Eisenhower or Montgomery: what does the evidence say?
Dwight Eisenhower (1890 to 1969) and Bernard Montgomery (1887 to 1976) were not enemies but superior and subordinate in the same alliance. From Sicily in 1943 to the German surrender in 1945 they argued over how to win the war in the West: on one broad front or with one powerful thrust, about Antwerp, Arnhem, the Ardennes and Berlin. Historians are divided. The US official historians, such as Ruppenthal, largely back Eisenhower on supply. Carlo D'Este finds both men right, but says the single thrust stood no chance in a coalition war. This page sets out the evidence for each and leaves the final verdict to you.
Eisenhower never led troops in battle. He was a staff officer who became the commander of a coalition: the Allied landings in North Africa, then Sicily and Italy, then the invasion of Europe. Montgomery was the field commander who had beaten Rommel at El Alamein and who came to Normandy to command the Allied armies in the assault. Their quarrels were real, and so was their mutual need.1
This is not a ranking, and the two men did different jobs. Below you will find their careers side by side, the seven episodes in which their judgements met, and six questions on which their record can be weighed. Under each we give the strongest evidence for Eisenhower and the strongest for Montgomery, from the official histories, their own memoirs and the historians who have argued the case since. At the end the decision is yours.
Side by side
- Lived
- 1890 to 1969, born in Denison, Texas, raised in Abilene, Kansas
- 1887 to 1976, born in London
- Trained at
- West Point, class of 1915, 64th of 164
- Sandhurst, then the Royal Warwickshire Regiment
- World War I
- Kept in the United States, training with the Tank Corps
- Shot through the lung at Ypres in 1914, then a staff officer
- Commands 1942 to 1943
- Allied commander for North Africa, Sicily and Italy
- Eighth Army, from El Alamein to Sicily and Italy
- Commands 1944 to 1945
- Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, from December 1943
- 21st Army Group, in charge of the land battle in Normandy until 1 September 1944
- Highest rank
- General of the Army, 20 December 1944
- Field marshal, announced 1 September 1944
- Battles named here
- Torch, Normandy, the Bulge, the Rhine
- El Alamein, Normandy, Market Garden, the Rhine
- After the war
- Army Chief of Staff, then President of the United States, 1953 to 1961
- Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, commander of the British Army of the Rhine
Dates and commands as given by the Eisenhower Presidential Library, the National Park Service, the National Army Museum and the US Army official history. A theatre commander and an army group commander did different jobs, so we give no tally of battles won.2
Where they met: seven arguments, 1943 to 1945
They never faced each other in battle. What they shared were decisions, and the official history of the Supreme Command, by Forrest Pogue, follows each of them. These are the seven that matter most.
Tunisia and Sicily, 1943
Their first contact came at the end of the war in Africa. The National Army Museum tells of a wager by Eisenhower's chief of staff, Bedell Smith, that the British would not take Sfax by 15 April 1943. Sfax fell on 10 April, Montgomery claimed an American bomber as his prize, and Eisenhower made Smith pay up.3
In Sicily, Eisenhower wrote, Montgomery's operations on the east coast had begun auspiciously, but the chance for a quick stroke towards Messina passed, if it ever had existed. He added that the Eighth Army faced ground as difficult as the Americans did, and most of the enemy strength.4
Planning the invasion, January 1944
Montgomery's appointment to command the British army group was a British decision. Pogue writes that Eisenhower was not consulted officially and had earlier asked for Alexander. Churchill showed Montgomery the existing invasion plan at Marrakech on 1 January 1944, and he found the front too narrow and the assault too small. In London he pointed at the map on both sides of the Cotentin and said: we should land here and here. On 23 January Eisenhower formally proposed raising the first assault from three divisions to five.5
The US Army historian Gordon Harrison records that early in January Montgomery replaced General Paget at the head of the 21st Army Group, which had been given the overall ground command for the assault. He came, Harrison writes, with a brilliant record that dated back to World War I.6

Normandy, June to August 1944
