PLSubscribe
Allied forces in Normandy, 1944

Eisenhower vs Montgomery: the supreme commander and his field general

Military history · Head to head · Evidence for both, the verdict is yours · ~16 min read · Updated November 2026

CPhoM Robert F. Sargent, US Coast Guard, 1944, via Wikimedia Commons, public domain (US government work).

In short

Eisenhower or Montgomery: what does the evidence say?

Dwight Eisenhower (1890 to 1969) and Bernard Montgomery (1887 to 1976) were not enemies but superior and subordinate in the same alliance. From Sicily in 1943 to the German surrender in 1945 they argued over how to win the war in the West: on one broad front or with one powerful thrust, about Antwerp, Arnhem, the Ardennes and Berlin. Historians are divided. The US official historians, such as Ruppenthal, largely back Eisenhower on supply. Carlo D'Este finds both men right, but says the single thrust stood no chance in a coalition war. This page sets out the evidence for each and leaves the final verdict to you.

Eisenhower never led troops in battle. He was a staff officer who became the commander of a coalition: the Allied landings in North Africa, then Sicily and Italy, then the invasion of Europe. Montgomery was the field commander who had beaten Rommel at El Alamein and who came to Normandy to command the Allied armies in the assault. Their quarrels were real, and so was their mutual need.1

This is not a ranking, and the two men did different jobs. Below you will find their careers side by side, the seven episodes in which their judgements met, and six questions on which their record can be weighed. Under each we give the strongest evidence for Eisenhower and the strongest for Montgomery, from the official histories, their own memoirs and the historians who have argued the case since. At the end the decision is yours.

Side by side

General Dwight D. Eisenhower in uniform, February 1945Dwight D. EisenhowerUnited States Army
Bernard Montgomery in his black beret, El Alamein, 1942Bernard MontgomeryBritish Army
Lived
1890 to 1969, born in Denison, Texas, raised in Abilene, Kansas
1887 to 1976, born in London
Trained at
West Point, class of 1915, 64th of 164
Sandhurst, then the Royal Warwickshire Regiment
World War I
Kept in the United States, training with the Tank Corps
Shot through the lung at Ypres in 1914, then a staff officer
Commands 1942 to 1943
Allied commander for North Africa, Sicily and Italy
Eighth Army, from El Alamein to Sicily and Italy
Commands 1944 to 1945
Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, from December 1943
21st Army Group, in charge of the land battle in Normandy until 1 September 1944
Highest rank
General of the Army, 20 December 1944
Field marshal, announced 1 September 1944
Battles named here
Torch, Normandy, the Bulge, the Rhine
El Alamein, Normandy, Market Garden, the Rhine
After the war
Army Chief of Staff, then President of the United States, 1953 to 1961
Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, commander of the British Army of the Rhine

Dates and commands as given by the Eisenhower Presidential Library, the National Park Service, the National Army Museum and the US Army official history. A theatre commander and an army group commander did different jobs, so we give no tally of battles won.2

Where they met: seven arguments, 1943 to 1945

They never faced each other in battle. What they shared were decisions, and the official history of the Supreme Command, by Forrest Pogue, follows each of them. These are the seven that matter most.

Tunisia and Sicily, 1943

Their first contact came at the end of the war in Africa. The National Army Museum tells of a wager by Eisenhower's chief of staff, Bedell Smith, that the British would not take Sfax by 15 April 1943. Sfax fell on 10 April, Montgomery claimed an American bomber as his prize, and Eisenhower made Smith pay up.3

In Sicily, Eisenhower wrote, Montgomery's operations on the east coast had begun auspiciously, but the chance for a quick stroke towards Messina passed, if it ever had existed. He added that the Eighth Army faced ground as difficult as the Americans did, and most of the enemy strength.4

