Mongol or knight: what does the evidence say?
The Mongol horse archer and the armoured knight of Central Europe really did meet, in the spring of 1241 at Legnica in Silesia and at Mohi in Hungary. The Mongols won both battles, then left Europe in 1242. Why they won, and why they left, is still argued. B. H. Liddell Hart believed Subutai's warriors were more than a match for the finest men-at-arms of medieval Europe. Recent work shifts the weight back to the defenders. Laszlovszky and his colleagues argue that resistance was greater than scholarship has acknowledged, and Borowski thinks Legnica could have been won. This page sets out the evidence for each and leaves the final verdict to you.
Most warrior match-ups are fantasies. This one has dates, places and eyewitnesses. In 1241 a Mongol army that had already broken the Rus' principalities crossed the Carpathians and the Vistula. One column cut through Lesser Poland and Silesia, the main army went into Hungary, and within three days the armies of Silesia and Hungary were destroyed. Then, in 1242, the Mongols turned back.1
This is not a ranking. Below you will find the two warriors side by side, the battles in which they actually met, and six questions on which a fighting man and his system can be judged, from horses to castles. Under each we give the strongest evidence for the Mongol and the strongest for the knight, with the period writers and modern historians who argue each case. At the end the decision is yours.
Side by side
- Who he served
- An empire founded by Genghis Khan, in 1241 led west by Batu and the general Subutai
- Dukes and kings such as Henry II the Pious of Silesia and Béla IV of Hungary, with the military orders
- Organisation
- Units of ten, a hundred, a thousand and ten thousand, with one commander over each
- Retinues and levies of each prince, joined by Templars, Hospitallers and Teutonic Knights at Legnica
- Weapons
- Two bows or one good one, three quivers, an axe. Richer men a curved sword, some a lance with a hook
- Built for the shock of the charge, with crossbows that Carpini says the Mongols greatly dreaded
- Armour
- Leather doubled or trebled, or lamellar of thin iron plates, for some men and horses
- Helmets and armour for men and horses, which Carpini urged every Christian army to keep
- Horses
- Three or four per man, by Rossabi's count
- Fewer, as Carpini admits: we are not so well stored with horses as they
Organisation, arms and horses as Carpini saw them in the 1240s, with Rossabi and the Museum of Polish History. We give no win and loss totals: the knights lost the two great battles of 1241, and most other clashes are known only from a line in a chronicle.2
Where they met: Poland and Hungary, 1241
Lesser Poland, winter and spring 1241
The first Mongol reconnaissance reached the Vistula in December 1240, a complete surprise because winter was no time for war in Poland. Wiesław Chełminiak of the Museum of Polish History describes how the knights of Lesser Poland met the raiders at Tursko, were fooled by a feigned escape, broke formation and were ambushed. In March 1241 the voivode Włodzimierz and the castellan Klemens were killed in the lost battle of Chmielnik, and Kraków was plundered and burned. The Mongols did not try to take Wawel castle.3
Legnica, 9 April 1241
Duke Henry II the Pious of Silesia, the most powerful Polish ruler of the day, gathered what he could at Legnica: knights of Silesia and Greater Poland, survivors from Lesser Poland, his cousin Mieszko II of Opole and a small contingent of the military orders. King Wenceslas I of Bohemia brought his army to within a day's march and stopped there. Henry fought on 9 April on the plain southeast of the town and was killed. The Mongols carried his head on a spear before the castle, whose defenders refused to surrender. A church raised where his body was found now holds the Museum of the Battle of Legnica.4

How many fought is unknown, and the sources pull in opposite directions. A friar known only as C. de Bridia wrote that Batu sent one tumen, about 10,000 men, against Poland. The Museum of Polish History treats about 8,000 Mongols at Legnica as the likeliest figure and puts Henry's army anywhere between 1,500 and 10,000. Jan Długosz, writing in the fifteenth century, made every Mongol division stronger than the whole Polish army. Liddell Hart, on the other hand, believed the Mongols were the smaller force.5
The best-known story of the battle comes from the same Długosz: the Mongols fell back, a standard bearer waved a monstrous bearded head, and stinking smoke poured out until the Poles could no longer fight. It is a late tale. The Museum of Polish History notes that C. de Bridia, who heard the Mongols' own account, tells something else: the invaders were about to withdraw from the field when the Christian ranks suddenly turned to flight. The full story is in our article on the Battle of Legnica.6
