Napoleon or Wellington: what does the evidence say?
Napoleon Bonaparte (1769 to 1821) and Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington (1769 to 1852) were born in the same year and fought one battle against each other, at Waterloo on 18 June 1815. Wellington and Blücher's Prussians won it, and it ended Napoleon's reign. Pedlow finds that Wellington's conduct at Quatre Bras and Waterloo more than made up for his cautious start, while Saul David calls Waterloo one of his least impressive victories. Roberts calls Napoleon's sixty battles an extraordinary record. This page sets out the evidence for each and leaves the final verdict to you.
For six years before Waterloo, Wellington fought Napoleon's marshals in Portugal and Spain while the emperor fought in Central Europe and Russia. The two men, as the historian Andrew Roberts puts it, never met or corresponded and fought only one battle against each other. Wellington, talking to Thomas Creevey in Brussels just after it, called that battle the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life.1
This is not a ranking. Below are the two careers side by side, the four days of June 1815 in which they met, and six questions on which a general can be judged, each with the strongest evidence for Napoleon and for Wellington. At the end the decision is yours.
Side by side
- Lived
- 15 August 1769 to 5 May 1821
- 1 May 1769 to 14 September 1852 (one French dictionary gives 29 April or 2 May for his birth)
- Origin
- Ajaccio, Corsica
- Dublin, an aristocratic Anglo-Irish family
- First command
- 1796, commander in chief of the Army of Italy, aged 26
- India, 1799, at the head of the 33rd Regiment, then Portugal in 1808
- Wars in command
- Italy 1796 to 1797, Egypt and Syria 1798 to 1799, the wars of the Consulate and the Empire to 1815
- Mysore and the Maratha War in India, the Peninsular War 1808 to 1814, the campaign of 1815
- Notable opponents
- The armies of Austria, Prussia, Russia, Spain and Britain, Blücher and Wellington in 1815
- Junot, Soult, Victor, Masséna and Marmont in the Peninsula, Napoleon in 1815
- Battle count
- Sixty battles, seven lost, in Andrew Roberts's count
- No published count we could verify
- Battles named here
- Austerlitz, Ligny, Waterloo
- Assaye, Vimeiro, Torres Vedras, Salamanca, Vitoria, Quatre Bras, Waterloo
- Death
- A prisoner at Longwood on St Helena
- Walmer Castle, Kent, after a stroke
Dates, origins and commands from the Fondation Napoléon, Larousse, the National Army Museum, GOV.UK and the Dictionnaire Napoléon. Roberts's is the only battle count we found.2
Where they met: four days in June 1815
Before 1815: never on the same field
The nearest they came before Waterloo was Spain. Wellesley beat Junot's army at Vimeiro in August, then was superseded by two senior generals and recalled to face the inquiry into the Convention of Cintra. In November Napoleon took command in Spain himself at Vitoria, with about 200,000 men in the country, of whom 120,000 were ready for operations. He forced the pass of Somosierra on 30 November and Madrid capitulated on 4 December. By the time Wellesley returned to Portugal in 1809, cleared by the inquiry, the emperor had gone back to Central Europe.3
15 and 16 June: Ligny and Quatre Bras
In June 1815 Napoleon struck first. Wellington's dispatch records how he gathered five corps, the Imperial Guard and nearly all his cavalry on the Sambre and, on the 15th, attacked the Prussian posts at Thuin and Lobbes at daylight. Wellington admits that he did not hear of these events till the evening. The next day Napoleon fell on Blücher, who had concentrated around Sombreffe, and beat the Prussians at Ligny, while Wellington, by his own account, repulsed every French attempt to take the crossroads of Quatre Bras.4
The size of Blücher's defeat is disputed. The Fondation Napoléon calls the beaten Prussian army 80,000 strong. The National Army Museum says the Prussians lost over 20,000 men at Ligny. Wellington, talking to Creevey in Brussels after Waterloo, put their loss at 14,000. What all agree on is what Blücher did next: instead of falling back east towards Prussia, he regrouped around Wavre, still in reach of Wellington, who had withdrawn from Quatre Bras to the ridge of Mont-Saint-Jean.5
18 June: Waterloo
The strengths on the day are not agreed either. The National Army Museum gives Napoleon 72,000 men and 246 guns, after he had sent 33,000 men under Grouchy after the Prussians, against 68,000 men and 156 guns in Wellington's army, with 48,000 Prussians coming up during the day. Thierry Lentz of the Fondation Napoléon writes that Napoleon, with around 65,000 men, had roughly the same strength as Wellington. Clausewitz, who served as chief of staff of a Prussian corps in the campaign, counted 129,000 men in Napoleon's whole army of the north, 93,800 in Wellington's and 115,000 in Blücher's.6

