Pompey or Caesar: what does the evidence say?
Pompey the Great (106 to 48 BC) and Julius Caesar (100 to 44 BC) were the two leading Roman generals of their age. They fought one civil war against each other. Pompey won at Dyrrachium, Caesar won the war at Pharsalus in 48 BC. Historians have not settled it. Mommsen called Caesar Rome's sole creative genius and wrote that Pompey was made by nature to be a good sergeant. Laurand thought Pompey the better general at Dyrrachium and van Ooteghem judged his strategy sound, while Kurt von Fritz blamed him for giving up Italy. This page sets out the evidence for each and leaves the final verdict to you.
For years they were political partners, and Pompey was Caesar's son-in-law until his wife Julia, Caesar's daughter, died. Then, in January 49 BC, Caesar crossed the Rubicon and the two most famous soldiers in Rome turned their armies on each other. Romans argued about them from the start. The poet Lucan, writing about a century later, put the rivalry in one line: Caesar could not bear a superior, nor Pompey an equal.1
This is not a ranking. Below you will find the two careers side by side, the campaign in which they actually met, and six questions on which a general can be judged, from strategy to what he left behind. Under each we give the strongest evidence for Pompey and the strongest for Caesar, with the ancient writers and modern historians who argue each case. At the end the decision is yours.
Side by side
- Lived
- 106 to 48 BC
- 100 to 44 BC (some date his birth to 102)
- Origin
- Picenum, son of the general Gnaeus Pompeius Strabo
- Rome, the old noble family of the Julii
- First command
- 83 BC, aged 23, with three legions he raised himself
- 61 BC, governor in Further Spain
- Wars in command
- Sulla's civil war 83 to 81, Sertorius in Spain 76 to 71, the pirates 67, Mithridates and the East 66 to 62, the civil war 49 to 48
- Spain 61 to 60, Gaul 58 to 50, the civil war 49 to 45
- Notable opponents
- Sertorius, the Cilician pirates, Mithridates VI of Pontus, Tigranes of Armenia, Caesar
- The Helvetii, the Nervii, Vercingetorix, Pompey, Pharnaces II, Pompey's sons
- Triumphs
- 3, over Africa, Europe and Asia
- 5, four in one month in 46 BC and one in 45 BC
- Battles named here
- Sucro, the night battle against Mithridates, Dyrrachium and Pharsalus
- The Sambre, Alesia, Dyrrachium and Pharsalus, Zela
- Death
- Killed off Pelusium in Egypt, 48 BC
- Killed in Rome on 15 March 44 BC
Dates, origins, commands and triumphs as given by the ancient sources and the Treccani encyclopedia. We give no win and loss totals because no source counts their battles the same way.2
Where they met: Italy, Dyrrachium and Pharsalus
The race for Italy, 49 BC
When Caesar crossed the Rubicon, Pompey did not try to hold Rome. He left the city and made for Brundisium on the heel of Italy, and Caesar followed him there, Velleius writes, hoping to end the war while talks were still possible. Caesar tried to close the harbour, but Pompey, as Florus tells it, slipped out by night through its entrance and crossed the Adriatic.3

Caesar did not chase him at once. Suetonius reports his words before he turned west against Pompey's legates in Spain: he was going to meet an army without a leader, and would return to meet a leader without an army. Velleius records that the legates, Afranius and Petreius, surrendered to him. Pompey meanwhile gathered at Dyrrachium a large army drawn from the provinces and the allied kings of the East, and tried to close the Adriatic to Caesar.4
Dyrrachium, spring and summer 48 BC
On 4 January 48 BC Caesar sailed from Brundisium with seven legions, in winter and past an enemy fleet, because he had ships for only about 15,000 legionaries and 500 horse. Once Antony brought over the rest, Caesar did something odd for the smaller army: he tried to wall the larger one in. Pompey answered with a ring of 24 forts and a line about fifteen miles long. Caesar's own works, by his account, ran for seventeen miles. Florus makes it sixteen.5
Hunger fell on Caesar's side first. His men baked bread from wild plants, and Pompey, Suetonius says, remarked on seeing it that he was fighting wild beasts. Florus notes that Pompey's command of the sea kept his own army supplied.6
Then Pompey struck where Caesar's lines were not finished. Caesar describes how light troops and archers were carried round by sea to the southern end, where the cross wall facing the sea was still open, and landed behind his men. Caesar lost 960 soldiers and 32 tribunes and centurions, and Pompey was hailed imperator by his army. Appian records Caesar's comment: that day the enemy would have won the war had they had a commander who knew how to use a victory. Caesar adds that after the defeat no one waited for orders, and every man set himself heavier work as a penalty.7
Pharsalus, August 48 BC
