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Duke Henry II the Pious and his knights fight the Mongols at Legnica, a miniature from the Hedwig Codex of 1353

Mongol vs Knight: when the steppe met the knights

Military history · Head to head · Evidence for both, the verdict is yours · ~16 min read · Updated November 2026

Hedwig Codex, 1353, J. Paul Getty Museum, via Wikimedia Commons, public domain.

In short

Mongol or knight: what does the evidence say?

The Mongol horse archer and the armoured knight of Central Europe really did meet, in the spring of 1241 at Legnica in Silesia and at Mohi in Hungary. The Mongols won both battles, then left Europe in 1242. Why they won, and why they left, is still argued. B. H. Liddell Hart believed Subutai's warriors were more than a match for the finest men-at-arms of medieval Europe. Recent work shifts the weight back to the defenders. Laszlovszky and his colleagues argue that resistance was greater than scholarship has acknowledged, and Borowski thinks Legnica could have been won. This page sets out the evidence for each and leaves the final verdict to you.

Most warrior match-ups are fantasies. This one has dates, places and eyewitnesses. In 1241 a Mongol army that had already broken the Rus' principalities crossed the Carpathians and the Vistula. One column cut through Lesser Poland and Silesia, the main army went into Hungary, and within three days the armies of Silesia and Hungary were destroyed. Then, in 1242, the Mongols turned back.1

This is not a ranking. Below you will find the two warriors side by side, the battles in which they actually met, and six questions on which a fighting man and his system can be judged, from horses to castles. Under each we give the strongest evidence for the Mongol and the strongest for the knight, with the period writers and modern historians who argue each case. At the end the decision is yours.

Side by side

Mounted archers shooting at the gallop in a Persian miniatureThe MongolHorse archer of the steppe
Knights in mail and great helms fighting on horseback in a thirteenth-century miniatureThe knightCentral Europe, 13th century
Who he served
An empire founded by Genghis Khan, in 1241 led west by Batu and the general Subutai
Dukes and kings such as Henry II the Pious of Silesia and Béla IV of Hungary, with the military orders
Organisation
Units of ten, a hundred, a thousand and ten thousand, with one commander over each
Retinues and levies of each prince, joined by Templars, Hospitallers and Teutonic Knights at Legnica
Weapons
Two bows or one good one, three quivers, an axe. Richer men a curved sword, some a lance with a hook
Built for the shock of the charge, with crossbows that Carpini says the Mongols greatly dreaded
Armour
Leather doubled or trebled, or lamellar of thin iron plates, for some men and horses
Helmets and armour for men and horses, which Carpini urged every Christian army to keep
Horses
Three or four per man, by Rossabi's count
Fewer, as Carpini admits: we are not so well stored with horses as they
Where they met
Chmielnik, Legnica and Mohi in 1241, raids in 1259 to 1260, 1285 and 1287 to 1288
The same fields, and the walls of Legnica, Wawel and the Hungarian castles

Organisation, arms and horses as Carpini saw them in the 1240s, with Rossabi and the Museum of Polish History. We give no win and loss totals: the knights lost the two great battles of 1241, and most other clashes are known only from a line in a chronicle.2

Where they met: Poland and Hungary, 1241

Lesser Poland, winter and spring 1241

The first Mongol reconnaissance reached the Vistula in December 1240, a complete surprise because winter was no time for war in Poland. Wiesław Chełminiak of the Museum of Polish History describes how the knights of Lesser Poland met the raiders at Tursko, were fooled by a feigned escape, broke formation and were ambushed. In March 1241 the voivode Włodzimierz and the castellan Klemens were killed in the lost battle of Chmielnik, and Kraków was plundered and burned. The Mongols did not try to take Wawel castle.3

Legnica, 9 April 1241

Duke Henry II the Pious of Silesia, the most powerful Polish ruler of the day, gathered what he could at Legnica: knights of Silesia and Greater Poland, survivors from Lesser Poland, his cousin Mieszko II of Opole and a small contingent of the military orders. King Wenceslas I of Bohemia brought his army to within a day's march and stopped there. Henry fought on 9 April on the plain southeast of the town and was killed. The Mongols carried his head on a spear before the castle, whose defenders refused to surrender. A church raised where his body was found now holds the Museum of the Battle of Legnica.4

Medieval miniature of mounted warriors with a severed head on a spear riding up to a castle whose defenders shoot back
Mongol horsemen carry the head of Duke Henry on a lance before the castle of Legnica, a miniature from the Hedwig Codex of 1353 (J. Paul Getty Museum). Public domain. Hedwig Codex, 1353, J. Paul Getty Museum, via Wikimedia Commons.