Montgomery was the commander of the ground forces in the assault in practice, Pogue writes, but was never given the title of ground commander, and the arrangement could be changed whenever the Supreme Commander decided. His plan, as he set it out himself, was to threaten a break-out at Caen, draw the German reserves there and break out in the west. Pogue writes that the criticism of his slowness at Caen rested on a fundamental misunderstanding of that plan.7
In August the Germans were nearly trapped between Falaise and Argentan. The US Army historian Martin Blumenson writes that Eisenhower, who was in France and following the fighting, might have resolved the halt at Argentan had he thought it necessary, but did not intervene, because overruling a commander closer to the scene was not his method of command.8
The halt itself was Bradley's order, Blumenson shows, given because he preferred, in his own words, a solid shoulder at Argentan to a broken neck at Falaise. Montgomery had not moved the boundary between the army groups, and he had not forbidden the Americans to go on.9
Broad front or single thrust, August and September 1944
Montgomery's own view, as he wrote it in 1947, was that one powerful full-blooded thrust across the Rhine and into the heart of Germany, backed by the whole resources of the Allied armies, would be likely to achieve decisive results. Eisenhower would not agree. Their meeting at Brussels on 10 September, Carlo D'Este writes, drove an even deeper wedge between them.10
Market Garden and Antwerp, September 1944
At Brussels Eisenhower also agreed to put off the opening of Antwerp so that Montgomery could try for a bridgehead over the Rhine. The National Army Museum writes that Montgomery convinced him to agree to Market Garden, and that the plan failed because of the many German armoured units in the area, with heavy losses. Eisenhower later admitted that without the Arnhem operation the attack on Walcheren, which opened Antwerp, might have begun two or three weeks earlier.11

The Ardennes, December 1944 to January 1945
When the Germans broke through in the Ardennes, Eisenhower put Montgomery in charge of the American First and Ninth Armies north of the salient. Montgomery wrote that the depth of the German advance had cut them off from Bradley's headquarters, and that he at once visited their commanders, Simpson and Hodges. Churchill told the Commons that Montgomery had been placed in command of American forces larger than his own.12
The cost fell mainly on the Americans. The US Army historian Hugh Cole counts 41,315 American battle casualties from 16 December to 2 January, 4,138 of them known killed.13
On 7 January 1945 Montgomery gave a press conference. He praised the American soldier as a brave fighting man, steady under fire, and warned that anyone who tried to break up the team spirit of the Allies was helping the enemy. Bradley and his staff, Pogue writes, were exasperated, if not outraged. Eisenhower wrote that he did not believe Montgomery meant his words as they sounded, but that the incident caused him more distress and worry than any similar one of the war.14
The Rhine and Berlin, March and April 1945
Montgomery's crossing of the lower Rhine, Operation Plunder, launched on the night of 23 March, used more than a million and a quarter men, according to the US official historian Charles MacDonald, with 3,411 British and 2,070 American guns and 21,680 airborne troops dropped on the far bank.15
Eisenhower then turned the main effort away from Berlin. On 7 April he told the Combined Chiefs that he regarded it as militarily unsound to make the city a major objective, since it was only 35 miles from the Russian lines. Bradley had estimated that a break through from the Elbe to Berlin might cost 100,000 casualties, a pretty stiff price for a prestige objective. On 8 April Montgomery asked for ten American divisions for a drive to Lübeck and Berlin, and was refused.16
Broad front or single thrust
The case for Eisenhower
Eisenhower's case rests on supply. The army historian Roland Ruppenthal shows that in early September deliveries ran at only 3,300 tons a day to the First Army and 2,500 to the Third, about half of what they needed, and that Antwerp was not expected to work before 1 November. The decision against a single thrust, he concludes, was based in large measure on the logistical situation.17
In his memoir Eisenhower argued that Germany's last power of resistance could not be broken merely by a single thrust along a narrow channel following the northern coast, because the German forces in the field still had to be destroyed wherever they stood.18
The case for Montgomery
Montgomery wrote that the success of such a thrust would have depended on concentrating the resources of the Allied armies behind it. The military historian Carlo D'Este wrote in 2009 that had the supply existed without crippling everyone else, there was a strong case for Montgomery's bold single thrust, with an end to the war in 1944 as the prize.19