Caesar broke away east into Thessaly, where the harvest could feed his army. Pompey's plan, says Appian, was to drag the war out and let famine wear Caesar down, but the senators in his camp all urged him to fight. Velleius writes that Pompey followed Caesar although he was advised either to cross back to Italy or to prolong the war. He offered battle near Pharsalus.8
Caesar gives Pompey 110 cohorts, about 45,000 men, and some 7,000 cavalry, against his own 80 cohorts of about 22,000 and 1,000 horse. Appian, following other Roman sources, gives Caesar about 22,000 and Pompey more than twice as many. Pompey massed his horse on his left to ride round Caesar's right. Caesar saw it, took six cohorts from his third line and hid them as a fourth line behind his cavalry. When the charge came, those cohorts drove the horsemen off the field and turned on Pompey's flank.9

Caesar put his own losses at about 200 soldiers and 30 centurions, and the Pompeian dead at about 15,000, with more than 24,000 taken prisoner. Asinius Pollio, one of Caesar's officers, counted 6,000 Pompeian dead, as Appian reports. Looking over the field, Caesar is quoted by Pollio, through Suetonius, as saying: they would have it so.10
He fled to Egypt. Off Pelusium the young king's men took him into a small boat and stabbed him before he reached the shore. Velleius dates his death to the eve of his birthday, in his fifty-eighth year. The full story of the battle is in our article on the Battle of Pharsalus.11
When Caesar reached Alexandria soon after, he was shown Pompey's head and his signet ring. The summary of Livy says he took offence and wept, and Plutarch says he turned away from the man who brought the head.12

Strategy: the plan for a whole war
The case for Pompey
Pompey's plan for 49 BC was to give up Italy, hold the sea and raise the resources of the East. Cicero, who disliked it, summed it up in a letter to Atticus: Pompey's policy is that of Themistocles, and he believes that whoever is master of the sea must be master of the empire. The Polish historian Roman Kamienik argued in 1963 that the evacuation of Italy was the only sound choice, because Caesar's sudden winter attack had made a levy impossible and Pompey was not even supreme commander in Italy, only one holder of command among several.13
In Greece the plan worked for months. Florus describes Pompey at Dyrrachium avoiding a decisive fight, cutting off Caesar's supplies and waiting for his drive to wear itself out. Kamienik reports that the Dutch scholar J. H. Thiel and the Belgian J. van Ooteghem both judged the strategy right and its abandonment the fatal error: by following Caesar inland, away from the coast and the fleet, Pompey gave Caesar the battle he wanted.14
The case for Caesar
Caesar's strategy was to move first and keep moving. He struck before Pompey's levies were raised, turned on Spain while Pompey was still gathering the East, and crossed the Adriatic in January, out of the sailing season, with only part of his army. Appian has him tell his men that neither winter nor the delay of their comrades would stop him. The German historian Matthias Gelzer, as summarised by Kamienik, wrote that Caesar always chose what Pompey thought impossible.15
The weak point is Dyrrachium. A smaller army trying to blockade a larger one with a ring of works many miles long, while the enemy held the sea, invited the defeat that followed. Cassius Dio says that in a night attempt on the town Caesar was caught front and rear and very nearly killed. Florus adds that the town's position alone made it impregnable. Caesar's answer was to give up the works and march away.16
Battlefield tactics
The case for Pompey
In 66 BC Pompey caught Mithridates VI of Pontus in a night attack. Dio describes the moon rising behind the Romans so that their long shadows confused the king's men, who were trampled in the crush. At Dyrrachium his attack on the open end of Caesar's lines was well chosen and well timed, and the Livy summary records that he stormed Caesar's forts with heavy losses to the other side. The French scholar L. Laurand argued in 1926, Kamienik reports, that at Dyrrachium Pompey showed more military talent than Caesar.17

His record also has setbacks, and the sources do not hide them. In Spain the rebel general Sertorius often beat both Pompey and his colleague Metellus, the summary of Livy says, and Treccani notes that Pompey never won a decisive result against him. The war ended only after Sertorius was murdered at a banquet by his own officers, led by Perperna, whom Pompey then defeated.18
The case for Caesar
On the Sambre in 57 BC the Nervii caught Caesar's army building its camp. Caesar writes that he took a shield from a soldier in the rear rank, went to the front line and called the centurions by name. Plutarch agrees that the snatched shield saved the day. By the Nervii's own count, he reports, their fighting men fell from sixty thousand to barely five hundred.19