Mohi, 11 April 1241
Two days later the main army met King Béla IV of Hungary on the Sajó river. Stephen Pow and József Laszlovszky show that the Mongol sources and Thomas of Split agree on the plan: a vanguard under Subutai drew the Hungarians after it to a river line where Batu's whole army was already waiting. Juvaini, writing for the Mongols, says the Hungarians were double the Mongol strength and puts them at 400,000 horsemen. The heaviest fighting was at a bridge, and then a force crossed by night and fell on the Hungarians from behind.7

Emperor Frederick II, writing that summer, blamed the Hungarians for sleeping with the enemy close by and trusting to the strength of their position. The Tartars surrounded the camp at dawn, he wrote, and massacred such a host that a similar slaughter was never remembered in one battle. The king himself with difficulty escaped, mounted on a fleet horse. In 2019 a metal-detector survey found Mongol and European arrowheads and a noble's seal ring at a proposed site of the Hungarian camp. The battle has its own page: the Battle of Mohi.8
1242: why did they leave?
In 1242 the Mongols pulled out of Hungary and Poland. The traditional reason is the death of the Great Khan Ögedei in December 1241 and the scramble for the succession. Columbia University's Asia for Educators still gives it as the reason. Ulf Büntgen and Nicola Di Cosmo argued in 2016 that a cold, wet spring turned the Hungarian plain to marsh and cut the pasture and the mobility of the Mongol cavalry. Zsolt Pinke and four colleagues answered in 2017 that the rain improved the pasture rather than ruining it, and that the Mongol command later kept its main forces in the marshy Volga delta.9
Horses and speed
The case for the Mongol
Carpini told Christian princes not to chase a retreating Tartar far, lest our horses be tired: for we are not so well stored with horses as they. Those horses which the Tartars use one day, he noted, they ride not again for three or four days after. Morris Rossabi writes that a cavalryman normally had three or four horses, and calls them the intercontinental ballistic missiles of the thirteenth century.10
Liddell Hart counted the result. Kaidu's column in Poland covered some 400 miles in less than a month, fought two decisive battles and took four great cities. Subutai's advance guard in Hungary, he writes, covered 180 miles in three days through country deep in snow. The Library of Congress study of Mongolia gives an earlier example: Jebe and Subutai's detachment of about 25,000 crossed the Caucasus, skirted the Caspian and rode into the steppes of southern Russia, and in 1224 Subutai led it back after a trek of more than 6,400 kilometres.11
The case for the knight
Mobility depended on grass. Büntgen and Di Cosmo read tree rings and chronicles to show warm, dry summers from 1238 to 1241 followed by cold and wet conditions in early 1242, and argue that marshy ground reduced pastureland and the mobility and military effectiveness of the Mongol cavalry.12
Not every Mongol moved at the speed of a raid. Pow and Laszlovszky cite the friar C. de Bridia: the army advanced in wagons and on horses with wives, children, slaves and herds, while light vanguards went ahead to spread havoc. They also doubt Master Roger's claim that the whole army crossed most of Hungary in three days, a feat they find doubtful even for a small detachment.13
Bow against armour
The case for the Mongol
Each man, Carpini says, had two long bows or one good one at least, three quivers full of arrows and an axe. Their arrowheads were exceedingly sharp, cutting both ways like a two-edged sword, and each man carried a file in his quiver to whet them. Some lances had a hook to pull men out of their saddles. Armour was laced from thin iron plates a finger broad and a handful long, polished so bright a man could see his face in it.14
Liddell Hart saw the bow as the decisive change. The armies of the Middle Ages relied almost entirely on shock, he wrote, while the Mongols used fire systematically to pave the way for the assault, and closed only when men and horses were worn down by arrows. In his view their mobility was a far better protection than armour.15
The case for the knight