D'Este also shows the limits of that case. Montgomery spoke of a force of some forty divisions, a figure D'Este calls wildly beyond what the logisticians could have supported without Antwerp. The most reasonable figure, he writes, was a mere twelve divisions.20
Planning the big operations
The case for Eisenhower
Eisenhower claims part of the wider invasion plan for himself. In his memoir he writes that he was doubtful of a plan that attacked on a relatively narrow three-division front, with only five divisions afloat at the moment of assault, and that he told Montgomery so. The account of the planning above gives Montgomery the first word in January, so the two versions differ on who raised it first.21
The National Park Service calls the D-Day attack the culmination of Eisenhower's work, after his diplomacy and determination had built a multinational headquarters that controlled British and American units alike.22
The case for Montgomery
Eisenhower himself wrote that Montgomery was always a master in the methodical preparation of forces for a formal, set-piece attack, and that he made the most meticulous preparations for the Rhine because the enemy's best remaining troops stood in front of him.23
The Rhine crossing showed that method at full scale. Mark Calhoun of the National WWII Museum calls the plan for Plunder massive, detailed and deliberate. MacDonald adds a doubt: whether such elaborate preparation was necessary at that stage of the war would forever remain conjecture, because the crossing might have been made earlier had Montgomery let the US Ninth Army jump the Rhine by surprise in early March.24
Supply and Antwerp
The case for Eisenhower
Eisenhower's supporters say he saw the port problem first. Ruppenthal writes that he repeated again and again that a large-scale drive into Germany was unthinkable without more supply capacity, and that this meant opening Antwerp. Tactical operations, Ruppenthal concludes, had become the art of the logistically feasible.25
Calhoun adds that Eisenhower solved the shortage of combat power in the north by giving Montgomery an American army on sound military principles, and that when he returned the First Army to Bradley in January 1945 he left the Ninth under Montgomery to weight the main effort.26
The case for Montgomery
His supporters turn the same evidence round: it was Eisenhower who agreed to defer Antwerp for Arnhem. The National Army Museum, which judges Market Garden a failure, also credits Montgomery with the skilful planning that trapped and defeated the German forces in the Falaise pocket.27
Holding the alliance together
The case for Eisenhower
Pogue writes that the quality most often stressed by those who served with Eisenhower in the Mediterranean was his ability to get people of different nationalities and viewpoints to work together. His willingness to go the extra mile drew from some American officers the gibe that Ike was the best commander the British had.28
His rise was that of a planner and trainer. He graduated first in his class at the army's Command and General Staff College in 1926 and served on the staff of Douglas MacArthur. He became a four-star general in February 1943, Supreme Commander in December 1943 and General of the Army on 20 December 1944.29
The case for Montgomery
Montgomery's defenders say he spoke plainly where others flattered, and that his loyalty was real. In 1945 he wrote to Eisenhower that he knew his own faults very well, that he did not suppose he was an easy subordinate, and that Eisenhower had kept him on the rails in difficult and stormy times.30
Eisenhower's own assessment of 1943, as the National Army Museum quotes it, was that Montgomery was a very able, dynamic type of army commander who needed only a strong immediate commander, and who loved the limelight perhaps only for the effect on his soldiers.31
Crisis in the Ardennes
The case for Eisenhower
Eisenhower kept his nerve. Cole notes that he refused to issue a backs to the wall order of the day like the one Haig had issued in April 1918, because the battle never came close to the narrow margin between success and failure.32
When Montgomery pressed at Hasselt on 28 December for one-man control of the whole battle in the north, General Marshall cabled from Washington: under no circumstances make any concessions of any kind whatsoever. Eisenhower held his line.33
The case for Montgomery
Churchill told the House of Commons on 18 January 1945 that Montgomery, acting with extraordinary promptitude, had concentrated powerful British reserves at the decisive strategic point. The National Army Museum writes that he redeemed himself with his excellent command in the battle, bolstering the American defences with 30 Corps.34