How many fought is unknown, and the sources pull in opposite directions. A friar known only as C. de Bridia wrote that Batu sent one tumen, about 10,000 men, against Poland. The Museum of Polish History treats about 8,000 Mongols at Legnica as the likeliest figure and puts Henry's army anywhere between 1,500 and 10,000. Jan Długosz, writing in the fifteenth century, made every Mongol division stronger than the whole Polish army. Liddell Hart, on the other hand, believed the Mongols were the smaller force.5

The best-known story of the battle comes from the same Długosz: the Mongols fell back, a standard bearer waved a monstrous bearded head, and stinking smoke poured out until the Poles could no longer fight. It is a late tale. The Museum of Polish History notes that C. de Bridia, who heard the Mongols' own account, tells something else: the invaders were about to withdraw from the field when the Christian ranks suddenly turned to flight. The full story is in our article on the Battle of Legnica.6

Mohi, 11 April 1241

Two days later the main army met King Béla IV of Hungary on the Sajó river. Stephen Pow and József Laszlovszky show that the Mongol sources and Thomas of Split agree on the plan: a vanguard under Subutai drew the Hungarians after it to a river line where Batu's whole army was already waiting. Juvaini, writing for the Mongols, says the Hungarians were double the Mongol strength and puts them at 400,000 horsemen. The heaviest fighting was at a bridge, and then a force crossed by night and fell on the Hungarians from behind.7

Medieval miniature of horsemen in blue helmets under a red crescent banner fighting knights in great helms across an arched bridge, with figures drowning in the river below
The fight at the bridge over the Sajó in a fourteenth-century miniature from a copy of Hayton of Corycus's Flor des estoires de la terre d'Orient. Austrian National Library, Cod. 2623, fol. 29r. Public domain

Emperor Frederick II, writing that summer, blamed the Hungarians for sleeping with the enemy close by and trusting to the strength of their position. The Tartars surrounded the camp at dawn, he wrote, and massacred such a host that a similar slaughter was never remembered in one battle. The king himself with difficulty escaped, mounted on a fleet horse. In 2019 a metal-detector survey found Mongol and European arrowheads and a noble's seal ring at a proposed site of the Hungarian camp. The battle has its own page: the Battle of Mohi.8

1242: why did they leave?

In 1242 the Mongols pulled out of Hungary and Poland. The traditional reason is the death of the Great Khan Ögedei in December 1241 and the scramble for the succession. Columbia University's Asia for Educators still gives it as the reason. Ulf Büntgen and Nicola Di Cosmo argued in 2016 that a cold, wet spring turned the Hungarian plain to marsh and cut the pasture and the mobility of the Mongol cavalry. Zsolt Pinke and four colleagues answered in 2017 that the rain improved the pasture rather than ruining it, and that the Mongol command later kept its main forces in the marshy Volga delta.9

Horses and speed

The case for the Mongol

Carpini told Christian princes not to chase a retreating Tartar far, lest our horses be tired: for we are not so well stored with horses as they. Those horses which the Tartars use one day, he noted, they ride not again for three or four days after. Morris Rossabi writes that a cavalryman normally had three or four horses, and calls them the intercontinental ballistic missiles of the thirteenth century.10

Liddell Hart counted the result. Kaidu's column in Poland covered some 400 miles in less than a month, fought two decisive battles and took four great cities. Subutai's advance guard in Hungary, he writes, covered 180 miles in three days through country deep in snow. The Library of Congress study of Mongolia gives an earlier example: Jebe and Subutai's detachment of about 25,000 crossed the Caucasus, skirted the Caspian and rode into the steppes of southern Russia, and in 1224 Subutai led it back after a trek of more than 6,400 kilometres.11

The case for the knight

Mobility depended on grass. Büntgen and Di Cosmo read tree rings and chronicles to show warm, dry summers from 1238 to 1241 followed by cold and wet conditions in early 1242, and argue that marshy ground reduced pastureland and the mobility and military effectiveness of the Mongol cavalry.12

Not every Mongol moved at the speed of a raid. Pow and Laszlovszky cite the friar C. de Bridia: the army advanced in wagons and on horses with wives, children, slaves and herds, while light vanguards went ahead to spread havoc. They also doubt Master Roger's claim that the whole army crossed most of Hungary in three days, a feat they find doubtful even for a small detachment.13

