Genghis Khan or Alexander: what does the evidence say?
Alexander the Great (356 to 323 BC) and Genghis Khan (born 1162 or 1167, died 1227) never met: fifteen centuries lie between them. Both built empires on the march, and both fought on the same ground in Central Asia and on the Indus. Historians have not settled who was the greater conqueror. Plutarch tells that Hannibal named Alexander the mightiest of generals, and Napoleon placed him first among the commanders to study. Liddell Hart wrote that the Mongol empire made Alexander's look almost insignificant, though he meant size, not skill. This page sets out the evidence for each and leaves the final verdict to you.
One was a king's son who inherited the best army of his age and led it from Macedonia to the Punjab. The other was the son of a minor Mongol chief, abandoned with his mother as a boy, who united the tribes of the steppe and then turned their horsemen on China and the Islamic world. Theodore Ayrault Dodge wrote of Alexander that no monarch of his years was ever so well equipped in head and heart. The Persian historian Juvaini asked what army in the whole world could equal the Mongol army.1
This is not a ranking. Below you will find the two careers side by side, the places where their campaigns crossed the same rivers and cities, and seven questions on which a conqueror can be judged, from strategy to what he left behind. Under each we give the strongest evidence for Genghis Khan and the strongest for Alexander, with the period writers and modern historians who argue each case. At the end the decision is yours.
Side by side
- Lived
- Born 1162 or 1167 (the year is uncertain), died 1227
- 356 to 323 BC
- Origin
- Son of Yesügei, a minor Mongol chief killed by the Tatars
- Son of King Philip II of Macedon
- Became ruler
- Proclaimed khan at the assembly of 1206, after years of steppe wars
- King in 336 BC, at twenty
- Army
- Built by himself from the tribes, ninety-five units of a thousand in 1206
- Inherited from Philip, some 30,000 to 32,000 foot and 4,500 to 5,000 horse in 334 BC
- Main wars
- The steppe tribes, Xi Xia from 1205, the Jin from 1211, Khwarazm from 1219, Xi Xia again 1226 to 1227
- The Persian empire 334 to 330 BC, Bactria and Sogdiana, India from 326 BC
- Notable opponents
- Jamuqa, Toghril Ong Khan, the Jin emperors, the Khwarazm-shah and his son Jalal al-Din
- Darius III, Bessus, Spitamenes, Porus
- Battles named here
- The Juyong pass 1211, Bukhara 1220, Parwan and the Indus 1221 (no page yet)
- The Granicus, Issus, Gaugamela, the Jaxartes, the Hydaspes
- Death
- On campaign against the Tanguts, 1227, cause unknown
- Of a fever, 323 BC
Dates, origins and armies as given by the Library of Congress country study of Mongolia, Treccani, the Secret History, Diodorus and Dodge. We give no win and loss totals because no source counts their battles the same way.2
They never met: the same ground, fifteen centuries apart
We found no source that compares the two men directly, except to measure their empires. Their campaigns, though, crossed the same frontier: the Syr Darya, which the Greeks called the Jaxartes, the cities of Sogdiana around Samarkand, and the road south to the Indus. On that ground Alexander was the outsider facing steppe horsemen, and Genghis Khan was the steppe horseman facing walled cities.
