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Operation Bodenplatte, 1 January 1945

World War II · 1 January 1945 · Germany vs the Allied air forces · ~11 min read · Updated November 2026

Next anniversary: 1 January 2027, the 82nd anniversary 1 January in history ›

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Black and white photograph of a P-51D Mustang fighter with the name Katydid on its nose and the code PE-F on its fuselage, propeller turning, pilot in the open cockpit, on a concrete airfield

P-51D Mustang “Katydid” of the 352nd Fighter Group, the group whose 487th Squadron flew from Asch in Belgium on 1 January 1945, photographed in England in 1945 (U.S. Army Air Forces), via Wikimedia Commons, public domain.

At a glance

The Allied air forces defeated Germany.

Date
1 January 1945, from about 08:00 to 10:00
Location
Allied airfields in the Netherlands, Belgium and north-eastern France
War
World War II, Western Front (Ardennes offensive)
Germany (Luftwaffe)Fighter units of the Luftwaffe in the West, among them Jagdgeschwader 3 and 26Defeat
Allied air forces (Britain, Canada, the United States and Poland)Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham (British Second Tactical Air Force) and the commanders of the U.S. tactical air commandsVictory

By the numbers

Strength
Germany (Luftwaffe):
About 700 aircraft (Craven and Cate). Over 900 (Ellis). Some thousand (RCAF official history). 1,035 (MacDonald). Eisenhower counted some 800 sorties1
Allied air forces (Britain, Canada, the United States and Poland):
17 airfields attacked, 13 British and 4 American (Ellis). 16 in Belgium and the Netherlands besides Metz in France (Spires). Eleven major airfields (RCAF official history)2
Losses
Germany (Luftwaffe): 270
aircraft destroyed and 40 damaged, 260 aircrew killed (Ellis). Three hundred aircraft and 214 pilots (RCAF official history). 200 aircraft (Eisenhower)3
Allied air forces (Britain, Canada, the United States and Poland): 156
aircraft lost, 36 of them American (Craven and Cate). 150 destroyed and 111 damaged, 46 personnel killed (Ellis). Second Tactical Air Force alone: 127 destroyed and 133 damaged (RCAF official history)4

Figures differ widely between the sources, and the text below sets them side by side. Some German losses were caused by German anti-aircraft fire.

Outcome
German failure. The Allies lose many aircraft on the ground but replace them, while the Luftwaffe loses aircraft and experienced pilots it cannot replace
Quick answer

What was Operation Bodenplatte?

Operation Bodenplatte was a German air attack on Allied airfields in the Netherlands, Belgium and France on the morning of 1 January 1945, during the German offensive in the Ardennes. Hundreds of German fighters flew in low to catch the Allied tactical air forces on the ground. They destroyed or damaged a few hundred Allied aircraft, at Eindhoven above all, but the Allies soon replaced them, while the Luftwaffe lost some 270 to 300 aircraft and more than 200 pilots it could not replace.5

The official history of the U.S. Army Air Forces calls it a savage New Year's Day blow and counts 1 January 1945 among the worst single days for losses in men and aircraft that the Luftwaffe ever had. The ground battle it was meant to help is told in our article on the Battle of the Bulge, and the rest of the day in 1 January in military history.6

The Luftwaffe at the end of 1944

On 16 December 1944 Germany opened its offensive in the Ardennes. For the first days low cloud kept most Allied aircraft on the ground, and the Luftwaffe rose in strength. Hugh Cole's official history of the battle gives between six and eight hundred German sorties a day in the first ten days, and Ellis, the British official historian, about 500 a day, against an Allied average of over 3,000. Cole notes that German records show 849 sorties on 18 December, the Luftwaffe's largest attempt to intervene directly in the battle, and that the IX Tactical Air Command called 24 December the heaviest Luftwaffe effort since D-Day, although few of those aircraft ever reached the battlefield itself.7

Dark locator map with a gold star in a glowing circle marking the approximate center of the fighting of Operation Bodenplatte, the coasts, rivers and lakes of the region, and a small world map inset with the area boxed
Operation Bodenplatte: the star marks the approximate center of the fighting, and the inset shows the area on a world map. Drawn for this article from Natural Earth data, with no modern borders. Location map: © Echoes of Battle (data: Natural Earth, public domain)

German factories were still turning out aircraft. Charles MacDonald, in the U.S. Army's official history of the last campaign, notes that Germany built 4,103 aircraft of all types in September 1944, and that in November the Luftwaffe had more planes than ever before, 8,103 without transports, of which 5,317 were operational.8