Planning the invasion, January 1944

Montgomery's appointment to command the British army group was a British decision. Pogue writes that Eisenhower was not consulted officially and had earlier asked for Alexander. Churchill showed Montgomery the existing invasion plan at Marrakech on 1 January 1944, and he found the front too narrow and the assault too small. In London he pointed at the map on both sides of the Cotentin and said: we should land here and here. On 23 January Eisenhower formally proposed raising the first assault from three divisions to five.5

The US Army historian Gordon Harrison records that early in January Montgomery replaced General Paget at the head of the 21st Army Group, which had been given the overall ground command for the assault. He came, Harrison writes, with a brilliant record that dated back to World War I.6

Seven Allied commanders of the D-Day supreme command, Eisenhower seated in the center between Tedder and Montgomery, four more standing, in front of wall maps in London, 1 February 1944, in color
The Allied supreme command for the invasion of Europe in London on 1 February 1944: Eisenhower sits in the center between Air Chief Marshal Tedder and General Montgomery, with Bradley, Ramsay, Leigh-Mallory and Bedell Smith behind. British official color photograph. Public domain

Normandy, June to August 1944

Montgomery was the commander of the ground forces in the assault in practice, Pogue writes, but was never given the title of ground commander, and the arrangement could be changed whenever the Supreme Commander decided. His plan, as he set it out himself, was to threaten a break-out at Caen, draw the German reserves there and break out in the west. Pogue writes that the criticism of his slowness at Caen rested on a fundamental misunderstanding of that plan.7

In August the Germans were nearly trapped between Falaise and Argentan. The US Army historian Martin Blumenson writes that Eisenhower, who was in France and following the fighting, might have resolved the halt at Argentan had he thought it necessary, but did not intervene, because overruling a commander closer to the scene was not his method of command.8

The halt itself was Bradley's order, Blumenson shows, given because he preferred, in his own words, a solid shoulder at Argentan to a broken neck at Falaise. Montgomery had not moved the boundary between the army groups, and he had not forbidden the Americans to go on.9

Broad front or single thrust, August and September 1944

Montgomery's own view, as he wrote it in 1947, was that one powerful full-blooded thrust across the Rhine and into the heart of Germany, backed by the whole resources of the Allied armies, would be likely to achieve decisive results. Eisenhower would not agree. Their meeting at Brussels on 10 September, Carlo D'Este writes, drove an even deeper wedge between them.10

Market Garden and Antwerp, September 1944

At Brussels Eisenhower also agreed to put off the opening of Antwerp so that Montgomery could try for a bridgehead over the Rhine. The National Army Museum writes that Montgomery convinced him to agree to Market Garden, and that the plan failed because of the many German armoured units in the area, with heavy losses. Eisenhower later admitted that without the Arnhem operation the attack on Walcheren, which opened Antwerp, might have begun two or three weeks earlier.11

Map of northern France and the Low Countries with the lines of the Allied armies advancing toward the German border
The Allied pursuit across France and Belgium to the German border, 26 August to 10 September 1944, the advance on a wide front that fueled the argument between the two men. Map from the US Army official history. Public domain

The Ardennes, December 1944 to January 1945

When the Germans broke through in the Ardennes, Eisenhower put Montgomery in charge of the American First and Ninth Armies north of the salient. Montgomery wrote that the depth of the German advance had cut them off from Bradley's headquarters, and that he at once visited their commanders, Simpson and Hodges. Churchill told the Commons that Montgomery had been placed in command of American forces larger than his own.12

The cost fell mainly on the Americans. The US Army historian Hugh Cole counts 41,315 American battle casualties from 16 December to 2 January, 4,138 of them known killed.13

On 7 January 1945 Montgomery gave a press conference. He praised the American soldier as a brave fighting man, steady under fire, and warned that anyone who tried to break up the team spirit of the Allies was helping the enemy. Bradley and his staff, Pogue writes, were exasperated, if not outraged. Eisenhower wrote that he did not believe Montgomery meant his words as they sounded, but that the incident caused him more distress and worry than any similar one of the war.14