At Alesia in 52 BC he shut Vercingetorix inside a line of siege works eleven miles round, then built a second line fourteen miles round, facing out, against a relief army he puts at 8,000 horse and about 250,000 foot. Both lines held, and Vercingetorix surrendered. Treccani calls it a work of military genius. Pharsalus, with its hidden fourth line, shows the same habit of reading the enemy's plan and placing a few cohorts exactly where it would break.20

Logistics and speed
The case for Pompey
The war against the pirates in 67 BC is the best evidence for Pompey as an organiser. The law of the tribune Gabinius gave him a three-year command over the whole Mediterranean and its coasts, Treccani notes, and the summary of Livy says he drove the pirates from the entire sea within forty days. Cicero, speaking the next year, says Pompey prepared at the end of winter, began in early spring and finished by midsummer.21
Ten years later, in charge of Rome's grain supply, he ordered his captains out into a storm with the words Plutarch preserves: to sail is necessary, to live is not. In 48 BC the same command of the sea fed his army at Dyrrachium, Florus notes, while Caesar's men dug roots for bread.22
The case for Caesar
Suetonius says Caesar travelled a hundred miles a day in a hired carriage with little baggage, and Plutarch that on his first journey from Rome to Gaul he reached the Rhone in seven days. In 47 BC he beat Pharnaces II at Zela within five days of arriving and four hours after first seeing him. He reported the campaign to Rome in three words, I came, I saw, I conquered, which Suetonius says were carried in his Pontic triumph.23
Speed had a price. In January 48 BC he crossed with ships for about 15,000 legionaries and 500 horsemen and left the rest of his army behind in Italy, with Pompey's fleet between them. Appian stresses that he sailed in midwinter, when no one expected a crossing.24
Leading men
The case for Pompey
At twenty-three, with no office, Pompey raised three legions in Picenum among his father's old soldiers and clients, as Velleius and Plutarch both report. In 62 BC, back from the East with his victorious army, he dismissed it at Brundisium, as Velleius and Robin Seager's biography both stress, and kept only the title.25
Laurand's argument, as Kamienik reports it, is that Caesar escaped disaster at Dyrrachium only through the devotion and hardness of his veterans, an advantage no general could have created in a single winter.26
The case for Caesar
Caesar called his men comrades, not soldiers, and Suetonius says he valued them only for their courage. At Pharsalus, Plutarch tells, the veteran centurion Crastinus opened the attack, promising Caesar his thanks alive or dead, and was killed in it.27
He was also hard. When the ninth legion mutinied at Placentia in 49 BC, Appian says he announced its decimation, then limited it to 120 ringleaders, of whom twelve were chosen by lot to die. Dio records the same mutiny and the executions. When the tenth legion mutinied in Italy before the African war, he addressed them as citizens, not soldiers, as if already discharged. Suetonius says this one word turned them, and Appian describes the same scene.28
Politics and war
The case for Pompey
He held one extraordinary command after another, each granted by law: against the pirates in 67 BC, then, under the law of the tribune Manilius, against Mithridates. In 52 BC the Senate made him consul without a colleague, and Velleius says he used the office to curb electoral corruption. Cicero told the people in 66 BC that a great general needs four things, knowledge of war, courage, authority and good fortune, and that Pompey had them all.29
He also shaped his own image. He liked to be compared with Alexander the Great, and Plutarch says his hair, lifting slightly from his forehead, gave him a likeness to Alexander's statues, though one more talked about than real. The Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek notes that the locks above the forehead on its portrait of Pompey imitate Alexander's.30
His critics point to the other side of that power. Velleius writes that from the start of his public life he could not brook an equal. In a letter of 49 BC Cicero quotes him: Sulla could do it, and shall not I?31
The case for Caesar
At Corfinium in February 49 BC Caesar captured senators and Pompey's general Domitius, sent them away unharmed and even returned the public money found in the town. He explained the policy in a letter that Cicero copied to Atticus: this is a new way of conquering, to strengthen one's position by kindness and generosity, and he would not follow Sulla's example.32