When the weather cleared on 23 December, the Allied air forces returned in force. Craven and Cate record that 800 German fighters tried without much success to interfere with the bombers that day, that the Germans fought again on 24 and 25 December, and that the Eighth Air Force lost only 13 heavy bombers to fighters in those three days. On 31 December German fighters intercepted a raid near Hannover and shot down fourteen bombers. The next morning they struck the airfields.9

The plan: catch them on the ground

The aim was to destroy the Allied tactical air forces on their own airfields in one blow. The official history of the Royal Canadian Air Force explains why the targets were tempting: bad weather and transport problems had forced British and American air formations to crowd onto the few fields with permanent runways, and many German leaders knew those fields well because they had flown from them only months before. The weakness of the plan lay in the pilots. The Canadian official history calls the operation one last, desperate, ill-considered gamble and notes that a high proportion of the German pilots were novices fresh from flying schools short of fuel. Only if they caught enough Allied aircraft on the ground, and did not lose too many of their own, could they win a notable victory.10

Craven and Cate write that Hitler himself had fathered the idea, and David Spires, in the U.S. Air Force history of the XIX Tactical Air Command, that the raid had first been planned to open the Ardennes offensive. The American air commander General Carl Spaatz later paid tribute to the careful planning behind it. Ellis describes how the attackers kept surprise: they maintained wireless silence and flew at tree-top height on roundabout routes to avoid radar detection.11

Take-off at first light

The sources disagree on the size of the force. Craven and Cate give about 700 German aircraft and note that Göring later claimed 2,300. Ellis writes of over 900 German planes, the Canadian official history of a fighter force of some thousand machines and pilots, Spires of between 750 and 800 fighters, and MacDonald of 1,035 planes in the air over the Netherlands, Belgium and northern France. Eisenhower, in his report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, counted some 800 sorties, the largest concentration of German aircraft since D-Day.12

The formations took off at first light. Craven and Cate place the attack between 08:00 and 10:00. Ellis counts 13 British and 4 American tactical airfields attacked, Spires 16 airfields in Belgium and the Netherlands besides one in France, and the Canadian official history eleven major Allied airfields.13

Surprise was almost complete. Some Allied aircraft were taking off to relieve others over the front when the Germans arrived, Ellis writes, so that many were already in the air, but many more were caught on the ground.14

Eindhoven: two rows of Typhoons

The worst blow fell on Eindhoven, home of two RCAF wings, Nos 39 and 143. According to the Canadian official history it was attacked by Jagdgeschwader 3, and eight Typhoons each of Nos 438 and 440 Squadrons were lined up for take-off. Two that got into the air were shot down, and the other fourteen were shot to pieces on the ground. Three pilots of the Typhoon wing were killed.15

Among them was Flight Lieutenant Peter Wilson of No. 438 Squadron, aged 31, who is recorded by the Canadian Virtual War Memorial as having died on 1 January 1945 and lies in Groesbeek Canadian War Cemetery. Corporal Walter Weiss, a ground crewman at Eindhoven, remembered in his testimony for the Memory Project that there was no warning, and that because the field was so muddy the aircraft stood in two rows along the runway, wing tip to wing tip, half a mile long. Walter Ward, a Typhoon pilot of 143 Wing, remembered it differently: the aircraft that were not flying, he said, were dispersed.16

Having destroyed the machines on the runway, the attackers circled and strafed the base for over twenty minutes, opposed mainly by three squadrons of RAF Regiment anti-aircraft gunners. Ground crew joined in with Bren guns, and two of them were credited with a Fw 190 found burnt out near the field three days later. The Canadian official history sums up the result: the attackers lost ten pilots killed or missing and six captured, but left Eindhoven a shambles, with thirteen dead, dozens wounded and thirty-one aircraft burning or shot up.17

Evere and Heesch

At Evere, the home of 127 Wing, rain and frost had turned the runways into skating rinks and kept the morning patrols on the ground. The attack that followed was short, about twelve minutes, and destroyed twenty-four of the roughly sixty Spitfires on the field. The Canadian official history quotes Wing Commander J. E. Johnson, the RAF officer who led the Canadian wing, as saying that not one Spitfire should have remained undamaged at Evere. The two attacking groups of Jagdgeschwader 26 lost eleven pilots killed, missing or captured, some of them to their own flak on the way in. RCAF casualties there were two killed and twelve wounded. Heesch fared better. German fighters caught ten Spitfires of No. 401 Squadron lining up for take-off, but all of them got into the air and drew the attackers into dogfights, while other squadrons recalled by radio joined in. The Canadian official history credits 126 Wing with nineteen German pilots brought down for the loss of one of its own killed and another wounded.18