The Jaxartes, 329 BC: Alexander against the steppe
On the Syr Darya Alexander met the Scythian horse archers. Arrian describes how they rode round his first cavalry in circles and wounded them, while escaping with ease. Alexander answered by mixing archers, Agrianians and other light troops among his horsemen, then charging with the Companions, so that the Scythians could no longer wheel. Arrian puts their losses at 1,000 dead and 150 captured, and says only Alexander's illness from bad water saved the rest.3
The same campaign showed how dangerous that country was. Near Maracanda, the city later called Samarkand, the Sogdian leader Spitamenes and his Scythian horsemen destroyed a Macedonian detachment on the Polytimetus river. In the version Arrian takes from Aristobulus, not more than forty horsemen and 300 foot escaped.4
The Syr Darya, 1219 to 1220: Genghis Khan against the cities
Fifteen centuries later the roles were reversed. After the Khwarazm-shah's men murdered a Mongol caravan at Otrar and killed the envoys sent to protest, Genghis Khan invaded in 1219 after, as Columbia University's Asia for Educators puts it, considerable time spent on logistical planning. The shah, Liddell Hart writes, strung his forces out in packets along the Syr Darya, like Napoleon's opponents in the fatal cordon system.5
Liddell Hart tells what followed. While his sons cleared the line of the river, Genghis Khan took a reserve of some 40,000 to 50,000 men across the Kyzyl Kum desert, believed impassable, and appeared in the shah's rear at Bukhara. Rarely, if ever, Liddell Hart wrote, has the principle of surprise been so dramatically or completely fulfilled. Juvaini preserves a survivor's summary of Bukhara: they came, they sapped, they burnt, they slew, they plundered and they departed.6

The Indus: 326 BC and 1221
Both men reached the Indus, and neither went much further. Alexander beat Porus on the Hydaspes in 326 BC, but his army would go no further. Plutarch says his men violently opposed him when he insisted on crossing the Ganges, and that he shut himself in his tent in anger before he gave way.7
Genghis Khan pursued Jalal al-Din, the shah's son, to the same river. The Secret History calls it the Sin and tells how the shah's men threw themselves into it, while Jalal al-Din fled upstream and saved his life. Edmund Bosworth, in the Encyclopaedia Iranica, dates the battle on the Indus to August or September 1221 or two months later, and says Jalal al-Din escaped by riding his horse across the river. Genghis Khan turned back towards Mongolia.8
Strategy: the plan for a whole war
The case for Genghis Khan
The Khwarazm war was planned as one blow from several sides. The Secret History gives Genghis Khan's orders to Jebe, Sübe'etei and Toqucar: go round the outside, come out at the other side of the sultan, and wait for us to arrive. Liddell Hart describes three armies under the khan and his sons converging on the Syr Darya while a fourth column came in from the south, and sums up the result: in five months an army of 200,000 was wiped out and the Khwarazmian empire overthrown, every move made in calculated and orderly sequence towards the objective. He set Genghis Khan and his general Subutai beside Napoleon as the only strategists to match them.9
The case for Alexander
Alexander's strategy was to take the whole of the Persian empire. Pierre Briant writes that from 334 BC he had in view the whole extent of the empire as it had been in Darius I's time. After Issus he marched not to the Euphrates but to Phoenicia and Egypt, which Briant reads as the plan made at Miletus in 334: to take the whole Aegean front of the Persian empire first.10
Theodore Ayrault Dodge, writing in 1889, called this advance our first instance on a grand scale of methodical war, the origin of strategy: Alexander would not risk the heart of Persia until he held the whole coast of the eastern Mediterranean as his base. Napoleon put Alexander first in the list of captains he told officers to read again and again.11
Battlefield tactics
The case for Genghis Khan
Asia for Educators names the feigned withdrawal as a tactic Genghis Khan particularly liked: troops pretend to be defeated, pull back, and the pursuers find fresh detachments falling on them. The Secret History gives an example from 1211. At the Juyong pass Jebe said, we shall entice them and get them to move and come after us, turned back, and routed the Jin troops who followed in successive waves, while Genghis Khan with the main body broke their army behind them.12
The army was built for this. Morris Rossabi writes that a cavalryman normally had three or four horses, so that each could rest, and calls Mongol horses the intercontinental ballistic missiles of the thirteenth century. John of Plano Carpini, who visited the Mongols some two decades after Genghis Khan's death, warned that the Tartar fights more by policy than by main force.13
The case for Alexander
Alexander won four great pitched battles, the Granicus in 334, Issus in 333, Gaugamela in 331 and the Hydaspes in 326 BC. At Gaugamela Arrian gives him 7,000 cavalry and about 40,000 infantry, and reports what Darius's army was said to contain, 40,000 cavalry and 1,000,000 infantry, a figure he gives only as hearsay. Even Livy, who argued that Rome would have beaten him, records the boast of his admirers that he never fought a battle unsuccessfully.14
