Genghis Khan or Napoleon: what does the evidence say?
Genghis Khan (born 1162 or 1167, died 1227) and Napoleon Bonaparte (1769 to 1821) lived six centuries apart and never met. Both turned a small start into the largest power of their time, and both sent armies into Russia, with very different results. Historians have not settled who was the greater conqueror. Liddell Hart set the strategy of Genghis Khan and Subutai beside Napoleon's and called Subutai's advance on Hungary the Napoleonic method. Jomini thought Napoleon's victories showed what boldness and skill can do, and his disasters what prudence could have prevented. This page sets out the evidence for each and leaves the final verdict to you.
No pair in this series has been compared more often by military writers. In 1927 Basil Liddell Hart wrote that the strategical ability of Genghis Khan and his general Subutai was matched in history only by that of Napoleon. Nearly a century earlier Jomini put both men in a single chapter on wars of invasion: Napoleon's career taught what to avoid, and Genghis Khan's war without good reason he called a crime against humanity.1
This is not a ranking. Below you will find the two careers side by side, the one country both of their armies invaded, and seven questions on which a conqueror can be judged, from strategy to the laws he left behind. Under each we give the strongest evidence for Genghis Khan and the strongest for Napoleon, with the period writers and modern historians who argue each case. At the end the decision is yours.
Side by side
- Lived
- Born 1162 or 1167 (the year is uncertain), died 1227
- Born at Ajaccio on 15 August 1769, died on St Helena on 5 May 1821
- Origin
- Son of Yesügei, a minor Mongol chief killed by the Tatars
- Corsican minor nobility, trained at the military school of Brienne
- Became ruler
- Proclaimed khan at the assembly of 1206
- Consul after the coup of November 1799, Emperor of the French in 1804
- Main wars
- The steppe tribes, Xi Xia from 1205, the Jin from 1211, Khwarazm from 1219, Xi Xia again 1226 to 1227
- Italy 1796 to 1797, Egypt 1798 to 1799, the coalitions to 1815, Spain from 1808, Russia 1812
- Battle count
- No source gives one
- Sixty fought, seven lost, by Andrew Roberts' count. Napoleon himself spoke of forty battles won
- Battles named here
- The Juyong pass 1211, Bukhara 1220, Parwan and the Indus 1221 (no page yet)
- Austerlitz, Jena, Borodino, Leipzig, Waterloo
- End
- Died on campaign against the Tanguts, his empire intact and still growing
- Abdicated in 1814 and again on 22 June 1815, died in exile
Dates and careers as given by the Library of Congress country study of Mongolia, the Secret History, Jean Tulard's Dictionnaire Napoléon and the Fondation Napoléon. Roberts' count is quoted from the Kirkus review of his biography.2
They never met: Russia, 1223 and 1812
The two men never fought each other, but both of their armies invaded the lands of the Rus'. Genghis Khan did not go there himself. His generals Jebe and Subutai did, at the head of a detachment sent west during the war against Khwarazm. Napoleon led his own army to Moscow. What happened to each army is the nearest thing to a test on the same ground that history offers.3
The Kalka, 1223
Morris Rossabi tells the story. Genghis Khan sent about 30,000 men under Jebe and Subutai on a reconnaissance to the west. Crossing the Caucasus cost them many men and horses. In May 1223 they met a Rus' army of 80,000 under Mstislav the Daring. The Mongols, no more than 20,000 by Rossabi's count, retreated for more than a week until their pursuers were strung out, then turned on them at the Kalka river and destroyed them. The Library of Congress study gives the detachment as about 25,000 and the Rus' and Cuman army also as 80,000, and adds that the battle followed the murder of Mongol envoys.4

The detachment then marched back east, after a trek the Library of Congress study puts at more than 6,400 kilometres. The conquest of the Rus' principalities began only in the 1230s, under his son and successor Ögedei. The papal envoy John of Plano Carpini, who passed through Kiev in the 1240s, writes that the Mongols besieged it a long while, took it and slew the citizens, and that scarcely two hundred houses remained.5
Moscow, 1812
Napoleon crossed the Niemen on 24 June 1812. How many men he took depends on whom you read. Clausewitz, using Chambray's figures, gives the centre that marched on Moscow as 301,000. J. Holland Rose counts the whole Grand Army, with its German, Italian and Polish contingents, at 600,000. By Smolensk, Clausewitz writes, the centre had lost 105,000 men, 95,000 of them to sickness and straggling in fifty-two days, before any great battle had been fought.6