A storm in the night soaked the ground, and Lentz writes that the French had to wait until 11 in the morning for it to dry enough. Wellington's dispatch puts the first furious attack, on the farm of Hougoumont, at about ten. Lentz adds that Napoleon was ill that day, with haemorrhoids or dysuria, no one knows for certain. The dispatch says the French attacks were repeated till about seven in the evening, when the enemy made a desperate effort near the farm of La Haye Sainte.7
The Prussians decided the timing. Lentz says Napoleon saw their columns in the distance early in the afternoon. Zieten's corps reached Wellington's left about seven in the evening, the Fondation Napoléon notes, while Bülow's corps pushed on Plancenoit behind the French right. Wellington's dispatch says he sent his whole line forward once Bülow's march upon Planchenois and La Belle Alliance had begun to take effect.8
The losses, like the strengths, differ by source. The museum says Napoleon lost nearly 40,000 men killed, wounded or captured and the allies 22,000. Lentz counts 10,800 dead, 6,800 of them French, and around 35,000 wounded, two thirds of them French. Wellington told Creevey that he and Blücher had lost 30,000 men. The full story is in our pages on the Battle of Waterloo and the Waterloo campaign.9
Strategy: the plan for a whole war
The case for Napoleon
Napoleon planned on the scale of a continent. In 1815, facing several coalition armies at once, he struck the nearest two before they could join, to beat them one at a time. Larousse describes the plan as an effort to stop Wellington's and Blücher's armies from concentrating. Daniel Moran notes that Clausewitz saw Napoleon's means and aims in 1815 as limited and judged that the best result open to him was a crushing defeat of Blücher, pursued ruthlessly after Ligny.10
His Spanish campaign of 1808 shows the same method. From taking command at Vitoria to the surrender of Madrid took him about four weeks, Garnier notes, in a war that, Larousse recalls, began with the Madrid rising of 2 May 1808, after he had forced the Spanish kings to abdicate at Bayonne.11
The case for Wellington
Wellington's strategy in the Peninsula was to survive first and win later. In 1810 he had a vast belt of entrenchments, palisades and redoubts built north of Lisbon, the Lines of Torres Vedras, as Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny describes them in the Dictionnaire Napoléon. Masséna's army came up against them and, the National Army Museum notes, withdrew to Spain in March 1811. By 1812, the museum adds, the French had over 350,000 soldiers in Iberia but 200,000 of them were guarding their lines of supply, and Napoleon called the war the Spanish Ulcer. The same museum records the failure of that autumn, when Wellington could not take Burgos and had to retreat to Portugal.12
Bertier de Sauvigny does not hide the setbacks either. He calls Talavera, in 1809, an indecisive battle fought against superior French numbers. The final result came in 1813 at Vitoria, which he calls a total defeat for the French, and on 10 April 1814 Wellington fought the bitter battle of Toulouse, at a time when Napoleon had already abdicated in Paris.13
Attack and defence
The case for Napoleon
Napoleon's most famous day is Austerlitz, on 2 December 1805, where the Austro-Russian armies were, in the words of the Larousse encyclopedia, scattered. Ten years later, at Ligny, he still beat a Prussian army the Fondation Napoléon puts at 80,000 men. Andrew Roberts, in his biography of 2014, counts sixty battles and only seven defeats, and calls it an extraordinary record for any general of any age.14

Waterloo is the case against him. Lentz describes a frontal collision on a front of under five kilometres against an enemy he calls an expert at defensive warfare, fought while Grouchy's corps was away. Clausewitz, as Moran summarises him, was harder still: in the last hours, sending the Guard forward instead of covering a retreat, Napoleon acted in vulgar exasperation and failed in his duty.15
The case for Wellington
Wellington is usually remembered for defence. At Vimeiro in 1808, the National Army Museum notes, he used the reverse slope, hiding his infantry behind the crest from the enemy's guns, and it became his trademark. Bertier de Sauvigny writes that there he surprised and beat Junot's army. At Waterloo, the museum notes, his position and the wet ground blunted the opening French bombardment, and it quotes his remark in the battle: hard pounding this, gentlemen, let's see who will pound longest. He could also attack. At Salamanca, on 22 July 1812, his British, Spanish and Portuguese army beat Marshal Marmont, and the museum says the day established his reputation as an offensive general. Bertier de Sauvigny calls it an undeniable victory over Marmont. Years earlier, in India in 1803, he had won at Assaye, which the museum says he later considered the best battle he fought. Our pages on Salamanca and Assaye tell both battles in full.16