Liddell Hart, writing about the Mongols, saw the difference between the two systems: cavalry was the decisive arm of Alexander too, but it formed the mobile wings hinged on a protective infantry centre, where the Mongols fought with a single arm.15

Building the army
The case for Genghis Khan
Genghis Khan made his army himself. In 1206, the Secret History says, he formed units of a thousand and named their commanders, ninety-five of them outside the forest peoples. Asia for Educators adds that he broke up the tribes that joined him and scattered their men through his units, so that loyalty went to him and not to a tribal chief. Tomasz Borowski of the Museum of Polish History reckons this an army of nearly 100,000.16
Carpini describes the same decimal ladder of tens, hundreds and thousands, and the collective punishment that held it: if one of ten was taken and his fellows did not rescue him, they were put to death. Timothy May's study, as its De Re Militari review summarises it, describes units answerable for one another's conduct, booty shared only after the battle, and an elite guard loyal to the unit rather than the clan.17
The case for Alexander
Alexander inherited his army, and Dodge says so plainly: like Hannibal and Frederick, Alexander owed his military training and his army to his father. Philip had found a rabble and left the most perfect machine of ancient days. The force that crossed to Asia in 334 BC was small. Arrian gives not much above 30,000 infantry and more than 5,000 cavalry, and Diodorus, counting unit by unit, 32,000 foot and 4,500 horse.18
What Alexander did with it was to make it larger and Asian. Briant notes the first recruitment of Iranian levies during the war in Bactria and Sogdiana, the choice of a Persian, Mazaios, as satrap of Babylon in 331 BC, and the marriages at Susa in 324. Livy, hostile, saw the same change from the other side: an army that had forgotten its native Macedonia and was rapidly becoming Persian in character.19
Walls and sieges
The case for Genghis Khan
The Mongols began as an army that could not take cities. The Library of Congress study of Mongolia notes that against the Jin they won in the field but were frustrated by the walls, until, with the help of Chinese engineers, they developed the techniques that made them among the most successful besiegers in history. The Jin capital, today's Beijing, was taken in 1215, and the Khwarazmian cities followed.20
The case for Alexander
Alexander was a besieger from the start. Tyre held out for seven months, Plutarch and Diodorus agree, against moles, siege engines and two hundred warships, until a breach let his men in. Diodorus counts more than seven thousand Tyrians cut down fighting and the women and children sold.21
Who led the fighting
The case for Genghis Khan
Genghis Khan led the main body himself in 1211, according to the Secret History, and took the reserve across the desert to Bukhara in 1220, according to Liddell Hart. He also chose and judged his generals: the Secret History shows him praising Jebe and Sübe'etei and demoting Toqucar for attacking towns against orders.22
His gift for choosing men is part of the case. The Library of Congress study tells how he sent only two units of ten thousand under a brilliant young general, Jebe, against Küchlüg of the Naimans, and Jebe overran the country. May's study, as reviewed, argues that the Mongols chose their commanders by merit and kept producing good ones, unlike their medieval rivals.23
The case for Alexander
Alexander fought in the front rank. At the Granicus, Arrian says, he struck the Persian Rhoesaces through the breastplate with his lance, and Cleitus cut off the arm of Spithridates as he raised his scimitar over the king, a rescue Plutarch tells too. In Sogdiana a dart went through his breastplate into his shoulder, and in India, after leaping into a Mallian stronghold, he was wounded by an arrow under the breast.24
Dodge notes that even at eighteen, at Chaeronea, he led the charges of the Macedonian left himself. He also saw the risk: fortune saved Alexander in many acts of rashness, he wrote, and he called him the captain of fortune.25
Setbacks and cost
The case for Genghis Khan
Genghis Khan's armies did lose. In 1221 Jalal al-Din defeated the Mongol army under Shigi Qutuqu at Parwan, as the Secret History records, and Tomasz Borowski of the Museum of Polish History calls Parwan a great battle with several thousand killed at least. Yet the defeat did not save Khwarazm, which the Mongols destroyed all the same.26
His critics point to the price. Juvaini reports a count of more than 1,300,000 dead at Merv, and Morgan cites chroniclers who gave 1,747,000 at Nishapur and 1.6 or 2.4 million at Herat, while warning that such figures should not be taken too literally and that it may be doubted anyone was counting. The destruction, he adds, was beyond anything contemporaries had known. Jomini called Genghis Khan's war of invasion a crime against humanity.27
The case for Alexander
Alexander's record has its own setbacks. His army refused to cross the Hyphasis in 326 BC, a chapter Arrian heads the army refuses to advance. On the march back through the Gedrosian desert, Arrian writes, the scorching heat and lack of water destroyed a great part of the army, and he reports, after Nearchus, that Alexander chose the route partly from a desire of excelling Cyrus and Semiramis.28