At Borodino on 7 September, the Fondation Napoléon writes, the Russians lost 45,000 dead, wounded or missing and Napoleon between 28,000 and 35,000. He entered Moscow on 14 September and left it in October without the peace he had come for. The crossing of the Berezina in November cost between 25,000 and 40,000 men. Of the 600,000 who had crossed the Niemen, Rose writes, only 20,000 famished, frost-bitten spectres staggered back across the bridge of Kovno in December.7

Clausewitz judged the campaign by its aim. If Napoleon did not obtain peace at Moscow, he wrote, there was nothing for him but a strategic defeat. Jomini named Napoleon in Russia among the bloody proofs that wars of conquest have natural limits that cannot be passed without disaster. The Mongols, by contrast, made winter their season: the Library of Congress study notes that Genghis Khan's last campaign struck late in 1226, when the rivers were frozen.8
Strategy and surprise
The case for Genghis Khan
Liddell Hart's admiration rests on the Khwarazm war of 1219 to 1220. The shah, he writes, strung his forces out in packets along the Syr Darya like Napoleon's opponents in the fatal cordon system. Genghis Khan's sons rolled up the river line while he took a reserve of 40,000 to 50,000 men across the Kyzyl Kum desert and appeared at Bukhara in the shah's rear. Rarely, if ever, Liddell Hart wrote, has the principle of surprise been so dramatically or completely fulfilled.9
The Secret History preserves the kind of order that made it work: go round the outside, come out at the other side of the sultan, and wait for us to arrive. David Morgan, in the Encyclopaedia Iranica, calls the invasion a carefully coordinated three-pronged attack.10
The case for Napoleon
Napoleon's answer is Ulm and Austerlitz. In October 1805 his corps swept round the Austrian army of General Mack until it was totally surrounded at Ulm. On 20 October, the Fondation Napoléon records, 25,000 Austrians with 60 cannon filed past him in surrender, and on 2 December he beat the Austrians and Russians at Austerlitz. Theodore Ayrault Dodge wrote that from Nice to Leoben in 1796 he showed the world what modern war can do.11
Clausewitz measured 1812 against 1805, 1807 and 1809: those campaigns had forced the enemy to make peace after Austerlitz, Friedland and Wagram, and that was their point.12

Speed
The case for Genghis Khan
Mongol speed came from the horse. Rossabi writes that a cavalryman normally had three or four, so that each could rest during a long march, and calls them the intercontinental ballistic missiles of the thirteenth century. The Secret History shows Jebe in 1211 marching through the night, each soldier leading a spare horse by hand, to take by surprise the town it calls Dungcang.13
Carpini, two decades later, warned Christian princes not to chase the Mongols, because those horses which the Tartars use one day they ride not upon three or four days after: we are not so well stored with horses as they.14
The case for Napoleon
Napoleon made speed a rule of war. The strength of an army, says the ninth of his maxims, is estimated like power in mechanics, by multiplying the mass by the rapidity, and a rapid march augments the morale of an army: press on. Dodge gives the example of Rivoli in January 1797, when his men fought at San Michele, marched all night to Rivoli, won there, and marched some thirty miles to Mantua to force Provera's surrender the next day. Napoleon could rightfully boast, Dodge wrote, to have equalled Caesar in speed of foot.15
Supply and distance
The case for Genghis Khan
The Mongol army carried its own supply system. Juvaini called it an army after the fashion of a peasantry: every man had to bring his share of weapons, ropes and pack animals according to his ten or hundred, and anyone missing even a little at the review was severely punished. Asia for Educators notes that Genghis Khan devoted considerable time to logistical planning before he invaded Khwarazm.16
Timothy May's study, as its De Re Militari review summarises it, gives a whole chapter to Mongol supply: food, spare mounts, pasture, siege engines and communications. The Mongols had good archers, the reviewer writes, and they also had good quartermasters.17
The case for Napoleon
Napoleon moved very large armies across a continent of roads and rivers. Dodge credits him with making himself independent of magazines, as Frederick had done. In 1805, the Fondation Napoléon's timeline shows, some 200,000 men left the camp at Boulogne at the end of August, were across the Rhine by forced marches in late September and over the Danube in early October.18