Carpini's advice to the Christians is also evidence of where the Mongols were weak. European soldiers, he wrote, must be furnished with strong hand-bows and crossbows, which the Tartars greatly dread, with maces of good iron and axes on long staffs. Arrowheads should be dipped red-hot into salt water so that they pierce the enemy's armour, and lances should carry hooks to pull Mongols from their saddles, out of which they are easily removed. Above all, he wrote, the provinces and governors of countries should agree in one and resist by common counsel.16
The knight was the better-armoured man, and Liddell Hart concedes the point even while praising the other side: the finest men-at-arms of medieval Europe, he wrote, had superiority both of numbers and armour. Rossabi notes that the Mongols themselves fielded heavy cavalry in mail, iron helmets and cuirasses with twelve-foot lances to finish what the archers began.17
Battlefield tactics
The case for the Mongol
The feigned flight was the Mongols' signature. Columbia's Asia for Educators describes it: troops pretend to be beaten and withdraw, and the pursuers find themselves trapped as fresh detachments appear and overwhelm them. At the Kalka in 1223, Rossabi writes, Jebe and Subutai retreated for more than a week before turning on a Rus' army of 80,000 that had strung itself out in pursuit.18
At Mohi the Yuan Shi biography of Subutai, quoted by Pow and Laszlovszky, says he carried out a plan to lure the king's army to the river. Morgan calls the army a virtually invincible force of cavalry archers.19
The case for the knight
The charge could still work. Chełminiak records that Mieszko II of Opole crushed a Mongol detachment trying to cross the Oder before Legnica, and Tomasz Borowski of the Museum of Polish History says the sources mention a leading Mongol commander killed by Polish knights before the battle. In his view the Mongols could be beaten, and 1241 was not a fight without hope.20
Carpini, who spoke with men at the Mongol court, wrote that had the Hungarians manfully withstood them, the Tartars would have been confounded and driven back. Laszlovszky and his colleagues note that the Yuan Shi agrees with him: the Mongol princes were afraid of the Hungarian army and wished to flee during the Battle of Mohi, and were only narrowly talked out of it. Even the victors remembered how close it was.21

Discipline and command
The case for the Mongol
Mongol discipline was collective. Carpini reports that unless all gave back together, every man who fled was put to death, that if some of a ten fought and the rest held back those were killed too, and that if one of ten was taken and his fellows did not rescue him they were punished with death. Anyone who ran to plunder before the victory was won was killed without mercy.22
Timothy May's study, as summarised in its De Re Militari review, describes units answerable for one another's conduct, an elite guard whose loyalty was to the unit rather than the clan, and commanders chosen on merit. Columbia's Asia for Educators adds that Genghis Khan broke up the tribes that joined him and scattered their men through his units, so that loyalty went to him and not to a tribal chief.23
The case for the knight
The knights' weakness was political rather than personal. Chełminiak describes a Poland split among Piast dukes who plotted against each other, and Henry left alone when the Bohemian king halted a day's march away. Frederick II accused the Hungarians of idleness and of trusting the place instead of watching the enemy. Laszlovszky and his colleagues note that several nobles ignored Béla's call to muster or escaped the battle.24
Courage was not lacking. Henry, Chełminiak writes, could not and would not flee, and drew reinforcements from wherever he could, even miners from the Sudeten gold mines. The military orders came because shedding blood for Christendom was their duty.25
Walls and the long war
The case for the Mongol
The campaign of 1241 was planned as one operation. Liddell Hart describes Subutai sending a flank army through Poland to crush the threat to his right while three columns converged on the Danube, a system he compares to the Napoleonic method. Treccani records the pace of the larger war: northern China by the fall of Beijing in 1215, the Muslim states of western Asia by 1221.26
Siege skill was not missing from the empire. The Library of Congress study notes that the Mongols learned from Chinese engineers in the war against the Jin and became among the most successful besiegers in the history of warfare, and Morgan that a siege train was added when cities in China and Persia had to be dealt with.27
The case for the knight
In Europe the walls held more often than the field armies. Laszlovszky and his colleagues show that fortified places, down to fortified villages, gave the Mongols trouble across Hungary, and both they and Treccani record that Béla himself escaped to Trogir on the Dalmatian coast, where the prince Qadan could not take him. Stephen Pow argues that European fortifications produced a strategic problem the Mongols could not surmount in the 1240s with the men and siege engines they had.28