Bow against armour

The case for the Mongol

Each man, Carpini says, had two long bows or one good one at least, three quivers full of arrows and an axe. Their arrowheads were exceedingly sharp, cutting both ways like a two-edged sword, and each man carried a file in his quiver to whet them. Some lances had a hook to pull men out of their saddles. Armour was laced from thin iron plates a finger broad and a handful long, polished so bright a man could see his face in it.14

Liddell Hart saw the bow as the decisive change. The armies of the Middle Ages relied almost entirely on shock, he wrote, while the Mongols used fire systematically to pave the way for the assault, and closed only when men and horses were worn down by arrows. In his view their mobility was a far better protection than armour.15

The case for the knight

Carpini's advice to the Christians is also evidence of where the Mongols were weak. European soldiers, he wrote, must be furnished with strong hand-bows and crossbows, which the Tartars greatly dread, with maces of good iron and axes on long staffs. Arrowheads should be dipped red-hot into salt water so that they pierce the enemy's armour, and lances should carry hooks to pull Mongols from their saddles, out of which they are easily removed. Above all, he wrote, the provinces and governors of countries should agree in one and resist by common counsel.16

The knight was the better-armoured man, and Liddell Hart concedes the point even while praising the other side: the finest men-at-arms of medieval Europe, he wrote, had superiority both of numbers and armour. Rossabi notes that the Mongols themselves fielded heavy cavalry in mail, iron helmets and cuirasses with twelve-foot lances to finish what the archers began.17

Battlefield tactics

The case for the Mongol

The feigned flight was the Mongols' signature. Columbia's Asia for Educators describes it: troops pretend to be beaten and withdraw, and the pursuers find themselves trapped as fresh detachments appear and overwhelm them. At the Kalka in 1223, Rossabi writes, Jebe and Subutai retreated for more than a week before turning on a Rus' army of 80,000 that had strung itself out in pursuit.18

At Mohi the Yuan Shi biography of Subutai, quoted by Pow and Laszlovszky, says he carried out a plan to lure the king's army to the river. Morgan calls the army a virtually invincible force of cavalry archers.19

The case for the knight

The charge could still work. Chełminiak records that Mieszko II of Opole crushed a Mongol detachment trying to cross the Oder before Legnica, and Tomasz Borowski of the Museum of Polish History says the sources mention a leading Mongol commander killed by Polish knights before the battle. In his view the Mongols could be beaten, and 1241 was not a fight without hope.20

Carpini, who spoke with men at the Mongol court, wrote that had the Hungarians manfully withstood them, the Tartars would have been confounded and driven back. Laszlovszky and his colleagues note that the Yuan Shi agrees with him: the Mongol princes were afraid of the Hungarian army and wished to flee during the Battle of Mohi, and were only narrowly talked out of it. Even the victors remembered how close it was.21

Medieval miniature of mounted knights in mail fighting with swords and lances
Knights in mail and great helms on a leaf of the Morgan Picture Bible painted in Paris around 1250 (J. Paul Getty Museum): a biblical battle shown in the armour of the artist's own day, a decade after Legnica. Public domain

Discipline and command

The case for the Mongol

Mongol discipline was collective. Carpini reports that unless all gave back together, every man who fled was put to death, that if some of a ten fought and the rest held back those were killed too, and that if one of ten was taken and his fellows did not rescue him they were punished with death. Anyone who ran to plunder before the victory was won was killed without mercy.22

Timothy May's study, as summarised in its De Re Militari review, describes units answerable for one another's conduct, an elite guard whose loyalty was to the unit rather than the clan, and commanders chosen on merit. Columbia's Asia for Educators adds that Genghis Khan broke up the tribes that joined him and scattered their men through his units, so that loyalty went to him and not to a tribal chief.23

The case for the knight

The knights' weakness was political rather than personal. Chełminiak describes a Poland split among Piast dukes who plotted against each other, and Henry left alone when the Bohemian king halted a day's march away. Frederick II accused the Hungarians of idleness and of trusting the place instead of watching the enemy. Laszlovszky and his colleagues note that several nobles ignored Béla's call to muster or escaped the battle.24

Courage was not lacking. Henry, Chełminiak writes, could not and would not flee, and drew reinforcements from wherever he could, even miners from the Sudeten gold mines. The military orders came because shedding blood for Christendom was their duty.25