1812 is the counter-case, and Clausewitz made it the textbook example of how an army melts away on the march: 95,000 men lost to sickness and straggling in fifty-two days, a third of the whole army, before the great battle. Rose, writing in the early twentieth century, followed the same collapse to the bridge of Kovno.19
Generals and marshals
The case for Genghis Khan
Genghis Khan picked his commanders and judged them. In 1206, the Secret History says, he named ninety-five commanders of a thousand. After the Khwarazm campaign it shows him praising Jebe and Subutai and demoting Toqucar for attacking towns against orders. The Library of Congress study tells how he sent only two units of ten thousand under a brilliant young general, Jebe, against Küchlüg of the Naimans, and Jebe overran the country.20
His generals won battles he never saw, from the Kalka in 1223 to Mohi in 1241, after his death. Liddell Hart treated Genghis Khan and Subutai together as one subject, and May's study, as reviewed, argues that the Mongols chose their commanders by merit and kept producing good ones, unlike their medieval rivals.21
The case for Napoleon
On 19 May 1804, the day after he became emperor, Napoleon named eighteen marshals of the Empire, Tulard records. They fought in his name and sometimes in his place. The National Army Museum notes that in 1815 he detached 33,000 men to follow the Prussians after Ligny, and that Wellington thought Napoleon's own presence on a battlefield made a huge difference to his troops.22
The marshals also ended his reign. On 4 April 1814, Tulard writes, Napoleon abdicated under the pressure of the marshals.23
Defeats
The case for Genghis Khan
Genghis Khan's armies did lose, though he never lost his empire. In 1221 Jalal al-Din, son of the shah, defeated the Mongol army under Shigi Qutuqu at Parwan, as both the Secret History and the Encyclopaedia Iranica record. Genghis Khan then caught him on the Indus, where Jalal al-Din escaped only by riding his horse across the river. Genghis Khan died in 1227 on campaign, and Morgan notes that the empire went on growing for half a century.24
The case for Napoleon
Napoleon's defeats came late and they were total. After Russia came Leipzig in October 1813, which Tulard calls the collapse of Napoleonic Germany, the fall of Paris in March 1814 and the first abdication. At Waterloo, the National Army Museum writes, he had 72,000 men and 246 guns against Wellington's 68,000, and lost nearly 40,000 killed, wounded or captured.25
His defenders point to how long the run lasted. Andrew Roberts, quoted by Kirkus Reviews, writes that he fought sixty battles and lost only seven, and calls it, for any general of any age, an extraordinary record. Dodge put it differently: his strength rose distinctly through half his career and as distinctly fell during the other half, while his intellectual power never changed.26
State and law
The case for Genghis Khan
Genghis Khan united the tribes, and Columbia University's Asia for Educators notes that many think the unification, not the conquests, was his greatest achievement. He gave the Mongols a written language based on the Uighur script, which Asia for Educators dates to 1204, and Morgan credits him with the nucleus of an imperial administration that served his successors well.27
Whether he left a written code of laws is disputed. Juvaini says his yasas were written down on rolls called the Great Book of Yasas and consulted whenever a khan was enthroned or an army mobilised. Morgan thinks it no longer possible to ascribe a written code, the great yasa, to him, and Asia for Educators speaks of a Jasagh of general moral injunctions and laws.28
The case for Napoleon
Napoleon's Civil Code was promulgated on 21 March 1804 with 2,281 articles, and codes of civil procedure, commerce, criminal procedure and penal law followed by 1810, the Fondation Napoléon records. On St Helena he said his true glory was not to have won forty battles, which Waterloo would efface, but the Civil Code, which nothing would efface.29
Tulard went further: the administrator was perhaps superior to the general. Dodge, who wrote only of the soldier, still granted that in carrying forward the equality of all men before the law no more useful man appears in modern history.30
The human cost
The case for Genghis Khan