The Polish wing at airfield B.61

No. 131 (Polish) Wing, with Nos 302, 308 and 317 Squadrons, flew from airfield B.61 in Belgium. Its combat report for 1 January records that between 08:27 and 09:24 thirty-one of its Spitfires took off, No. 308 Squadron with 12 aircraft and No. 317 with 11 on a bombing mission and No. 302 with 8 on armed reconnaissance.19

At about 09:30, while they were away, 30 to 50 Fw 190s attacked the airfield with cannon and machine guns. The report records 18 Spitfires destroyed and 5 damaged on the ground, along with some aircraft of the 85 Group communication squadron, of the U.S. Army Air Forces and of Bomber Command that stood on the field. The Polish pilots, returning low on fuel, saw smoke over their base from the Lokeren area. Flight Lieutenant Olszewski, leading No. 308 Squadron, warned all the pilots by radio, and they attacked the Germans over and around it, in a fight that spread across the Lokeren and Ghent area.20

The wing's report claims 20 Fw 190s destroyed, one probably destroyed and four damaged in air combat, for the loss of two Spitfires and two pilots. These are the wing's own claims, written down the same day.21

The American fields and Asch

The American losses were lighter. Craven and Cate count 36 American aircraft among the 156 Allied airplanes lost, and Ellis four American airfields among the seventeen attacked. Craven and Cate add that one of the fields struck lay in France.22

That field was Metz, the base of the XIX Tactical Air Command. Spires writes that at 10:30 a.m. 15 Bf 109s came in low, in flights of three, and strafed it from all four points of the compass, destroying 20 aircraft and damaging 11 more. The Metz anti-aircraft battery claimed 12 of the 15 attackers, and Third Army units 6 of 10 other fighters over the area. By a twist of timing, the American fighter-bombers there were keeping out of the skies over two corps areas that day after a run of friendly fire incidents.23

At Asch in Belgium, a detachment of the 487th Fighter Squadron of the 352nd Fighter Group had been flying its P-51 Mustangs since 23 December 1944. The squadron's official lineage, compiled by the USAF Historical Division, lists a Distinguished Unit Citation for Belgium, 1 January 1945, and a French Croix de Guerre with Palm for the same day. The lineage gives the date and the place of the award, not the story behind it.24

Black and white photograph of a wrecked German fighter lying in a snowy field, two American soldiers looking into the cockpit, a swastika and the number 210194 on the tail fin, jeeps in the background
A Focke-Wulf Fw 190 D-9 of Jagdgeschwader 2 down in the snow near Dorff, south-east of Aachen, in January 1945. The description of the photograph identifies it as a fighter hit by anti-aircraft fire on 1 January 1945, whose pilot was taken prisoner. U.S. Army Air Forces photograph 342-FH-3A20520-116060AC, via Wikimedia Commons, public domain

Shot down by their own guns

The flight home was as dangerous as the attack. The Canadian official history states that a third of the Luftwaffe's losses that day were caused by friendly anti-aircraft fire. At Evere some of the attackers of Jagdgeschwader 26 were brought down by their own flak before they reached the target. The Allied fighters that had been airborne or got off the ground in time took a heavy toll of the returning aircraft. Ellis records that 270 German aircraft were destroyed and 40 damaged by anti-aircraft fire or by fighters, and that the German aircrew killed numbered 260, among them many experienced pilots the enemy could ill afford to lose. Memories on the ground did not always match the record: Walter Ward, a pilot of 143 Wing at Eindhoven, recalled that the RAF Regiment gunners there could not fire a shot because their telephone lines had been cut, while the Canadian official history names those gunners as the attackers' main opposition.25

Counting the losses

No two official histories give the same Allied losses. Craven and Cate count 156 Allied airplanes lost, 36 of them American. Ellis gives 150 aircraft destroyed and 111 damaged, and 46 personnel killed, six of them in air combat. The Canadian official history gives 127 aircraft destroyed and 133 damaged for the Second Tactical Air Force alone, plus 36 American, and calls the material losses by no means negligible. Spires gives 134 Allied aircraft destroyed and 62 more needing major repair. Eisenhower wrote only that the losses of planes on the ground were considerable.26

The German losses are just as uncertain. Ellis gives 270 aircraft destroyed and 40 damaged and 260 aircrew killed, the Canadian official history three hundred machines and 214 pilots, Eisenhower 200 aircraft on that one day, and Spires cites the German fighter commander Adolf Galland, who reported a loss of 220. Craven and Cate do not give a total but call it one of the worst single days for human and aircraft losses the Luftwaffe ever experienced. Among the British aircraft destroyed, Ellis notes, was the personal aircraft of Field Marshal Montgomery, and when Eisenhower learned of it he at once replaced it with one of his own.27

