “The Histories”. Ellen Millender, review of Nino Luraghi and Susan E. Alcock (eds.), “Helots and Their Masters in Laconia and Messenia”. ↩
  22. Xenophon, “Hellenica”. Diodorus Siculus, “Library of History”. ↩
  23. Pseudo-Xenophon, “The Polity of the Athenians”. Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, “Peloponneso, guerra del”. Stewart Flory, review of Victor Davis Hanson, “A War Like No Other”. ↩
  24. Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, “Sparta”. Xenophon, “Hellenica”. ↩
  25. Bryn Mawr Classical Review, review of Paul Cartledge, “Spartan Reflections”. ↩
  26. Stephen Lambert and Robin Osborne, “IG I³ 259”. ↩
  27. Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, “Peloponneso, guerra del”. ↩
  28. Tim Rood, review of Donald Kagan, “Thucydides”. Aristotle, “Politics”. ↩
  29. Tim Rood, review of Donald Kagan, “Thucydides”. Bruno Bleckmann, review of Ugo Fantasia, “La guerra del Peloponneso”. Bryn Mawr Classical Review, review of Paul Cartledge, “Spartan Reflections”. ↩
  30. Stewart Flory, review of Victor Davis Hanson, “A War Like No Other”. Bryn Mawr Classical Review, review of Paul Cartledge, “Spartan Reflections”. ↩

Sources

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