His conquests were not bloodless either. Diodorus records the men of Tyre cut down and the women and children enslaved. Dodge tells how, before he crossed to Asia, he destroyed Thebes and sold its people into slavery, and Livy, writing three centuries later, still recalled the smoking ruins of Thebes.29
What came after
The case for Genghis Khan
Morgan calls the empire Genghis Khan founded the most extensive land empire known to history, and notes that it kept expanding for another half century. He also left the nucleus of an imperial administration and, borrowing the Uighur script, a written Mongolian language. Asia for Educators dates that script to 1204 and lists a law code, the Jasagh, among his legacies, while Morgan doubts that a written code, the great yasa, can be ascribed to him.30
Asia for Educators also notes the weakness: he left no orderly system of succession, and the empire rested on personal loyalty to the khan. Treccani sums him up as a great destroyer but also a great general and the organiser and lawgiver of the nomad world.31
The case for Alexander
Briant sees in Alexander's empire a restoration of the Persian empire to the limits Darius I had given it, including the Indian lands, run through the Achaemenid satrapies that he kept. Plutarch's account of the court journals has him dying of a fever in 323 BC, still discussing the army's vacant posts with his officers in his last days.32
The weak point is the same as Genghis Khan's: it all rested on one man. Arrian tells of Cleitus, who had saved his life at the Granicus, killed by Alexander's own hand at a drinking party, and of the quarrel over prostration before the king. Livy listed the prostrations and the love of Persian dress among the drawbacks to his merits as a commander.33
How historians have judged them
Alexander's judges started in antiquity. Plutarch tells that Hannibal named Alexander the mightiest of generals. Napoleon placed him first among the commanders every officer should study. Dodge wrote that if the test were the accomplishment of the all but impossible, Alexander would easily stand at the head of all men who have ever lived, while noting that he never met armies such as the Macedonian army was.34
Genghis Khan's judges are divided in the same way. Juvaini admired his army and recorded its massacres. Jomini condemned the war as a crime. Liddell Hart in 1927 tried to rescue Genghis Khan and Subutai from neglect and wrote that their empire made the empires of Rome and Alexander appear almost insignificant in comparison, though he meant size, not skill.35
Modern scholarship tempers both. Briant warns that overemphasising Alexander's three great victories has led historians to underestimate how hard the Persian empire fought on. May's study argues that Mongol success rested on discipline and organisation rather than on sheer numbers, a view its reviewer finds already well understood. Treccani gives Genghis Khan both labels at once, destroyer and great general.36
Battles on the site
None of Genghis Khan's own battles has a page here yet. Below are Alexander's battles, the later Mongol battles fought by his generals and grandsons, and the guides that set both men in context.
Alexander in command · 333 BCBattle of Issus
Alexander in command · 331 BCBattle of Gaugamela
Alexander in command · 326 BCBattle of the Hydaspes
His heirs · 1241Battle of Legnica
Subutai and Batu · 1241Battle of Mohi
Mongols defeated · 1260Battle of Ain Jalut
Guide · 336 to 323 BCThe Wars of Alexander the Great
CommanderGenghis Khan
CommanderAlexander the Great
CommanderSubutai
CommanderPhilip II of Macedon
ExplainerHorse Archers
RankingGreatest Mongol Generals
RankingThe Greatest Battles of the Persian Empire
GuideBattles of India
RankingThe Greatest Military Commanders
Your verdict
We do not pick a winner. Here are the two cases at their strongest, and the questions that decide which one you find more convincing.
For Genghis Khan
- An army built from feuding tribes, not inherited
- The desert march to Bukhara and the fall of Khwarazm in months
- Generals such as Jebe and Subutai, chosen and judged by him
- A siege craft learned in war and used from China to Persia
- An empire that kept growing for half a century after his death
For Alexander
- Four great pitched battles, all won
- King at twenty, master of the Persian empire four years after crossing to Asia
- Victory over the steppe horse archers on their own river
- Tyre taken after seven months, against moles and warships
- A king who fought in the front rank and was wounded again and again
Questions to weigh before you decide:
- Is creating an army from feuding clans a greater feat than leading the best army of the age to its limit?
- Should a conqueror be credited with the size his empire reached under his sons and grandsons?
- Genghis Khan left many campaigns to his generals, Alexander led almost all in person. Which matters more?
- On the same Central Asian ground, who adapted more: the Macedonian against horse archers, or the horse archers against walls?
- How should the killing of civilians weigh in judging either man?
Cast your vote below and see how other readers have judged them.