After 1242 Hungary built. Citing Erik Fügedi's count, Laszlovszky and his colleagues give between 147 and 172 new castles raised between 1242 and 1300. When the Mongols returned in 1285, they write, they met much more effective resistance, which shows that the lessons of the first invasion had been learned.29
What came after
The case for the Mongol
The Mongols kept what they had taken in the east. Stephen Pow notes that they retained their hold on Russia, the Black Sea steppe and the Volga region, and both Treccani and Columbia's Asia for Educators describe the Golden Horde that ruled there.30
The case for the knight
The Mongols did not stay in Poland or Hungary. Treccani notes that once they had gone Béla rebuilt the country and gave it fortifications against new invasions, and Laszlovszky and his colleagues that Hungary recovered fast enough to wage war on its western neighbours within a few years and to prosper in the following century. The field armies of 1241 were lost, but the kingdoms they served survived.31

How historians have judged them
The first judges were the losers. Carpini thought no single kingdom or province able to resist the Mongols, and wrote his chapter on how they might be resisted for the princes of Christendom. Frederick II blamed Hungarian carelessness more than Mongol genius. Juvaini, the Mongols' own historian, called Mohi one of their greatest deeds and their fiercest battles.32
B. H. Liddell Hart, writing in 1927, was the great modern admirer. He believed Subutai's warriors proved more than a match for the finest men-at-arms of medieval Europe, and he dismissed the overwhelming Mongol numbers of the chronicles as a fictitious excuse put forward to save the reputation of European chivalry. David Morgan gives the army as Genghis Khan's most impressive creation, but notes that its size is much disputed.33
Recent work shifts the weight back towards the defenders. Laszlovszky and his colleagues argue that resistance was greater than scholarship has acknowledged and that no single cause explains the withdrawal. Büntgen and Di Cosmo give the weather a decisive part, Pow the castles. Borowski thinks Legnica could have been won. The debate is open.34
Battles on the site
Every battle page on Echoes of Battle where Mongols fought European knights, with the nearest fights of knights against other horse archers, and the guides that set them in context.
Mongols against knights · 1241Battle of Legnica
Mongols against knights · 1241Battle of Mohi
Knights the next year · 1242The Battle of the Ice
Mongols defeated · 1260Battle of Ain Jalut
Horse archers · 1071Battle of Manzikert
Knights against horse archers · 1187Battle of Hattin
Knights against horse archers · 1191Battle of Arsuf
Knights against the Ottomans · 1396Battle of Nicopolis
Tatar horse beside Polish knights · 1410Battle of Grunwald
CommanderSubutai
CommanderBatu Khan
CommanderGenghis Khan
ExplainerHorse Archers: How They Fought and How They Were Beaten
ComparisonHeavy Cavalry vs Light Cavalry
RankingGreatest Mongol Generals
GuideThe Military History of Poland
Your verdict
We do not pick a winner. Here are the two cases at their strongest, and the questions that decide which one you find more convincing.
For the Mongol
- Two great victories in three days, at Legnica and Mohi
- Several horses per man and marches no European army could match
- The bow and the feigned flight, which broke formations before contact
- Collective discipline and a campaign planned as one operation
- Spies who knew Europe better than Europe knew them
For the knight
- Heavier armour, and crossbows the Mongols feared
- Smaller victories, such as Mieszko's at the Oder
- Mohi so hard fought that the Mongol princes wanted to flee
- Castles and towns that held, and a Mongol withdrawal in 1242
- A stronger defence when the Mongols came back in 1285
Questions to weigh before you decide:
- Was Legnica a test of Mongol against knight, or of one Mongol army against one divided duchy?
- Should the knight be judged by the field battles of 1241, or by the walls and the return match of 1285?
- Does the withdrawal of 1242 count as a Mongol choice, a European success or an accident of the weather?
- How far can we trust chroniclers on both sides who wrote of hundreds of thousands?
- Is this a comparison of two soldiers, or of an empire's army against feudal princes who would not unite?
Cast your vote below and see how other readers have judged them.