The Rhine and Berlin, March and April 1945

Montgomery's crossing of the lower Rhine, Operation Plunder, launched on the night of 23 March, used more than a million and a quarter men, according to the US official historian Charles MacDonald, with 3,411 British and 2,070 American guns and 21,680 airborne troops dropped on the far bank.15

Eisenhower then turned the main effort away from Berlin. On 7 April he told the Combined Chiefs that he regarded it as militarily unsound to make the city a major objective, since it was only 35 miles from the Russian lines. Bradley had estimated that a break through from the Elbe to Berlin might cost 100,000 casualties, a pretty stiff price for a prestige objective. On 8 April Montgomery asked for ten American divisions for a drive to Lübeck and Berlin, and was refused.16

Broad front or single thrust

The case for Eisenhower

Eisenhower's case rests on supply. The army historian Roland Ruppenthal shows that in early September deliveries ran at only 3,300 tons a day to the First Army and 2,500 to the Third, about half of what they needed, and that Antwerp was not expected to work before 1 November. The decision against a single thrust, he concludes, was based in large measure on the logistical situation.17

In his memoir Eisenhower argued that Germany's last power of resistance could not be broken merely by a single thrust along a narrow channel following the northern coast, because the German forces in the field still had to be destroyed wherever they stood.18

The case for Montgomery

Montgomery wrote that the success of such a thrust would have depended on concentrating the resources of the Allied armies behind it. The military historian Carlo D'Este wrote in 2009 that had the supply existed without crippling everyone else, there was a strong case for Montgomery's bold single thrust, with an end to the war in 1944 as the prize.19

D'Este also shows the limits of that case. Montgomery spoke of a force of some forty divisions, a figure D'Este calls wildly beyond what the logisticians could have supported without Antwerp. The most reasonable figure, he writes, was a mere twelve divisions.20

Planning the big operations

The case for Eisenhower

Eisenhower claims part of the wider invasion plan for himself. In his memoir he writes that he was doubtful of a plan that attacked on a relatively narrow three-division front, with only five divisions afloat at the moment of assault, and that he told Montgomery so. The account of the planning above gives Montgomery the first word in January, so the two versions differ on who raised it first.21

The National Park Service calls the D-Day attack the culmination of Eisenhower's work, after his diplomacy and determination had built a multinational headquarters that controlled British and American units alike.22

The case for Montgomery

Eisenhower himself wrote that Montgomery was always a master in the methodical preparation of forces for a formal, set-piece attack, and that he made the most meticulous preparations for the Rhine because the enemy's best remaining troops stood in front of him.23

The Rhine crossing showed that method at full scale. Mark Calhoun of the National WWII Museum calls the plan for Plunder massive, detailed and deliberate. MacDonald adds a doubt: whether such elaborate preparation was necessary at that stage of the war would forever remain conjecture, because the crossing might have been made earlier had Montgomery let the US Ninth Army jump the Rhine by surprise in early March.24

Supply and Antwerp

The case for Eisenhower

Eisenhower's supporters say he saw the port problem first. Ruppenthal writes that he repeated again and again that a large-scale drive into Germany was unthinkable without more supply capacity, and that this meant opening Antwerp. Tactical operations, Ruppenthal concludes, had become the art of the logistically feasible.25

Calhoun adds that Eisenhower solved the shortage of combat power in the north by giving Montgomery an American army on sound military principles, and that when he returned the First Army to Bradley in January 1945 he left the Ninth under Montgomery to weight the main effort.26

The case for Montgomery

His supporters turn the same evidence round: it was Eisenhower who agreed to defer Antwerp for Arnhem. The National Army Museum, which judges Market Garden a failure, also credits Montgomery with the skilful planning that trapped and defeated the German forces in the Falaise pocket.27