Walls and the long war

The case for the Mongol

The campaign of 1241 was planned as one operation. Liddell Hart describes Subutai sending a flank army through Poland to crush the threat to his right while three columns converged on the Danube, a system he compares to the Napoleonic method. Treccani records the pace of the larger war: northern China by the fall of Beijing in 1215, the Muslim states of western Asia by 1221.26

Siege skill was not missing from the empire. The Library of Congress study notes that the Mongols learned from Chinese engineers in the war against the Jin and became among the most successful besiegers in the history of warfare, and Morgan that a siege train was added when cities in China and Persia had to be dealt with.27

The case for the knight

In Europe the walls held more often than the field armies. Laszlovszky and his colleagues show that fortified places, down to fortified villages, gave the Mongols trouble across Hungary, and both they and Treccani record that Béla himself escaped to Trogir on the Dalmatian coast, where the prince Qadan could not take him. Stephen Pow argues that European fortifications produced a strategic problem the Mongols could not surmount in the 1240s with the men and siege engines they had.28

After 1242 Hungary built. Citing Erik Fügedi's count, Laszlovszky and his colleagues give between 147 and 172 new castles raised between 1242 and 1300. When the Mongols returned in 1285, they write, they met much more effective resistance, which shows that the lessons of the first invasion had been learned.29

What came after

The case for the Mongol

The Mongols kept what they had taken in the east. Stephen Pow notes that they retained their hold on Russia, the Black Sea steppe and the Volga region, and both Treccani and Columbia's Asia for Educators describe the Golden Horde that ruled there.30

The case for the knight

The Mongols did not stay in Poland or Hungary. Treccani notes that once they had gone Béla rebuilt the country and gave it fortifications against new invasions, and Laszlovszky and his colleagues that Hungary recovered fast enough to wage war on its western neighbours within a few years and to prosper in the following century. The field armies of 1241 were lost, but the kingdoms they served survived.31

Old map of Eastern Europe with the routes of the Mongol invasion
The Mongol invasion of 1236 to 1242 on an operational sketch from the Hungarian military historian József Breit's A magyar nemzet hadtörténelme (1929). One column rode into Poland and Silesia, the other into Hungary. The map counts 500,000 horsemen, an old estimate that Liddell Hart already cut to little more than 100,000 for the Polish and Hungarian campaigns. Public domain. József Breit, 1929, via Wikimedia Commons.

How historians have judged them

The first judges were the losers. Carpini thought no single kingdom or province able to resist the Mongols, and wrote his chapter on how they might be resisted for the princes of Christendom. Frederick II blamed Hungarian carelessness more than Mongol genius. Juvaini, the Mongols' own historian, called Mohi one of their greatest deeds and their fiercest battles.32

B. H. Liddell Hart, writing in 1927, was the great modern admirer. He believed Subutai's warriors proved more than a match for the finest men-at-arms of medieval Europe, and he dismissed the overwhelming Mongol numbers of the chronicles as a fictitious excuse put forward to save the reputation of European chivalry. David Morgan gives the army as Genghis Khan's most impressive creation, but notes that its size is much disputed.33

The Tartar fights more by policy than by main force. John of Plano Carpini, 1247

Recent work shifts the weight back towards the defenders. Laszlovszky and his colleagues argue that resistance was greater than scholarship has acknowledged and that no single cause explains the withdrawal. Büntgen and Di Cosmo give the weather a decisive part, Pow the castles. Borowski thinks Legnica could have been won. The debate is open.34

Battles on the site

Every battle page on Echoes of Battle where Mongols fought European knights, with the nearest fights of knights against other horse archers, and the guides that set them in context.

Your verdict

We do not pick a winner. Here are the two cases at their strongest, and the questions that decide which one you find more convincing.

For the Mongol

  • Two great victories in three days, at Legnica and Mohi
  • Several horses per man and marches no European army could match
  • The bow and the feigned flight, which broke formations before contact
  • Collective discipline and a campaign planned as one operation
  • Spies who knew Europe better than Europe knew them

For the knight

  • Heavier armour, and crossbows the Mongols feared
  • Smaller victories, such as Mieszko's at the Oder
  • Mohi so hard fought that the Mongol princes wanted to flee
  • Castles and towns that held, and a Mongol withdrawal in 1242
  • A stronger defence when the Mongols came back in 1285

Questions to weigh before you decide:

  1. Was Legnica a test of Mongol against knight, or of one Mongol army against one divided duchy?
  2. Should the knight be judged by the field battles of 1241, or by the walls and the return match of 1285?
  3. Does the withdrawal of 1242 count as a Mongol choice, a European success or an accident of the weather?
  4. How far can we trust chroniclers on both sides who wrote of hundreds of thousands?
  5. Is this a comparison of two soldiers, or of an empire's army against feudal princes who would not unite?