Speed and timing in 1815
The case for Napoleon
The opening of the campaign caught both allied commanders off balance, as Wellington's own dispatch admits. Clausewitz blamed the allies' slow concentration and wrote that a quicker gathering alone would have gained at least twelve hours and avoided much misfortune. Gregory Pedlow quotes Wellington's words to Baron von Reede on the morning of the 15th: I do not believe that they will attack us, we are very strong.17
Speed had a price for Napoleon too. After Ligny he sent Grouchy's corps after the Prussians, and it was not on the field on the 18th. Clausewitz himself was chief of staff of the Prussian III Corps under Thielmann, which, Christopher Bassford notes, held Wavre against superior numbers and kept Grouchy from reaching Waterloo.18
The case for Wellington
Pedlow defends the slow start. Wellington had to cover Brussels and Ghent and keep open his communications with England, Holland and Germany. He feared the attack on the Sambre was a feint, and said it was little safe to make what is called a false movement in Napoleon's presence. The Prussians also failed to tell him they had given up Gosselies, so his first orders rested on stale information.19
Once committed, he moved fast enough. He held Quatre Bras on the 16th, a stand that Pedlow argues also helped Blücher, and on the 17th fell back towards Waterloo in step with the Prussian retreat to Wavre, which the Fondation Napoléon notes kept the two armies in touch. Rory Muir, as summarised by Saul David, accepts that Wellington was slow to react but argues that all three commanders made mistakes.20
Armies and allies
The case for Napoleon
Napoleon commanded alone. Wellington, asked about it in 1831, told Philip Stanhope that he could hardly conceive anything greater than Napoleon at the head of an army, especially a French army, and that he had one prodigious advantage: he had no responsibility and could do whatever he pleased. In a memorandum of 1836 Wellington agreed that he had often called Napoleon's presence in the field equal to 40,000 men, though he added that this was a very loose way of talking.21
In 1815 Clausewitz counted 129,000 men in the army Napoleon led into Belgium, and it came to Waterloo fresh from beating the Prussians at Ligny. Roberts notes the emperor's confidence on the morning of the battle: he told Soult, who had fought Wellington in Spain, that Wellington was a bad general, the English were bad troops and the day would be the affair of a breakfast.22
The case for Wellington
Wellington led a mixed army: his dispatch names, besides the British, troops of the King of the Netherlands, Hanoverians, the Brunswick corps and the Nassau contingent. And Waterloo was won together with another army. He wrote that he would not do justice to his own feelings, or to Blücher and the Prussian army, if he did not attribute the result to the cordial and timely assistance he received from them. Stanhope records him saying, when comparing his task with Marlborough's, that the Dutch were worse to manage than the Spaniards or the Portuguese.23

His men held. Bertier de Sauvigny credits him with having inspired his troops at Waterloo with confidence in their leader and a resolve to fight to the death. The dispatch admits that the British loss had been immense.24
Command and politics
The case for Napoleon
Napoleon was head of state and commander in chief at once. Larousse dates his proclamation as emperor to 18 May 1804, his first abdication to 6 April 1814 and his second to 22 June 1815. Between them he could decide war, peace and strategy without asking anyone, which is exactly the advantage Wellington named. In 1808 he could force the Spanish kings to abdicate at Bayonne and then take an army south himself, as Larousse and Garnier both describe.25
His critics point to the other side of that power. The reviewer of Roberts's biography in Kirkus Reviews notes that the campaigns went well until he overreached in Spain and Russia. Moran adds that in 1815 the allies could accept costs and risks that Napoleon could not, because he lacked their overwhelming superiority of numbers, and that this, in the end, is why the fortunes of war favoured them.26
The case for Wellington
Wellington served a government and answered to it. After Vimeiro he lost his command and had to clear himself before an inquiry before he got it back. After Waterloo he commanded the allied army of occupation in France until November 1818, GOV.UK records, and he later served as Prime Minister from 1828 to 1830 and again in 1834.27
The same man, Peter Hofschröer argues, also shaped how the campaign was remembered. His study of 1815, as described by the Fondation Napoléon, holds that Wellington performed poorly, played down his own errors and the role of his allies, put a number of false statements into the Waterloo dispatch and blocked an English edition of Clausewitz's history.28