Churchill also warned against claiming too much. The Americans, he said, had engaged 30 or 40 men for every one the British had engaged, and this was undoubtedly the greatest American battle of the war. Let no one, he added, lend himself to the chatter of mischief-makers.35
Berlin and the end
The case for Eisenhower
Eisenhower wrote that Berlin was not the logical nor the most desirable objective for the Western Allies. When they stood on the Rhine in the last week of March, he pointed out, they were 300 miles from Berlin with the Elbe still 200 miles ahead, while the Russians were already on the Oder.36
The case for Montgomery
The British saw Berlin differently. Churchill wrote that its fall would be the supreme signal of defeat to the German people, and the British Chiefs of Staff held that Eisenhower, by informing Stalin of his plans directly, had not only made a political mistake but had also exceeded his powers.37
How historians have judged them
The American official historians largely back Eisenhower on supply. Ruppenthal's conclusion is that the decision against one thrust into Germany was based in large measure on the logistical situation of September 1944.38
Carlo D'Este gives each a share of the argument. When Eisenhower said that public opinion wins wars and Montgomery answered that victories win wars, D'Este writes, both were right, but the single thrust stood no chance in the climate of coalition warfare.39
D'Este criticises both. Montgomery, he writes, failed to see that trying to run roughshod over Eisenhower was a waste of time, while Eisenhower's great instinct for compromise shaped his decisions in the most critical weeks of the war.40
The National Army Museum calls Montgomery one of the British Army's greatest ever commanders, and arrogant, unlikeable, but ultimately successful. The Eisenhower Presidential Library and the National Park Service stress the other side of the pair: the organiser who commanded the Normandy invasion and went on to the presidency.41
Battles on the site
Every battle page on Echoes of Battle where one of the two men commanded, with the guides that set them in context. Sicily, Kasserine, Caen, Cobra and the Rhine crossings have no page of their own yet.
Together · 1944D-Day and Normandy
Together · 1944The Battle of Falaise
Together · 1944Operation Market Garden
Together · 1944The Scheldt: opening Antwerp
Together · 1944The Battle of the Bulge
Together · 1943The Mediterranean and Italy
Both · 1942 to 1943The North African Campaign
Eisenhower · 1942Operation Torch
Eisenhower's broad front · 1944Hürtgen Forest
Montgomery · 1942El Alamein
Montgomery · 1940The Dunkirk Evacuation
Montgomery wounded · 1914First Ypres
CommanderDwight D. Eisenhower
CommanderBernard Montgomery
Arnhem, the Polish sideStanisław Sosabowski
GuideThe Western Front of World War II
More head to head pages: Montgomery vs Rommel, Patton vs Montgomery and Patton vs Rommel. See also Omar Bradley, the greatest American commanders, the greatest British commanders and the greatest battles of World War II.
Your verdict
We do not pick a winner. Here are the two cases at their strongest, and the questions that decide which one you find more convincing.
For Eisenhower
- He held a quarrelsome coalition together from Torch to the German surrender
- He backed the larger invasion plan and took the decisions that carried it out
- The supply figures of September 1944 support his broad front
- He kept his nerve and his authority in the Ardennes crisis
- He refused to spend lives on Berlin for prestige
For Montgomery
- He widened the invasion plan that succeeded on D-Day
- He commanded the Allied armies to victory in Normandy
- A single thrust might have ended the war in 1944, if supply had allowed
- He took charge of the northern flank in the Ardennes with real effect
- His Rhine crossing was a model of preparation
Questions to weigh before you decide:
- Can a theatre commander who never led troops in battle be fairly compared with an army group commander?
- Was the single thrust of September 1944 feasible with the fuel and ports the Allies had, or only on paper?
- Who carries Market Garden: the general who proposed it or the superior who approved it and delayed Antwerp?
- Did Montgomery's command in the Ardennes justify the tone of his press conference?
- How much should a coalition commander weigh national opinion against military efficiency?
- Was leaving Berlin to the Soviets a sound military choice or a political mistake?
Cast your vote below and see how other readers have judged them.