Cast your vote below and see how other readers have judged them.

Frequently asked questions

Who was better, a Mongol warrior or a knight?

The Mongols won both battles where they met knights, at Legnica and Mohi in 1241, but historians still argue why. B. H. Liddell Hart believed Subutai's warriors were more than a match for the finest men-at-arms of medieval Europe. Recent work shifts the weight back to the defenders, and Borowski thinks Legnica could have been won. This page compares the evidence for both sides.

Did Mongols and knights ever fight?

Yes. In 1241 Mongol armies met the knights of Central Europe at Legnica in Silesia on 9 April and at Mohi in Hungary two days later, after smaller fights in Lesser Poland such as Chmielnik. Mongol raids returned to Poland in 1259 to 1260 and 1287 to 1288, and to Hungary in 1285.

Who won at Legnica and Mohi?

The Mongols won both battles. At Legnica Duke Henry II the Pious was killed and his army destroyed. At Mohi the Hungarian camp was surrounded and King Béla IV escaped on a fast horse, as Emperor Frederick II wrote that summer. Winning these battles is not the same as answering which kind of warrior was better, which is what this page leaves to the reader.

How many soldiers fought at Legnica?

Nobody knows. The Museum of Polish History thinks about 8,000 on the Mongol side likely, following a friar called C. de Bridia who speaks of one tumen of about 10,000 sent against Poland, and puts Henry's army somewhere between 1,500 and 10,000. Older figures of tens of thousands on each side are rejected. Liddell Hart believed the Mongols were the smaller army, the Polish chronicler Jan Długosz the larger.

Why did the Mongols leave Europe in 1242?

Historians disagree. The traditional answer, going back to John of Plano Carpini, is the death of the Great Khan Ögedei in December 1241. Büntgen and Di Cosmo point to a cold, wet spring that ruined pasture. Laszlovszky and his colleagues argue that local resistance and Mongol military failures must count too, and Stephen Pow that castles and walled towns posed a problem the Mongols could not solve with the men and engines they had.

Did the Mongols use feigned retreats against the knights?

Feigned flight was a known Mongol method: Carpini warned Christians not to chase a retreating Tartar too far for fear of an ambush. In Poland the Museum of Polish History describes the knights of Lesser Poland being drawn out by a feigned escape at Tursko. The well-known story of a retreat, a monstrous head and stinking smoke at Legnica comes from Jan Długosz, writing two centuries later.

What armour did Mongols wear?

Carpini, who saw them in the 1240s, describes helmets of iron or steel, armour for men and horses made of leather doubled or trebled, and lamellar of thin iron plates a finger broad and a handful long, laced together with thongs and polished bright. Not every rider had iron armour.

Were the Mongols ever beaten in Central Europe?

Not in a pitched battle in 1241. But smaller forces were beaten: the Museum of Polish History says Duke Mieszko II of Opole crushed a Mongol detachment trying to cross the Oder, and Hungarian castles and towns held out in 1241 and 1242. When the Mongols invaded Hungary again in 1285 they met much more effective resistance.

Notes

A number in the text points to a note. Each note names the works that paragraph draws on, listed in full under Sources.