Holding the alliance together

The case for Eisenhower

Pogue writes that the quality most often stressed by those who served with Eisenhower in the Mediterranean was his ability to get people of different nationalities and viewpoints to work together. His willingness to go the extra mile drew from some American officers the gibe that Ike was the best commander the British had.28

His rise was that of a planner and trainer. He graduated first in his class at the army's Command and General Staff College in 1926 and served on the staff of Douglas MacArthur. He became a four-star general in February 1943, Supreme Commander in December 1943 and General of the Army on 20 December 1944.29

The case for Montgomery

Montgomery's defenders say he spoke plainly where others flattered, and that his loyalty was real. In 1945 he wrote to Eisenhower that he knew his own faults very well, that he did not suppose he was an easy subordinate, and that Eisenhower had kept him on the rails in difficult and stormy times.30

Eisenhower's own assessment of 1943, as the National Army Museum quotes it, was that Montgomery was a very able, dynamic type of army commander who needed only a strong immediate commander, and who loved the limelight perhaps only for the effect on his soldiers.31

Crisis in the Ardennes

The case for Eisenhower

Eisenhower kept his nerve. Cole notes that he refused to issue a backs to the wall order of the day like the one Haig had issued in April 1918, because the battle never came close to the narrow margin between success and failure.32

When Montgomery pressed at Hasselt on 28 December for one-man control of the whole battle in the north, General Marshall cabled from Washington: under no circumstances make any concessions of any kind whatsoever. Eisenhower held his line.33

The case for Montgomery

Churchill told the House of Commons on 18 January 1945 that Montgomery, acting with extraordinary promptitude, had concentrated powerful British reserves at the decisive strategic point. The National Army Museum writes that he redeemed himself with his excellent command in the battle, bolstering the American defences with 30 Corps.34

Churchill also warned against claiming too much. The Americans, he said, had engaged 30 or 40 men for every one the British had engaged, and this was undoubtedly the greatest American battle of the war. Let no one, he added, lend himself to the chatter of mischief-makers.35

Berlin and the end

The case for Eisenhower

Eisenhower wrote that Berlin was not the logical nor the most desirable objective for the Western Allies. When they stood on the Rhine in the last week of March, he pointed out, they were 300 miles from Berlin with the Elbe still 200 miles ahead, while the Russians were already on the Oder.36

The case for Montgomery

The British saw Berlin differently. Churchill wrote that its fall would be the supreme signal of defeat to the German people, and the British Chiefs of Staff held that Eisenhower, by informing Stalin of his plans directly, had not only made a political mistake but had also exceeded his powers.37

How historians have judged them

The American official historians largely back Eisenhower on supply. Ruppenthal's conclusion is that the decision against one thrust into Germany was based in large measure on the logistical situation of September 1944.38

Carlo D'Este gives each a share of the argument. When Eisenhower said that public opinion wins wars and Montgomery answered that victories win wars, D'Este writes, both were right, but the single thrust stood no chance in the climate of coalition warfare.39

Both were right but, in the end, the scheme stood no chance in the climate of coalition warfare. Carlo D'Este

D'Este criticises both. Montgomery, he writes, failed to see that trying to run roughshod over Eisenhower was a waste of time, while Eisenhower's great instinct for compromise shaped his decisions in the most critical weeks of the war.40

The National Army Museum calls Montgomery one of the British Army's greatest ever commanders, and arrogant, unlikeable, but ultimately successful. The Eisenhower Presidential Library and the National Park Service stress the other side of the pair: the organiser who commanded the Normandy invasion and went on to the presidency.41

Battles on the site

Every battle page on Echoes of Battle where one of the two men commanded, with the guides that set them in context. Sicily, Kasserine, Caen, Cobra and the Rhine crossings have no page of their own yet.

More head to head pages: Montgomery vs Rommel, Patton vs Montgomery and Patton vs Rommel. See also Omar Bradley, the greatest American commanders, the greatest British commanders and the greatest battles of World War II.