Record and reputation
The case for Napoleon
Wellington's own judgement is the strongest evidence for Napoleon. In the memorandum of September 1836 he wrote that Napoleon was a grand homme de guerre, possibly the greatest that ever appeared at the head of a French army. Roberts argues that before 1815 both men rated each other's military ability highly, and that the received wisdom about Napoleon's contempt for Wellington is entirely wrong.29
The case for Wellington
Wellington beat Junot at Vimeiro, Marmont at Salamanca and the French armies in Spain at Vitoria, and then beat the emperor himself, with the Prussians, in the only battle they fought. Roberts notes that the two belittled each other: Napoleon called him a general of sepoys, and Wellington came privately to despise Napoleon both as a general and as a man.30

How historians have judged them
The argument started with the men who were there. Clausewitz wrote his history of the campaign in the 1830s and criticised Wellington's slow concentration. Wellington answered with a memorandum of his own in 1842. Pedlow finds the memorandum wrong on several timings but concludes that Wellington's conduct at Quatre Bras and Waterloo more than made up for his cautious first response, and he rejects the Prussian charge, made by Gneisenau, that Wellington failed to keep a promise to help at Ligny.31
On the question of who won Waterloo, the historians split. Hofschröer gives the decisive role to the Prussians. Pedlow reads the Prussian war diary and Zieten's casualty returns the other way, as evidence that the Prussian attack succeeded only after the British advance, and concludes that it was neither a British victory nor a Prussian victory but an allied victory. Bassford, his co-editor, notes that Clausewitz and Wellington were simply talking past one another on one central question, the value of a great battle.32
On Wellington, Rory Muir, in the second volume of his biography, generally gives his subject the benefit of the doubt, Saul David writes, while David himself calls Waterloo one of the Iron Duke's least impressive victories. On Napoleon, Lentz explains the defeat by illness, the weather, Grouchy's absence and the Prussians, and Roberts calls his sixty battles an extraordinary record.33
Battles on the site
Every battle page on the site that involves either man, with the guides that set them in context.
Both in command · 1815Battle of Waterloo
Both in command · 1815The Waterloo campaign
Napoleon in command · 1815Battle of Ligny
Wellington in command · 1815Battle of Quatre Bras
Same campaign · 1815Battle of Wavre
Wellington in command · 1812Battle of Salamanca
Wellington in command · 1810Battle of Bussaco
Wellington in command · 1809Second Battle of Porto
Wellington in command · 1803Battle of Assaye
Napoleon in command · 1805Battle of Austerlitz
Napoleon in command · 1806Battle of Jena
Napoleon in command · 1807Battle of Friedland
Napoleon in command · 1812Battle of Borodino
Napoleon in command · 1813Battle of Leipzig
Guide · 1808 to 1814The Peninsular War
Guide · 1803 to 1815The Napoleonic Wars
CommanderNapoleon Bonaparte
CommanderThe Duke of Wellington
RankingThe 15 Greatest Napoleonic Battles
QuizHow Well Do You Know Napoleonic Battles?
Vimeiro, Talavera, Fuentes de Oñoro, Vitoria and the Lines of Torres Vedras have no page of their own yet. For both men among their peers, see the greatest commanders of France and the greatest British commanders.
Your verdict
We do not pick a winner. Here are the two cases at their strongest, and the questions that decide between them.
For Napoleon
- Sixty battles and seven defeats, in Andrew Roberts's count
- Austerlitz, and a whole continent fought on his plans
- The opening of 1815, which split the allies and beat Blücher at Ligny
- Wellington's own judgement: possibly the greatest general ever at the head of a French army
- Ill, outnumbered by two armies and short of Grouchy's corps at Waterloo
For Wellington
- Six years of victories over Napoleon's marshals in Portugal and Spain
- Torres Vedras, a defence that stopped Masséna's invasion
- Salamanca, proof that he could attack
- He held the ridge at Waterloo until the Prussians came
- He won the only battle the two ever fought
Questions to weigh before you decide:
- Is one victory over the greatest general of the age worth more than sixty battles against everyone else?
- How much of Waterloo belongs to Blücher and Bülow, and does that change your view of either man?
- Should Napoleon's illness and the rain count against him, or are they part of command?
- Do six years of beating the marshals measure Wellington against Napoleon, or only against his subordinates?
- Which is harder: commanding as an absolute ruler, or commanding a coalition army that answers to a government?
- Does a general's skill show more in attack or in defence?
Cast your vote below and see how other readers have judged them.