  1. Columbia University, “The Mongols in World History”. Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, “Mongoli”. ↩
  2. John of Plano Carpini, “The Journey of Frier John de Plano Carpini”. Morris Rossabi, “All the Khan's Horses”. Wiesław Chełminiak, “A War of the Worlds at Legnica”. ↩
  3. Wiesław Chełminiak, “A War of the Worlds at Legnica”. Museum of Polish History, “Najazdy mongolskie na Polskę”. ↩
  4. Wiesław Chełminiak, “A War of the Worlds at Legnica”. Adam Mickiewicz Institute, “Museum of the Battle of Legnica”. ↩
  5. Museum of Polish History, “Najazdy mongolskie na Polskę”. B. H. Liddell Hart, “Great Captains Unveiled”. ↩
  6. Museum of Polish History, “Najazdy mongolskie na Polskę”. ↩
  7. Stephen Pow and József Laszlovszky, “Finding Batu's Hill at Muhi”. ʿAla-ad-Din ʿAta-Malik Juvaini, “The History of the World-Conqueror”. ↩
  8. Matthew Paris, “The emperor's letter”. Ludovika University of Public Service, “Breakthrough in the research of the Battle of Mohi”. ↩
  9. Columbia University, “The Mongols in World History”. Ulf Büntgen and Nicola Di Cosmo, “Climatic and environmental aspects of the Mongol withdrawal from Hungary in 1242 CE”. Zsolt Pinke, “Climate of doubt”. ↩
  10. John of Plano Carpini, “The Journey of Frier John de Plano Carpini”. Morris Rossabi, “All the Khan's Horses”. ↩
  11. B. H. Liddell Hart, “Great Captains Unveiled”. Library of Congress, “Mongolia”. ↩
  12. Ulf Büntgen and Nicola Di Cosmo, “Climatic and environmental aspects of the Mongol withdrawal from Hungary in 1242 CE”. ↩
  13. Stephen Pow and József Laszlovszky, “Finding Batu's Hill at Muhi”. ↩
  14. John of Plano Carpini, “The Journey of Frier John de Plano Carpini”. Morris Rossabi, “All the Khan's Horses”. ↩
  15. B. H. Liddell Hart, “Great Captains Unveiled”. David O. Morgan, “Čengīz Khan”. ↩
  16. John of Plano Carpini, “The Journey of Frier John de Plano Carpini”. ↩
  17. B. H. Liddell Hart, “Great Captains Unveiled”. Morris Rossabi, “All the Khan's Horses”. ↩
  18. Columbia University, “Chinggis's Mastery of Organization and Military Tactics”. Morris Rossabi, “All the Khan's Horses”. ↩
  19. Stephen Pow and József Laszlovszky, “Finding Batu's Hill at Muhi”. David O. Morgan, “Čengīz Khan”. ↩
  20. Wiesław Chełminiak, “A War of the Worlds at Legnica”. Museum of Polish History, “Najazdy mongolskie na Polskę”. ↩
  21. József Laszlovszky, “Contextualizing the Mongol Invasion of Hungary in 1241 to 1242”. ↩
  22. John of Plano Carpini, “The Journey of Frier John de Plano Carpini”. Muhammed Hassanali, “The Mongol Art of War”. ↩
  23. Muhammed Hassanali, “The Mongol Art of War”. Columbia University, “Chinggis's Mastery of Organization and Military Tactics”. ↩
  24. Wiesław Chełminiak, “A War of the Worlds at Legnica”. Matthew Paris, “The emperor's letter”. József Laszlovszky, “Contextualizing the Mongol Invasion of Hungary in 1241 to 1242”. ↩
  25. Wiesław Chełminiak, “A War of the Worlds at Legnica”. ↩
  26. B. H. Liddell Hart, “Great Captains Unveiled”. Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, “Mongoli”. ↩
  27. Library of Congress, “Mongolia”. David O. Morgan, “Čengīz Khan”. ↩
  28. József Laszlovszky, “Contextualizing the Mongol Invasion of Hungary in 1241 to 1242”. Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, “Bela IV re d'Ungheria”. Lindsey Stephen Pow, “Deep Ditches and Well-Built Walls”. ↩
  29. József Laszlovszky, “Contextualizing the Mongol Invasion of Hungary in 1241 to 1242”. Lindsey Stephen Pow, “Deep Ditches and Well-Built Walls”. ↩
  30. Lindsey Stephen Pow, “Deep Ditches and Well-Built Walls”. Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, “Mongoli”. Columbia University, “The Mongols in World History”. ↩
  31. Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, “Bela IV re d'Ungheria”. József Laszlovszky, “Contextualizing the Mongol Invasion of Hungary in 1241 to 1242”. ↩
  32. John of Plano Carpini, “The Journey of Frier John de Plano Carpini”. Matthew Paris, “The emperor's letter”. ʿAla-ad-Din ʿAta-Malik Juvaini, “The History of the World-Conqueror”. ↩
  33. B. H. Liddell Hart, “Great Captains Unveiled”. David O. Morgan, “Čengīz Khan”. ↩
  34. József Laszlovszky, “Contextualizing the Mongol Invasion of Hungary in 1241 to 1242”. Ulf Büntgen and Nicola Di Cosmo, “Climatic and environmental aspects of the Mongol withdrawal from Hungary in 1242 CE”. Lindsey Stephen Pow, “Deep Ditches and Well-Built Walls”. Museum of Polish History, “Najazdy mongolskie na Polskę”. ↩

Sources

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