Why it failed

The Allied machines could be replaced. Craven and Cate write that Hitler could replace his lost aircraft as readily as the Allies, but that he had spent some of his last capable pilots and key squadron leaders, and that the military effect on the Allies was, save for some embarrassment, negligible. Ellis concludes that the Germans had lost much more than they had gained. Walter Ward remembered that his squadron was fully re-equipped and flying again two to three weeks later. Spires adds that, coming so late, the raid gave the German troops in the Bulge no relief and further decimated the Luftwaffe.28

The Canadian official history adds that the losses came after two disastrous months in which almost eight hundred German pilots had been killed or captured, and quotes the German historian Werner Girbig, who judged that Bodenplatte amounted to total defeat for the home defence fighter units, which never recovered from the blow.29

The figures that followed bear this out. Craven and Cate record that after 1 January the Luftwaffe flew no more than 125 to 150 sorties a day on average over the battle area, with exceptions on 6 and 16 January, and the Canadian historians that the Luftwaffe could do little afterwards but fly defensive patrols. Cole had already noted that in the last six days of December only sixty to eighty German planes a day reached the battlefield.30

The same morning in Alsace

On the same 1 January 1945 Germany opened another offensive further south, against the U.S. Seventh Army in Alsace, with considerable support from the Luftwaffe. Craven and Cate describe it as a diversion meant to ease the pressure on the German troops retreating in the Ardennes, and note that the lost ground was back in Allied hands early in February. Spires writes that the Luftwaffe moved between 400 and 500 aircraft south from the Ardennes to support the attack north of Strasbourg in the first week of January.31

In the Ardennes, Eisenhower's report records, the Luftwaffe had for the first time since the landings in Normandy risen to support the ground forces, both in the air and against the airfields. Bodenplatte was the largest of those efforts against the airfields.32

Frequently asked questions

What was Operation Bodenplatte?

A German air attack on Allied airfields in the Netherlands, Belgium and France on the morning of 1 January 1945, during the Ardennes offensive. It had first been planned to open that offensive.33

How many German aircraft took part in Operation Bodenplatte?

The sources differ: about 700 by the U.S. Army Air Forces history, over 900 by the British official history, some thousand by the RCAF official history, 750 to 800 by David Spires, and 1,035 by Charles MacDonald. Eisenhower counted some 800 sorties.34

How many aircraft did the Allies lose on 1 January 1945?

Craven and Cate give 156, 36 of them American. Ellis gives 150 destroyed and 111 damaged, and Spires 134 destroyed and 62 needing major repair.35

How many German aircraft were lost in Operation Bodenplatte?

Ellis gives 270 destroyed and 40 damaged with 260 aircrew killed, the RCAF official history about three hundred aircraft and 214 pilots, and Eisenhower 200 aircraft. The RCAF official history adds that a third of the losses were caused by German anti-aircraft fire.36

Which airfield was hit hardest?

Eindhoven, home of two RCAF wings. The RCAF official history records fourteen Typhoons shot to pieces on the runway and two shot down taking off, thirteen dead and thirty-one aircraft burning or shot up.37

Why did Operation Bodenplatte fail?

The Allies replaced their lost aircraft quickly, while the Luftwaffe lost experienced pilots and squadron leaders it could not replace, so that, in Ellis's words, the Germans lost much more than they gained.38

Notes

A number in the text points to a note. Each note names the works that paragraph draws on, listed in full under Sources.