Your verdict

We do not pick a winner. Here are the two cases at their strongest, and the questions that decide which one you find more convincing.

For Eisenhower

  • He held a quarrelsome coalition together from Torch to the German surrender
  • He backed the larger invasion plan and took the decisions that carried it out
  • The supply figures of September 1944 support his broad front
  • He kept his nerve and his authority in the Ardennes crisis
  • He refused to spend lives on Berlin for prestige

For Montgomery

  • He widened the invasion plan that succeeded on D-Day
  • He commanded the Allied armies to victory in Normandy
  • A single thrust might have ended the war in 1944, if supply had allowed
  • He took charge of the northern flank in the Ardennes with real effect
  • His Rhine crossing was a model of preparation

Questions to weigh before you decide:

  1. Can a theatre commander who never led troops in battle be fairly compared with an army group commander?
  2. Was the single thrust of September 1944 feasible with the fuel and ports the Allies had, or only on paper?
  3. Who carries Market Garden: the general who proposed it or the superior who approved it and delayed Antwerp?
  4. Did Montgomery's command in the Ardennes justify the tone of his press conference?
  5. How much should a coalition commander weigh national opinion against military efficiency?
  6. Was leaving Berlin to the Soviets a sound military choice or a political mistake?

Cast your vote below and see how other readers have judged them.

Frequently asked questions

Were Eisenhower and Montgomery enemies?

No. They served on the same side in World War II. Eisenhower was the Allied commander in the Mediterranean in 1943 and Supreme Commander in northwest Europe from December 1943, and Montgomery served under him, first with the Eighth Army in Sicily and Italy, then with the 21st Army Group from Normandy to the German surrender.

What was the broad front versus single thrust argument?

In September 1944 Montgomery argued that one powerful thrust in the north, backed by most Allied resources, could reach the heart of Germany and end the war. Eisenhower advanced on a broad front instead. The US Army historian Roland Ruppenthal shows that supply deliveries then covered only about half of what the armies needed and that Antwerp was not expected to work before 1 November.

Who approved Operation Market Garden?

Eisenhower approved it at Brussels on 10 September 1944 and agreed to put off the opening of Antwerp so that Montgomery could try for a Rhine bridgehead at Arnhem. The plan failed. Eisenhower later wrote that without Arnhem the attack on Walcheren might have begun two or three weeks earlier.

Why did Montgomery's press conference of January 1945 cause trouble?

On 7 January 1945 he spoke about the Ardennes battle and praised the American soldier, but many Americans read it as a claim that he had rescued them. Bradley and his staff were exasperated, if not outraged, as the official historian Forrest Pogue writes, and Eisenhower called it the incident that caused him more distress and worry than any similar one of the war.

Who was the better commander, Eisenhower or Montgomery?

They did different jobs, and historians disagree. The US official historians largely support Eisenhower on supply, and Carlo D'Este wrote that both were right in their argument over strategy. The National Army Museum calls Montgomery one of the British Army's greatest commanders. This page sets out the evidence for both and leaves the verdict to the reader.

Why did Eisenhower not go for Berlin?

On 7 April 1945 he told the Combined Chiefs of Staff that it was militarily unsound to make Berlin a major objective, since it was only 35 miles from the Russian lines. Bradley estimated that a breakthrough from the Elbe to Berlin might cost 100,000 casualties. The British Chiefs of Staff and Churchill disagreed.

Did Eisenhower ever command troops in combat?

Not at the front. In World War I the army kept him in the United States, training troops with the Tank Corps. In World War II he commanded theatres and coalitions: the landings in North Africa, Sicily and Italy, then the invasion of Normandy and the campaign in northwest Europe.

Notes

A number in the text points to a note. Each note names the works that paragraph draws on, listed in full under Sources.