He was also a master of telling his own story. The French scholar Michel Rambaud argued in 1952, Kamienik reports, that Caesar's own Civil War paints Pompey as a general of inaction and flight and distorts what he actually did in Macedonia. Most of what we know about Dyrrachium and Pharsalus comes from the winner. Cassius Dio puts the difference between them in a phrase: Pompey wanted to be second to no man, Caesar to be first of all.33
What came after
The case for Pompey
Pompey reshaped the East. He ended the Seleucid kingdom and organised the region into Roman provinces, Syria among them, as Treccani notes. Kamienik notes that the American scholar W. E. Caldwell saw in his use of legates and client kings a forerunner of the system of Augustus.34
On the Ides of March, Plutarch writes, Caesar fell dying against the pedestal of Pompey's statue.35

The case for Caesar
Caesar turned all of Gaul into a province paying a fixed yearly tribute, Suetonius says, after nine years of command. After Pharsalus he was given the dictatorship without a time limit, and he reformed the calendar to a year of 365 days with a leap day every fourth year. The civil war did not end with Pompey: his sons fought on until Caesar beat them at Munda in 45 BC.36
Munda was no walkover. Florus writes that Caesar's usual luck deserted him there, that the fight stayed in doubt for a long time and that even his veterans gave ground before he won. Treccani names Gnaeus, Pompey's elder son, as the commander he beat.37
How historians have judged them
Ancient opinion was divided, and often on Pompey's side. Velleius calls Pompey a man of exceptional purity of life and gives Caesar a courage beyond human nature. Appian, telling of Pompey's death, says he had been unvanquished and most fortunate from his youth. Dio says that both men had the name of being the most skilled in all matters of war.38
The nineteenth century swung hard towards Caesar. Theodor Mommsen called him the sole creative genius produced by Rome, and wrote of Pompey that he was created by nature to be a good sergeant and called by circumstances to be a general and a statesman, a man who struck only once he had built an immense superiority.39
Twentieth-century scholars pushed back, and Kamienik's survey of them is a good map of the argument. Laurand thought Pompey the better general at Dyrrachium and believed he could still have won after Pharsalus. Gelzer gave Caesar the genius but asked whether Pompey's strategy would have succeeded had he held to it. Van Ooteghem judged the strategy sound. Kurt von Fritz, on the other side, blamed Pompey for giving up Italy and called him unable to take decisions and risks. Kamienik himself defended the evacuation of Italy and blamed the Senate's divided command for much of the defeat.40
Lucan's next line names the judges: the winning cause pleased the gods, the losing cause pleased Cato. Two thousand years later the jury is still out.41
Battles on the site
Every battle page on Echoes of Battle that involves one of the two men, with the guides that set them in context.
Both in command · 48 BCBattle of Dyrrachium
Both in command · 48 BCBattle of Pharsalus
Caesar in command · 52 BCBattle of Alesia
Before the war · 53 BCCarrhae: Crassus, the third triumvir, falls
After Caesar · 42 BCPhilippi: Caesar's heirs against his killers
After Caesar · 31 BCActium: the last war of the Republic
Guide · 88 BC to AD 324The Roman Civil Wars
CommanderPompey the Great
CommanderJulius Caesar
RankingThe Greatest Commanders of Ancient Rome
RankingThe Greatest Battles of Ancient Rome
ExplainerHow the Roman Legion Worked
QuizHow Well Do You Know Roman Battles?
Your verdict
We do not pick a winner. Here are the two cases at their strongest, and the questions that decide which one you find more convincing.
For Pompey
- Three triumphs, over Africa, Europe and Asia
- The pirate war, won in a single season
- The defeat he inflicted on Caesar at Dyrrachium
- A sea strategy that nearly starved Caesar out, abandoned under pressure from his own senators
- The settlement of the East, with Syria made a Roman province
For Caesar
- Gaul conquered in nine years, with Alesia as the masterpiece
- A smaller army that beat a larger one at Pharsalus
- Speed that kept every opponent off balance, from Italy to Zela
- Veterans who would follow him through hunger and defeat
- Lasting reforms, such as the calendar of 365 days
Questions to weigh before you decide:
- Should a general be judged by his whole career, or by the one war in which the two met?
- Was Pharsalus Pompey's mistake, or the Senate's, which pushed him into it?
- How much of Caesar's success came from his veterans of Gaul rather than from his own decisions?
- How far can we trust a war whose main account was written by the winner?
- Does Dyrrachium show Pompey's skill, or Caesar's recklessness?
- Is organising a war, as Pompey did against the pirates, as great a gift as winning a battle?
Cast your vote below and see how other readers have judged them.