  1. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II. L. F. Ellis with A. E. Warhurst, “Victory in the West, Volume II”. Brereton Greenhous, “The Crucible of War, 1939-1945”. Charles B. MacDonald, “The Last Offensive”. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force, 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945”. ↩
  2. L. F. Ellis with A. E. Warhurst, “Victory in the West, Volume II”. David N. Spires, “Air Power for Patton’s Army”. Brereton Greenhous, “The Crucible of War, 1939-1945”. ↩
  3. L. F. Ellis with A. E. Warhurst, “Victory in the West, Volume II”. Brereton Greenhous, “The Crucible of War, 1939-1945”. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force, 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945”. ↩
  4. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II. L. F. Ellis with A. E. Warhurst, “Victory in the West, Volume II”. Brereton Greenhous, “The Crucible of War, 1939-1945”. ↩
  5. David N. Spires, “Air Power for Patton’s Army”. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force, 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945”. ↩
  6. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II. ↩
  7. Hugh M. Cole, “The Ardennes”. L. F. Ellis with A. E. Warhurst, “Victory in the West, Volume II”. ↩
  8. Charles B. MacDonald, “The Last Offensive”. ↩
  9. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II. Hugh M. Cole, “The Ardennes”. ↩
  10. Brereton Greenhous, “The Crucible of War, 1939-1945”. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II. ↩
  11. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II. David N. Spires, “Air Power for Patton’s Army”. L. F. Ellis with A. E. Warhurst, “Victory in the West, Volume II”. ↩
  12. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II. L. F. Ellis with A. E. Warhurst, “Victory in the West, Volume II”. Brereton Greenhous, “The Crucible of War, 1939-1945”. David N. Spires, “Air Power for Patton’s Army”. Charles B. MacDonald, “The Last Offensive”. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force, 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945”. ↩
  13. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II. L. F. Ellis with A. E. Warhurst, “Victory in the West, Volume II”. David N. Spires, “Air Power for Patton’s Army”. Brereton Greenhous, “The Crucible of War, 1939-1945”. ↩
  14. L. F. Ellis with A. E. Warhurst, “Victory in the West, Volume II”. Walter “Wally” Ward, testimony in the Memory Project Archive. ↩
  15. Brereton Greenhous, “The Crucible of War, 1939-1945”. ↩
  16. Veterans Affairs Canada, “Flight Lieutenant Peter Wilson”. Walter Weiss, testimony in the Memory Project Archive. Walter “Wally” Ward, testimony in the Memory Project Archive. Brereton Greenhous, “The Crucible of War, 1939-1945”. ↩
  17. Brereton Greenhous, “The Crucible of War, 1939-1945”. Walter Weiss, testimony in the Memory Project Archive. ↩
  18. Brereton Greenhous, “The Crucible of War, 1939-1945”. ↩
  19. 131 Wing, “Personnel combat reports, 308 & 317 Squadrons (Polish), 1.1.45”. ↩
  20. 131 Wing, “Personnel combat reports, 308 & 317 Squadrons (Polish), 1.1.45”. ↩
  21. 131 Wing, “Personnel combat reports, 308 & 317 Squadrons (Polish), 1.1.45”. ↩
  22. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II. L. F. Ellis with A. E. Warhurst, “Victory in the West, Volume II”. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II. ↩
  23. David N. Spires, “Air Power for Patton’s Army”. ↩
  24. Maurer Maurer, “Combat Squadrons of the Air Force, World War II”. ↩
  25. L. F. Ellis with A. E. Warhurst, “Victory in the West, Volume II”. Walter “Wally” Ward, testimony in the Memory Project Archive. Brereton Greenhous, “The Crucible of War, 1939-1945”. ↩
  26. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II. L. F. Ellis with A. E. Warhurst, “Victory in the West, Volume II”. Brereton Greenhous, “The Crucible of War, 1939-1945”. David N. Spires, “Air Power for Patton’s Army”. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force, 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945”. ↩
  27. L. F. Ellis with A. E. Warhurst, “Victory in the West, Volume II”. Brereton Greenhous, “The Crucible of War, 1939-1945”. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force, 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945”. David N. Spires, “Air Power for Patton’s Army”. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II. ↩
  28. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II. L. F. Ellis with A. E. Warhurst, “Victory in the West, Volume II”. Walter “Wally” Ward, testimony in the Memory Project Archive. David N. Spires, “Air Power for Patton’s Army”. ↩
  29. Brereton Greenhous, “The Crucible of War, 1939-1945”. ↩
  30. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II. Brereton Greenhous, “The Crucible of War, 1939-1945”. Hugh M. Cole, “The Ardennes”. ↩
  31. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II. David N. Spires, “Air Power for Patton’s Army”. ↩
  32. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force, 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945”. ↩
  33. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II. David N. Spires, “Air Power for Patton’s Army”. ↩
  34. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II. L. F. Ellis with A. E. Warhurst, “Victory in the West, Volume II”. David N. Spires, “Air Power for Patton’s Army”. Charles B. MacDonald, “The Last Offensive”. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force, 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945”. ↩
  35. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II. L. F. Ellis with A. E. Warhurst, “Victory in the West, Volume II”. David N. Spires, “Air Power for Patton’s Army”. ↩
  36. L. F. Ellis with A. E. Warhurst, “Victory in the West, Volume II”. Brereton Greenhous, “The Crucible of War, 1939-1945”. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force, 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945”. ↩
  37. Brereton Greenhous, “The Crucible of War, 1939-1945”. ↩
  38. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II. L. F. Ellis with A. E. Warhurst, “Victory in the West, Volume II”. ↩

Sources

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