  1. Kansas Historical Society, “Dwight D. Eisenhower”. B. L. Montgomery, “El Alamein to the River Sangro”. ↩
  2. Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, “Dwight David Eisenhower chronology”. National Park Service, “Dwight D. Eisenhower”. National Army Museum, “Bernard Law Montgomery”. Forrest C. Pogue, “The Supreme Command”. ↩
  3. National Army Museum, “Bernard Law Montgomery”. ↩
  4. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Crusade in Europe”. ↩
  5. Forrest C. Pogue, “The Supreme Command”. ↩
  6. Gordon A. Harrison, “Cross-Channel Attack”. ↩
  7. Forrest C. Pogue, “The Supreme Command”. B. L. Montgomery, “Normandy to the Baltic”. ↩
  8. Martin Blumenson, “Breakout and Pursuit”. ↩
  9. Martin Blumenson, “Breakout and Pursuit”. ↩
  10. B. L. Montgomery, “Normandy to the Baltic”. Carlo D'Este, “A Lingering Controversy”. ↩
  11. National Army Museum, “Bernard Law Montgomery”. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Crusade in Europe”. ↩
  12. B. L. Montgomery, “Normandy to the Baltic”. Hansard, “War Situation and Foreign Policy”. ↩
  13. Hugh M. Cole, “The Ardennes”. ↩
  14. Forrest C. Pogue, “The Supreme Command”. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Crusade in Europe”. ↩
  15. Charles B. MacDonald, “The Last Offensive”. ↩
  16. Forrest C. Pogue, “The Supreme Command”. ↩
  17. Roland G. Ruppenthal, “Logistics and the Broad-Front Strategy”. ↩
  18. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Crusade in Europe”. ↩
  19. B. L. Montgomery, “Normandy to the Baltic”. Carlo D'Este, “A Lingering Controversy”. ↩
  20. Carlo D'Este, “A Lingering Controversy”. ↩
  21. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Crusade in Europe”. ↩
  22. National Park Service, “Dwight D. Eisenhower”. ↩
  23. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Crusade in Europe”. ↩
  24. Mark T. Calhoun, “General William H. Simpson's Ninth US Army and the Crossing of the Rhine”. Charles B. MacDonald, “The Last Offensive”. ↩
  25. Roland G. Ruppenthal, “Logistics and the Broad-Front Strategy”. ↩
  26. Mark T. Calhoun, “General William H. Simpson's Ninth US Army and the Crossing of the Rhine”. ↩
  27. National Army Museum, “Bernard Law Montgomery”. ↩
  28. Forrest C. Pogue, “The Supreme Command”. ↩
  29. Kansas Historical Society, “Dwight D. Eisenhower”. Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, “Dwight David Eisenhower chronology”. ↩
  30. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Crusade in Europe”. ↩
  31. National Army Museum, “Bernard Law Montgomery”. ↩
  32. Hugh M. Cole, “The Ardennes”. ↩
  33. Forrest C. Pogue, “The Supreme Command”. ↩
  34. Hansard, “War Situation and Foreign Policy”. National Army Museum, “Bernard Law Montgomery”. ↩
  35. Hansard, “War Situation and Foreign Policy”. ↩
  36. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Crusade in Europe”. ↩
  37. Forrest C. Pogue, “The Supreme Command”. ↩
  38. Roland G. Ruppenthal, “Logistics and the Broad-Front Strategy”. ↩
  39. Carlo D'Este, “A Lingering Controversy”. ↩
  40. Carlo D'Este, “A Lingering Controversy”. ↩
  41. National Army Museum, “Bernard Law Montgomery”. Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, “Dwight David Eisenhower chronology”. National Park Service, “Dwight D. Eisenhower”. ↩

Sources

Battles that changed the world

The turning points of history

Marathon, Gaugamela, Cannae, Constantinople, Waterloo, Stalingrad: the days the world changed course.

The same choice for every reader · why? ·

Take the field with the great commanders

Echoes of Battle brings the great battles of history to life, narrated on the real map. Subscribe below for new battle stories, and we will send word to your inbox the day it launches.