The Mongol conquests killed on a scale the chroniclers could not count. Juvaini reports more than 1,300,000 dead at Merv, and Morgan cites 1,747,000 at Nishapur and 1.6 or 2.4 million at Herat from other chroniclers, while warning that such figures should not be taken too literally and that it may be doubted anyone was counting. The destruction, he writes, was beyond anything contemporaries had known. The Secret History itself boasts of the Tanguts exterminated down to the offspring of their offspring.31
The case for Napoleon
Napoleon's wars cost lives on a vast scale too. Borodino alone, by the Fondation Napoléon's count, cost the Russians 45,000 and the French 28,000 to 35,000 dead, wounded or missing, and Rose's figures make the Russian campaign the loss of the greater part of 600,000 men. Jomini called the invasion of Spain in 1808 a cunning and wanton attack that threatened the existence of the Spanish nation.32
Tulard, for his part, thought Napoleon never understood national wars, that his surprises stopped working once his enemies had learned the lesson, and that his idea of war was closer to poker than to chess.33
How historians have judged them
The direct comparison belongs to Liddell Hart, who in 1927 set the strategy of Genghis Khan and Subutai beside Napoleon's, likened the shah's dispositions to those of Napoleon's opponents, and called Subutai's three-column advance on Hungary the Napoleonic method. He thought the West did wrong to dismiss the military potential of the East. Morgan, some sixty years later, called the Mongol army Genghis Khan's most impressive creation.34
Napoleon's judges began in his lifetime. Clausewitz took 1812 apart as a lesson in how an army wastes away on the march. Jomini thought him sent into the world to teach generals and statesmen what they should avoid, his victories showing what activity, boldness and skill can do and his disasters what prudence could have prevented.35
Modern verdicts on Napoleon divide as sharply. Andrew Roberts, quoted by Kirkus, sees an extraordinary record. Tulard prefers the administrator to the general. Dodge, in 1889, thought that at his best he was a greater soldier than Frederick the Great, though Frederick was greater in disaster. Treccani calls Genghis Khan both a great destroyer and a great general.36
Battles on the site
None of Genghis Khan's own battles has a page here yet. Below are Napoleon's battles, the Mongol battles fought by his generals and grandsons, and the guides that set both men in context.
Napoleon in command · 1796Battle of Montenotte
Napoleon in command · 1798Battle of the Pyramids
Napoleon in command · 1805Battle of Austerlitz
Napoleon in command · 1806Jena and Auerstedt
Napoleon in command · 1807Battle of Friedland
Napoleon in command · 1812Battle of Borodino
The retreat · 1812Battle of Maloyaroslavets
Napoleon in command · 1813Battle of Leipzig
Napoleon in command · 1815Battle of Ligny
Napoleon in command · 1815Battle of Waterloo
His heirs · 1241Battle of Legnica
Subutai and Batu · 1241Battle of Mohi
Guide · 1812Napoleon's Invasion of Russia
Guide · 1803 to 1815The Napoleonic Wars
CommanderGenghis Khan
CommanderNapoleon Bonaparte
CommanderSubutai
RankingThe Greatest Napoleonic Battles
Your verdict
We do not pick a winner. Here are the two cases at their strongest, and the questions that decide which one you find more convincing.
For Genghis Khan
- The desert march to Bukhara, a model of surprise
- An army that brought its own supplies and remounts across Asia
- Generals he chose who won without him, from the Kalka on
- Died on campaign with his empire intact and still growing
- United the tribes and gave the Mongols a written language
For Napoleon
- Ulm and Austerlitz, and sixty battles with seven lost by Roberts' count
- Victories over the professional armies of Europe for nearly two decades
- Speed his maxims turned into a rule of war
- The Civil Code of 2,281 articles, the glory he named himself
- An administrator Tulard ranks perhaps even above the general
Questions to weigh before you decide:
- Should Genghis Khan be credited with what his generals won at the Kalka and his son and grandsons took in Russia?
- Is losing at the end of a career, as Napoleon did from 1812, a worse mark than never meeting an enemy organised like your own?
- Which counts for more: an empire that outlived its founder, or a code of laws that outlived an empire?
- Russia destroyed Napoleon's army and not the Mongols'. Is that a judgement on the two men, or on horses against roads and winter?
- How should Jomini's moral verdict on Genghis Khan weigh against Liddell Hart's military one?
Cast your vote below and see how other readers have judged them.







